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INTRODUCTION

The manner by which judges are appointed (“Judicial Appointment”)
has enormous implications for the Rule of Law.1 Politicization of the
judiciary and subordination of judges to interested constituencies can threaten
the underpinnings of a strong democracy.2
The United States is a common law country that employs Judicial
Appointment systems at the federal, state, and local levels that differ
1.
See James D. Wilets & Camilo Espinosa, Rule of Law in Haiti Before and
After the 2010 Earthquake, 6 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (2011); F.C.
DeCoste, Political Corruption, Judicial Selection, and the Rule of Law, 38 ALTA. L. REV. 654,
668 (2000). “Rule of [L]aw” has been defined as a system of law which contains the following
elements: (1) the government is bound, and its citizens governed, by laws which are clear and
prospective in nature; (2) supremacy of law over personal, pecuniary or political considerations;
(3) efficient and predictable enforcement of law; (4) efficient and predictable interpretation of
the law; (5) equality of persons before the law among all persons similarly situated; (6)
implementation of, and respect for, human rights and other individual rights in a manner not
inconsistent with international standards; (7) accountability of government officials for their
failure to apply or conform to the law. Wilets & Espinosa, supra (footnotes omitted).
2.
See Samuel L. Bufford, Defining the Rule of Law, 46 JUDGES’ J., 2007, at
16, 20–21. This issue is all the more pertinent today as the Executive Branch has, in the recent
past, explicitly articulated a goal of using the judiciary to advance the personal political goals
of a particular president; undermining the separation of powers, which has been traditionally
viewed as an important component of the Rule of Law, and placing the personal interests of the
president over those of the country in a manner that supersedes even the concerns that prompted
the development of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. See id.; Rebecca R.
Ruiz et al., A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-court-judges.html (last updated Mar.
16, 2020).
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significantly from those used in other common law and civil law systems.3
Examining those differences provides an opportunity to assess deficiencies in
the American Judicial Appointment system while simultaneously determining
the aspects of those systems that could improve the American legal system and
strengthen the Rule of Law.4
The systems discussed in this article seek to reconcile three goals in
the Judicial Appointment process: (1) judicial independence, so that judges
can adjudicate based on a neutral interpretation of the law and in a nonpoliticized manner, (2) judicial accountability to the body politic, and (3)
appointment of qualified judges based on merit who are capable of following
the Rule of Law regardless of the specific Judicial Appointment system
adopted.5
This Article posits that the United States’ systems of judicial review
at the federal and state level, employing a mix of political and partisan
appointment methods, do not satisfy the above-articulated goals.6 For
example, judicial election—which is primarily used at the state level—may
satisfy political accountability, but severely limits judicial independence and
the appointment of the most qualified judges.7 Similarly, the appointment of
judges in the United States based primarily on political considerations does
not satisfy any of the above-articulated goals.8
The principal distinctions between the United States’ systems of
Judicial Appointment and most other legal systems are the manner in which

3.
See Mark C. Miller, The Study of Judicial Politics, in EXPLORING JUDICIAL
POLITICS 1, 2–3 (Mark C. Miller ed., 2008).
4.
See id.
5.
See discussion infra Part IV; Mary L. Volcansek, Appointing Judges the
European Way, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 363, 364–66 (2007).
6.
See discussion infra Part III; Sandra Day O’Connor, Opinion, The Threat
to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A18; Volcansek, supra note 5, at 364–
66.
7.
Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. L.J. 553,
555–56, 561 (2014) (“[T]he accountability theory is about holding judges accountable for
mistakes (intentional and unintentional), for ignoring the law, for imposing their own views of
the law, and for ethical misconduct, but not for correct decisions that the public does not like,
or that the public does not understand.”); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial
Accountability from the Realm of Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RSVR. L. REV. 911, 916, 924
(2006). The Judicial Independence Theory provides for a judiciary free of being bound to a
state legislature, governor, or public will, and rather use the law solely to decide cases. See
Geyh, supra, at 915–16.
8.
See Miller, supra note 3, at 2–3; Volcansek, supra note 5, at 364; Adam
Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at 1.
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judges are trained, and the United States’ relatively unusual use of elections
for Judicial Appointment.9
With respect to the training of judges, many countries utilize the Civil
Service Model, which trains potential judges directly out of law school in a
non-partisan manner.10 This contrasts sharply with the United States’ system
of judicial training, where judges are appointed later in their careers based
chiefly on partisan considerations.11 Thus, rather than utilizing elections or
appointments based on political considerations, countries using this model
draw upon a professionalized pool of judicial nominees in merit-based
appointments.12 Unlike the United States, the pool of judicial candidates from
which merit-based appointments are made are less likely to be closely
affiliated with a particular political party or ideology.13
II.

IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM TO BE REMEDIED: RULE OF LAW AND
JUDICIAL POLITICIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Article II of the United States Constitution states that the “[President]
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint” United States Supreme Court members.14 Supreme Court Justices
are granted lifetime tenure and cannot be removed, except through
impeachment. 15 Life tenure was meant to enhance judicial independence by
separating the judiciary from political branches and insulate the justices from
partisan passions.16
The Founders’ concerns of balancing judicial
independence and accountability were central determinants in creating the

9.
See Liptak, supra note 8, at 5; Rachel Paine Caufield, The Curious Logic of
Judicial Elections, 64 ARK. L. REV. 249, 258–59 (2011); Volcansek, supra note 5, at 367.
10.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 371–72.
11.
See id. at 367; BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44235,
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS: PRESIDENT’S SELECTION OF A NOMINEE 8–9 (2022),
http://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44235.pdf; Merit Selection: The Best Way to Choose the Best
Judges,
AM.
JUDICATURE
SOC’Y,
http://5y1.org/download/45dc88d03617d31c40d2730fa731b429.pdf (last visited Apr. 28,
2022).
12.
Merit Selection: The Best Way to Choose the Best Judges, supra note 11.
13.
See id.
14.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
15.
Id. arts. II, § 4, III, § 1.
16.
Stuart Taylor Jr., Life Tenure Is Too Long for Supreme Court Justices, 37
NAT’L J. 2033, 2033 (2005).
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means of selecting the judiciary and maintaining those justices in office.17 One
commentator illustrated this tension, stating that:
[P]roviding judges with life tenure usually leads to a more
independent judiciary, one that places itself above the fray of
ordinary politics. There is also agreement that subjecting judges to
periodic checks conducted by the public or its elected officials, such
as reelection or reappointment, may lead to more accountable
courts. Where commentators diverge is over how the balance
between independence and accountability should be struck. While
some argue for lifetime appointments to induce independence,
others hold that accountability requires a threat of enforcement,
including the possibility of removal by the people or their
representatives.18
However, the appointment of judges and how they maintain their
position are separate issues, the core of this Article focuses on the initial
phase of appointment.*

A.

Bush v. Gore

One of the most salient examples of the pernicious effects of the
politicization of the judicial appointment process with a concurrent loss of
independent, non-partisan judicial decision-making, is Bush v. Gore.19 This
case arose out of the vote count in Florida during the 2000 presidential
election.20 In this case, Vice President Al Gore contested the Florida election
results, in which there was a voting margin difference of 537 votes in favor of
Republican Texas Governor George W. Bush out of almost a total of 6 million

17.
See id. Alexander Hamilton most famously expressed this view in
Federalist No. 78, one of a series of essays designed to garner support for the ratification of the
Constitution. Rachel Paine Caufield, What Makes Merit Selection Different?, 15 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 765, 765 (2010). He envisioned a federal judiciary that would stand above
the fray of ordinary politics, interpreting the Constitution and statutes free from overt partisan
or ideological influence. Caufield, supra note 9, at 258. To realize this vision and to prevent
judges from evolving into legislators, the framers agreed on the need for judicial independence.
See Caufield, supra note 9, at 258; Taylor, supra note 16, at 2033.
18.
LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 8 (2005).
19.
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
20.
See id. at 100–01; Linda Greenhouse, Bush Prevails: By Single Vote,
Justices End Recount, Blocking Gore After 5-Week Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A1.
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votes, resulting in making Governor Bush President-Elect.21 States are
generally empowered with governing their own elections.22 With that power,
the Supreme Court of Florida ordered a vote recount consistent with state
law.23 Governor Bush and Richard Cheney immediately appealed the
Supreme Court of Florida’s decision to the United States Supreme Court as
well as an emergency petition for a stay.24 Within days, a review was granted
and oral arguments took place, ultimately leading to the reversal of the
Supreme Court of Florida’s decision.25 As noted by Ron Elving of NPR News,
“Bush v. Gore has been regarded as one of the most politically consequential
decisions in the history of the court, and one that damaged the court's preferred
image of itself as an institution far removed from everyday partisan politics.”26
Bush v. Gore exemplifies the importance of avoiding politicization of the
judicial appointment system because it can produce inconsistent judicial
decision-making.27
The Supreme Court of the United States’ five most conservative
justices, who were all appointed by Republican presidents—Anthony
Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and
Clarence Thomas—blocked the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision to
recount ballots in all counties where “undervotes” had not already been
recounted by hand.28 The five to four majority Supreme Court decision held
21.
Kristine Phillips, Why Donald Trump Isn’t Al Gore: How 2020 Legal
Challenges
to
the
Election
Differ
from
2000,
USA
TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/09/trump-isnt-gore-how2020-s-legal-challenges-arent-same-2000/6220157002/ (last updated Nov. 10, 2020, 5:16 PM);
US Election 2020: Does This Compare to 2000 Florida Recount?, BBC (Nov. 12, 2020),
http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-54903188.
22.
Phillips, supra note 21.
23.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 100; Michel Rosenfeld, Bush v. Gore: Three
Strikes for the Constitution, the Court, and Democracy, but There Is Always Next Season, in
THE LONGEST NIGHT: POLEMICS AND PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTION 2000 111, 125 (Arthur J.
Jacobson & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2002).
24.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 100–01.
25.
BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 97 (E.J. Dionne
Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001); Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between
Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1410–12, 1430 (2001).
26.
Ron Elving, The Florida Recount of 2000: A Nightmare That Goes on
Haunting, NPR (Nov. 12, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/666812854/theflorida-recount-of-2000-a-nightmare-that-goes-on-haunting.
27.
See id.; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111.
28.
See Greenhouse, supra note 20, at A1; Pam Bacon, What are Undervotes
and Overvotes?, S. PLATTE SENTINEL, http://www.southplattesentinel.com/2019/03/19/whatare-undervotes-and-overvotes/ (last updated May 16, 2019, 5:33 AM).
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that the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision ran afoul the U.S. Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause because it failed to provide the guidance necessary to
conduct the recounts in the short time that remained.29 By reversing the
Supreme Court of Florida, the five justices handed the State’s electoral votes
and thus, a majority of the Electoral College to Governor George W. Bush.30
The Court refused to have its own majority opinion decision treated
as binding precedent, strongly suggesting it had little faith that its reasoning
was sufficient to constitute binding legal precedent for future cases.31 The
Court’s internal inconsistency went beyond contradicting the traditional
judicially conservative deference to states’ rights and state courts—a judicial
principle putatively embraced by the majority.32 The conservative justices’
contradiction of their own judicially conservative tenets of judicial restraint,
deference to the states, and its refusal to treat its own decision as binding
precedent, constitutes a highly unusual and explicitly result-oriented
decision.33 Indeed, the dissent noted the traditional (frequently conservative)
view that the Court is supposed to “accord[] respectful consideration and great
weight to the views of the State’s highest court.”34
Bush provides one of the best examples of the problems with partisan
Judicial Appointment affecting judicial decision-making and thereby
undermining Rule of Law.35 The dissent in this case reflected this view of the
case as unwarranted judicial review.36
[An undervote] occurs when the number of choices selected by a voter in
an election contest is less than the maximum number allowed for that contest. An
undervote also occurs when there are no votes for a single choice contest. For
example, a voter that is permitted to cast one vote for a candidate and does not select
a candidate has undervoted. Voters have a right to undervote if they choose to do so,
a ballot will not be canceled or disqualified as the result of an undervote.

Bacon, supra.
29.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110 (reasoning that the difficulties of adopting
“adequate statewide standards for determining what is a legal vote, and practicable procedures
to implement them, but also orderly judicial review of any disputed matters that might arise”
would violate the requirements of equal protection and due process); see also Greenhouse, supra
note 20, at A1.
30.
EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 16–17.
31.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111; but see id. at 127–28 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
32.
Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33.
Balkin, supra note 25, at 1409.
34.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 137 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503
U.S. 181, 186 (1992)).
35.
Id. at 1408–09.
36.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 129. The dissenting Justices — Stephen Breyer,
John P. Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and David Souter — in Bush v. Gore, agreed that the
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Politicization of the Appointment/Election of Judges at the State and
Local Levels

The question of how to best select state and federal judges began
during the 1787 debates leading to the United States Constitution.37 In most
countries, the judicial appointment is made by various appointment methods,
and it was initially the preferred method in America.38
In the colonial era, judges were selected by the king.39 After the
Revolution, the original thirteen states each had their own manner of
appointing judges.40 Some states vested the appointment power in one or both
of their legislative houses or by the governor and his council, and others vested
appointment power in their governor but required him to gain consent of the
Supreme Court erred in even taking on the case and involved overreaching by the Court. Id. at
144 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 129 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 135–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissenting Supreme Court Justices
disagreed with the Court taking on the case and effectively overturning the Supreme Court of
Florida’s interpretation of its state law because there was nothing to indicate that the
interpretation was flawed. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 129
(Souter, J., dissenting); Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer stated in his
dissenting opinion: “[t]he political implications of this case for the country are momentous.
[Nevertheless,] the federal legal questions presented, with one exception, are insubstantial.” Id.
at 144.
37.
John L. Dodd et al., Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for Judicial
Appointments, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 353, 354 (2002). In the Federalist Papers, Alexander
Hamilton advocated selecting federal judges through appointment rather than election in order
to provide for judicial independence and protect against encroachment by the other branches of
government. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 393, 396–97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro
ed., 2009) (“[N]othing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency
in office . . . .”). Anti-Federalists, however, advocated selecting federal judges through popular
election. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES
120 (Ralph Ketcham ed., Signet Classics 1986). The Federalists, of course, won this debate in
the federal system. See Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the Solution to Harmful
Speech? Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262,
265–66 (2003). See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 129 (Souter,
J. dissenting); Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
38.
Christine L. Nemacheck, Book Review, 16 L. & POL. BOOK REV. 664, 666
(2006) (reviewing APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006)) (“[T]he judicial
appointment commission . . . is the most frequently used approach by countries revising their
judicial appointment systems.”); Dodd et al., supra note 38, at 355–56. Judicial appointments
varied from state to state, but most states that have or had judicial appointments made were done
by the Governor. See Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence
and Popular Democracy, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 65, 70 (2001).
39.
Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report,
64 JUDICATURE 176, 176 (1980).
40.
Id.
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council.41 The states’ shift from judicial appointments to elections began
during the presidency of Andrew Jackson amid a growing concern that
“unelected judges, especially those who made unpopular decisions, were not
answerable to the [public].”42 Only the United States, Japan, and Switzerland
select state and local judges by popular vote.43 In contrast, the Judicial
Appointment process as provided in Article III has remained as the federal
judiciary selection method.44
III.

METHODS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

The individual states in the United States have adopted several means
of Judicial Appointment: direct appointment, merit-based appointment by a
commission or bar committee, and contested elections either non-partisan or
partisan.45 In addition, there have been proposals for a hybrid of the processes
above.46 Although the basic processes seem clear cut, no two states have
adopted identical selection processes.47 In fact, many states have not
conformed to one single selection process and have instead adopted more than
one to select judges at different levels of the court system.48
A.

Direct Appointment

There are two types of direct appointment: (1) gubernatorial and (2)
legislative.49 The gubernatorial appointment system is one by which the
Governor appoints a candidate without the recommendation of a nomination
commission.50 In some cases, the appointment may require confirmation by
an executive council or legislature.51 “There are variations within such
41.
Id. at n.1.
42.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 358.
43.
Liptak, supra note 8, at 3 (“Nationwide, [eighty-seven] percent of all state
court judges face elections, and [thirty-nine] states elect at least some of their judges, according
to the National Center for State Courts.”).
44.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 357.
45.
AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: HOW IT
WORKS, WHY IT MATTERS 6–7, http://perma.cc/CN88-MJ9V (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
46.
Id.; see Maida R. Milone, No System for Choosing Judges Is Perfect, but a
Hybrid System Would Be Better, LANCASTERONLINE (Sept. 15, 2019),
http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/no-system-for-choosing-judges-is-perfect-buta-hybrid-system-would-be-better/article_6d2530c4-d599-11e9-b8a3-abd9f28ec2c0.html.
47.
AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 45, at 6–7.
48.
Id.
49.
See id. at 360.
50.
AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 45, at 7.
51.
Id.
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systems, and even restrictions on the gubernatorial appointment power apart
from the standard requirement that nominations come from a commissionsupplied list.”52 One alleged advantage of the appointment model as opposed
to electing judges is that judicial candidates are selected based on the merits
of their expertise rather than participating in a partisan political campaign.53
For example, in New Jersey, the Governor appoints judges with the State
Senate’s advice and consent.54 This system provides New Jersey Senators
with the power to veto appointments of federal judges from their home
district.55 Senators from other districts, as a courtesy, will not approve of such
an appointment until the Senator from that home district approves.56
In California, the Governor has the sole discretion to appoint judges
with the consent of the judicial appointment commission, which is comprised
of the chief justice, attorney general, and a presiding justice of the court of
appeals.57 However, the Governor must first submit the list of candidates to a
judicial evaluation commission appointed by the State Bar Association to
conduct a thorough background investigation.58
Thereafter, any
recommendations from the judicial evaluation committee are not binding upon
the Governor in his appointment decision.59
The legislative appointment system empowers legislatures to appoint
judges, but is only adopted by four states: Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Connecticut.60 The states vary in whether the legislature
appoints only the Supreme Court justices or also appoints judges at the trial
and appellate levels.61 Unlike gubernatorial systems, legislative appointments
must secure the confidence of a majority of both houses for the selection and
the retention of a candidate.62 For example, in South Carolina, the State’s
Supreme Court justices are selected by the South Carolina legislature to serve
52.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 361.
53.
Id. at 360–61.
54.
Id. at 361; Welcome to the New Jersey Court System, N.J. CTS.,
http://www.njcourts.gov/public/process.html?lang=eng#one (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
55.
Martin Tolchin, Three U.S. Judgeships Unfilled Here a Year, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 1973, at 40.
56.
Colleen O’Dea, Explainer: How Do Our Judges Make It to the Bench in
New Jersey?, NJ SPOTLIGHT NEWS (June 3, 2014), http://www.njspotlightnews.org/2014/06/1406-02-explainer-how-judges-make-it-to-the-bench-in-new-jersey/.
57.
How Appellate and Supreme Court Justices are Selected, CAL. CTS.: JUD.
BRANCH CAL., http://www.courts.ca.gov/7434.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
58.
Id.
59.
See id.
60.
See Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 360.
61.
Id.
62.
See Virginia Courts in Brief, VA. CTS., (Sept. 2021),
http://www.vacourts.gov/courts/cib.pdf.
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ten-year terms.63 In Virginia, the legislature appoints judges at both trial and
appellate levels.64
Many states utilize a combination of the gubernatorial and legislative
systems, using distinct systems for different judicial system levels.65
However, both systems may open the door to nepotism and favoritism—
evidencing that political considerations play as important a role in these
selection systems as in every judicial selection system—due to the fact that
there have been accounts of legislative leaders using their influence to see that
their close friends are appointed to the bench, relying on the influence of
unelected party power brokers in the appointment process, and refusing to
reappoint judges for ideological reasons.66
Thus, the appointment system’s inherent nature creates exposure to
political influences in gubernatorial and legislative systems.67 The risks of
such appointment systems include the apparent infiltration of partisan politics
and the limited pool of known candidates to the legislature.68
B.

Merit-Based Appointment

Merit-based appointment is the most prevalent method of appointing
state appellate judges in the United States.69 No state that has adopted it has
ever wholly abandoned it.70 This type of selection method is based on
professional merit and qualifications—impartiality, experiences, legal
expertise, and temperament—rather than politics.71 Most states have adopted
a variation of the merit-based system, which avoids many of the problems with
delegating the appointment power solely to the governor.72
Because of the pitfalls in giving governors sole discretion in Judicial
Appointment, many states have adopted the assisted appointment system—in
which nominating bodies are formed for the initial selection of potential

63.
Overview
of
SC
Judicial
System,
S.C. JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.sccourts.org/OverviewofSCJudicialSystem.cfm (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
64.
Virginia Courts in Brief, supra note 62.
65.
See Berkson, supra note 39, at 178; Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 361.
66.
See Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 360, 363, 369; Joanna M. Shepherd, Are
Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589, 1609 (2009).
67.
See Shepherd, supra note 66, at 1593.
68.
See id.
69.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 360.
70.
Id.
71.
Caufield, supra note 17, at 766.
72.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 361.
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candidates and interim candidates.73 This commission recommends a pool of
applicants to the governor from which they appoint the best-qualified
candidates.74
Their recommendations rely on each candidates’ qualifications.75 The
nominating body is not homogenous and may be comprised of judges, lawyers,
and some members of the legislative body.76 However, “nearly all merit[appointment] states delegate to bar associations the authority to fill some or
all of the lawyer seats on the commissions, either by directly selecting
members for the commission or by controlling the list of names from which
elected officials must select members.”77 Thus, the state’s bar has
considerable influence in the initial selection by choosing the formation and
composition of the nominating committee.78 This is significant because the
nominating committee, through its recommendation of judicial candidates,
essentially molds the composition of the state’s judiciary.79
Proponents of merit appointments argue that commission-based
appointments provide a better quality of judges, advance diversity on the
bench, and help prevent judicial misconduct.80 An empirical study using
misconduct and diversity as its variables revealed that over a twenty-five year
period, the New York City elected judiciary “far surpass[ed] the [merit-based]
appointed judiciary, on the variable of judicial misconduct.”81 The study also
revealed that the bench owed its diversity to the merit-based selection system
73.
See id. at 362; Aman L. McLeod, Differences in State Judicial Selection, in
EXPLORING JUDICIAL POLITICS 10, 21 (Mark C. Miller ed., 2009); see, e.g., Caufield, supra note
17, at 777.
74.
McLeod, supra note 73, at 21; AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 45, at 6;
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 361. Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia use
nominating commissions to help the governor select state judges. McLeod, supra note 73, at
21; DOUGLAS KEITH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS 1 (2019),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201908/Report_Judicial_Nomination_Commissions.pdf. Thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia use the commission plan to make initial appointments to most, or all, of their courts;
nine others use panels only for interim appointments. See McLeod, supra note 73, at 21. Under
the “Missouri Plan,” after the initial appointment, a judge then has to stand for subsequent
retention elections. Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 362. This plan was seen as a “practical
compromise between the goals of judicial independence and public accountability.” Id.
75.
McLeod, supra note 73, at 21.
76.
Id.; see also AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 44, at 6.
77.
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675,
679 (2009).
78.
Id. at 681.
79.
See id.; McLeod, supra note 73, at 21.
80.
Steven Zeidman, Judicial Politics: Making the Case for Merit Selection,
68 ALB. L. REV. 713, 721 (2005).
81.
Id.
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because it allowed non-political individuals to participate.82 Merit-based
appointments, which focus on candidates qualifications rather than on political
alliances or influences, allow such candidates to stand on their own
achievements, thus resulting in the nomination of non-traditional candidates.83
For instance, racial minority candidates—who have historically been
underrepresented due to voter suppression and lack of ongoing voter
participation—would have fewer hurdles to overcome because they could
instead be directly nominated based on their qualifications.84 Furthermore,
proponents claim that this more objective selection process eliminates “party
influence inherent in an election [and] frees judges from any corrupting
influence of partisanship.”85
However, critics argue that the advantages of the merit appointment
process come with substantial costs.86 First, it deprives the public of using
their fundamental right to vote for a critical government body.87 Second, it
diminishes judicial accountability when the public does not participate in the
selection process.88 The latter can be problematic because judges are already
given many “undemocratic” powers, such as the authority to declare laws
unconstitutional.89
Merit-selection states have much in common but differ widely in their
retention methods.90 Typically, selected judges are subject to retention
elections, “or some other means of confirmation by legislative or popular
endorsement,” typically referred to as a hybrid merit-selection based
appointment system.91 Although merit-appointment systems preserve what

(2002).

82.
83.

Id.
Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 856

84.
See id.
85.
Id. at 855.
86.
Id.; but see Diane M. Johnsen, Building a Bench: A Close Look at State
Appellate Courts Constructed by the Respective Methods of Judicial Selection, 53 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 829, 840 (2016) (explaining the results of a 2011 survey showing that appointed judges
were more qualified than judges chosen by popular election and that appointed judges typically
wrote higher-quality opinions than those who were elected). Researchers concluded that
“[a]ppointed judges ‘care about their reputation among a national community of like-minded
professionals,’ but elected judges are more like politicians who ‘care about their reputation in
the local community of lay voters and politicians.’” Johnsen, supra.
87.
Bierman, supra note 83, at 855.
88.
Id.
89.
See id.
90.
See id. at 858–59.
91.
Id. at 855; see also Milone, supra note 46. Regardless of the retention
method used, the judge who is up for retention runs unopposed and is reselected. Judicial
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purely contested election appointment systems lack, it also perpetuates its
flaws.92 Elected retention appointment provides an effective, yet not perfect,
check on non-elected appointments, ensuring that the judicial accountability
inherent in the process is maintained.93
Critics such as Maida Milone have suggested that the United States
adopt a hybrid-merit based system for the selection of justices and appellate
judges that includes greater formal participation of bar associations or other
screening bodies, while also requiring that these bodies be balanced from a
partisan perspective.94 Additionally, such a system should limit the degree to
which governors and legislatures hold sole discretion in determining who
retains their position by requiring a limited role for retention elections—which
in turn, provides voters the ability to decide what justices and appellate judges
will maintain their position based on their performance in the appointed
roles.95 Diversity of members whose voices would be heard in the judicial
appointment process is promoted while also ensuring bipartisanship and
protecting the public’s respect for the judicial branch.96 This system does not
entirely resolve the tension between judicial accountability and judicial
independence but does constitute a kind of compromise.97

Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/judicial-selection-significant-figures (last updated Oct. 4, 2021);
Bierman, supra note 83, at 855. Retention elections can occur before, or after, a judge serves a
full term but usually occur after a full term. McLeod, supra note 73, at 21–22; Milone, supra
note 46.
92.
See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and
Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (1994). Substantial empirical evidence establishes that judges,
to ensure their chances of being re-elected are not harmed, decide politically charged cases
based on public opinion. Shepherd, supra note 66, at 1594. Thus, retention concerns are highly
influential on the voting of judges who face re-election. See id. Moreover, judges selected
through the merit-based plus election retention process require funding for their retention
elections equally as much as the judges in partisan elections do. McLeod, supra note 73, at 23.
This creates a danger as judges may develop a sense of owing a duty to their financial supporters
during and after retention elections. Id.
93.
Goldschmidt, supra note 92, at 2; Bierman, supra note 83, at 855. The
Missouri Plan still perpetuates problems of a purely contested election process. Bierman, supra
note 83, at 860.
94.
Milone, supra note 46.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.; Melissa Miller-Byrnes, Judicial Independence, Interdependence, and
Judicial Accountability: Management of the Courts from the Judges’ Perspective, NAT’L CTR.
STATE
CTS.
1,
3
(May
2006),
http://www.ncsc.org/_data/assets/pdf_file/0018/17622/millerbyrnesmelissacedpfinal0506.pdf.
97.
Miller-Byrnes, supra note 96, at 3–4.
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In Federalist No.78, Alexander Hamilton makes a valid argument in
favor of judicial appointment for life without elections.98 Specifically, he
argued that subjecting the judiciary to periodic appointments or elections
might lead judges to decide cases in a particular way to curry popular favor.99
This would arguably jeopardize the objective application of the Rule of Law
and diminish public confidence in the courts.100
C.

Contested Elections

By the early 1830s, the American judicial appointment system came
under attack, and states began to adopt contested election systems to select
judges, whereby judges run against each other in non-partisan or partisan
elections.101 In partisan election systems, a judicial candidate is selected to
represent a party in the same way parties choose cabinet officers and are listed
on a ballot with their political party.102
Non-partisan elections, on the other hand, do not permit party
association or endorsement of any candidate.103 Regardless of party
association, “each decision [a judge] make[s] on the bench is potential fodder
for an opponent or special interest group during the next election.”104 For
example, judges in jurisdictions where the death penalty is popular may strictly
impose the death penalty or be reluctant to overturn a death sentence to ensure

98.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 355–56; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note
37, at 396–97.
99.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 355–56; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note
37, at 396–97.
100.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 355–56; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note
37, at 396–97.
101.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 361; Berkson, supra note 39, at 176. Seven
states elect all of their judges in partisan elections; seven states use partisan elections to elect
some of their judges. Berkson, supra note 39, at 184. Thirteen states use nonpartisan elections
to select all of their judges. Id. at 178. An additional eight states use nonpartisan elections to
select some of their judges. Id. In total, thirty-five states choose some, most, or all of their
judges using some form of contestable popular election. See id. at 178, 184.
102.
Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary 26 J.L. ECON & ORG. 290, 297
(2010). Some states allow parties to compete through primary elections and general elections,
and others are determined through conventional nomination. See id.
103.
Id.
at
3;
see
also
Dodd
et
al.
supra note 37, at 355.
104.
Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and
Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 197 (1996).
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members of the community are content.105 American history is riddled with
examples of judicial decisions influencing the results of a judicial campaign.106
Increased competition and advertising costs have led partisan and nonpartisan candidates to “become increasingly dependent on and influenced by
campaign contributions.”107 Therefore, a decisive factor in a judge’s decision
may be the relative amount of campaign contributions from lawyers that are
involved in a case a judge is deciding.108
Hans A. Linde, former Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court,
condemned the United States’ adherence to judicial elections at the state level
as equally incomprehensible as the country’s repudiation of the metric
system.109 Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has also
denounced the practice of electing judges, claiming that other nations do not
follow the process because it jeopardizes judges’ fairness and impartiality.110
105.
Id. at 200.
106.
See, e.g., id. at 197; Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign
Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J. L.
& POL. 57, 80–81 (1985).
107.
Wiener, supra note 104, at 193; Schotland, supra note 106, at 61–63.
108.
Wiener, supra note 104, at 203; see, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J.
Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next
Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 820–21 (1995) (discussing unethical campaign
contributions in return for attorney appointments); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant
Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional
Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 331–38 (1988) (arguing against the litigant choice model);
Schotland, supra note 106, at 61–63 (listing examples of unethical campaign contributions, such
as those from political action committees and lawyers who represent insurance companies);
Mark Andrew Grannis, Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and
Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign
Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 418 (1987) (arguing that there is a
constitutional right to an impartial forum that should protect individuals from judicial bias that
results from an attorney’s campaign contributions). “Whenever such contributions are large
enough that a decision in the contributor's favor would substantially advance a judge’s chance
of reelection, or whenever such contributions otherwise create a possible temptation to decide
one way or the other, this important constitutional right is violated.” Grannis, supra at 108; but
see Kenyon N. Griffin & Michael J. Horan, Patterns of Voting Behavior in Judicial Retention
Elections for Supreme Court Justices in Wyoming, 67 JUDICATURE 68, 70 (1983) (contrasting
the lack of campaigns for or against justices in Wyoming); Liptak, supra note 8, at 5 (arguing
that there is greater transparency when judges are elected).
109.
Adam Liptak, U.S. Voting for Judges Perplexes Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES
(May
25,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/world/americas/25ihtjudge.4.13194819.html; Liptak, supra note 8, at 21.
110.
Liptak, supra note 8, at 21. The education of judges in other parts of the
world differs from that of American judges. Id. at 21. They spend years taking practical and
theoretical courses to educate them on how to be judges, consequently, “[t]he rest of the
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The critiques focus on a lack of judicial independence or lack of
electoral accountability.111 As discussed earlier, to some extent, this is a zerosum game since these are, to a large extent, inconsistent goals.112 As this
Article will discuss below, an appointment process that draws upon a pool of
professionally trained and non-partisan judges would presumably maintain the
judiciary’s independence while retaining its professional character and avoid
the problems with electing judges discussed above.113
IV.

NON-POLITICAL CHECK ON JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

The American Bar Association (“ABA”) was founded in 1878 to
advance the rule of law across the United States to provide practical resources
for legal professionals, model ethics codes, and more.114 The ABA is the
largest voluntary bar association of lawyers and law students in the United
States and is responsible for law school accreditation and continuing legal
education for legal professionals.115 It has also served a role in recommending
Judicial Appointment at various levels.116 Unfortunately, this involvement by
a non-partisan civic organization has recently been eroded.117 For example,
former President Trump curtailed the involvement of organizations such as the
ABA, choosing to appoint judges based on their loyalty to a particular political
agenda rather than their ability to uphold the professional standards and Rule
of Law.118
The ABA first created the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
1908 and the standards for law school accreditation in 1952.119 Also, in 1952,
the ABA Standing Committee reached an agreement with the U.S. Department
world . . . is stunned and amazed at what [America does], and vaguely aghast . . . the idea that
judges with absolutely no judge-specific educational training are running political campaigns is
both insane and characteristically American.” Id. at 21.
111.
Dodd et al., supra note 37, at 368.
112.
See Miller-Byrnes, supra note 96, at 6–7; but see Stephen B. Burbank,
Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909,
912, 913–14 (2007).
113.
See discussion infra Part IV; Volcansek, supra note 5, at 375–76.
114.
About
the
American
Bar
Association,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
115.
See id.
116.
See
ABA
Timeline,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/timeline (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
117.
See Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the
Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-courtjudges.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2020).
118.
Id.
119.
ABA Timeline, supra note 116.
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of Justice under which the ABA would no longer make recommendations for
federal judicial vacancies and would limit its work to the evaluation of the
professional qualification of the nominees.120 The ABA went further in 1978
and established the Center for Professional Responsibility “to provide national
leadership in developing and interpreting standards and producing scholarly
resources in legal and judicial ethics, professional regulation, professionalism,
and client protection.”121 With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990, the ABA
launched its Rule of Law Initiative (“ROLI”) to promote the rule of law in
emerging democracies, and expanded this program in 2007 to other regions of
the world.122
Similar to the role of the ABA in the United States, Canada employs
Judicial Advisory Committees (“JAC”) to evaluate judicial applications.123
The JAC must assess applicants against published assessment criteria, such as:
general proficiency in law, intellectual ability, capacity to exercise sound
judgment, awareness of racial and gender issues, and more.124 The recent
changes made to the appointment process for federal judges in Canada are to
promote transparency and accountability.125 The trend towards self-regulation
and transparency is to promote public confidence in the judicial institution and
“reflects the evolution of the accepted judicial values of independence and
impartiality towards the inclusion of values such as accountability and
transparency.”126 The focuses on accountability and transparency are a
reflection of the public’s growing concern with the significant power wielded
by the judiciary.127
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Dep’t. Just. Can., Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada
Announces Judicial Appointments in the Province of Ontario, GOV’T CAN. (Dec. 20. 2021),
http://www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2021/12/minister-of-justice-and-attorneygeneral-of-canada-announces-judicial-appointments-in-the-province-of-ontario.html.
124.
Guide for Candidates, OFF. COMM’R FOR FED. JUD. AFF. CAN.,
http://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html (last updated
Apr. 1, 2022); Guidelines for Judicial Advisory Committee Members, OFF. COMM’R FOR FED.
JUD.
AFF.
CAN.,
http://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/committeescomites/guidelines-lignes-eng.html#AppendixA (last updated Dec. 16, 2016).
125.
Judicial Conduct: Reforming the Complaints Process, GOV’T CAN.,
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/jc-cj/index.html (last updated Mar. 15, 2022).
126.
Gabrielle Appleby & Alysia Blackham, The Growing Imperative to Reform
Ethical Regulation of Former Judges, 67 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 505, 506 (2018); see also Richard
Devlin & Adam Dodek, Regulating Judges: Challenges, Controversies and Choices, in
REGULATING JUDGES: BEYOND INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 9 (Richard Devlin &
Adam Dodek eds., 2016).
127.
Appleby & Blackham, supra note 126, at 510.
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Public confidence in the judicial system is essential to all modern
democracies.128 The rule of law is necessary because it requires governance
“by rules fixed and announced beforehand.”129 An example of why the rule of
law is essential can be observed in the European Court of Human Rights case
of Baka v. Hungary.130 Hungary adopted a new Constitution in 2011 which
restructured its existing judiciary system.131 Andras Baka was the president of
the Hungarian Supreme Court, which before the restructure was the highest
court in the country.132 Baka was elected by the Parliament in 2009 to serve a
six-year term set to expire in 2015.133 As president of the Supreme Court, he
had an explicit legal obligation to express his opinion on parliamentary bills
affecting the judiciary.134
In 2011, as the government began to take steps towards a new
Constitution, Baka publicly criticized several legislative reforms affecting the
judiciary such as the lowering of the mandatory retirement age.135 The new
Constitution, called the Fundamental Law, was adopted in spring of 2011.136
With its adoption, the highest court in the country was now named Kuria and
the Supreme Court was terminated along with Baka’s mandate.137 The
Constitution ended Baka’s tenure three and a half years too early and left him
unable to challenge the decision in a Hungarian court.138 The Kuria kept the
same powers and competencies as the former Supreme Court and retained all
its judges, but left Baka as the odd man out when it terminated his position.139
The new criteria in place for selecting a president of the Kuria also excluded
Baka from applying to the new position because the criteria specifically
excluded the time he served as a judge of an international court.140 Baka had
served sixteen years as a judge of the European Court of Human Rights but
only served two and a half years as a national judge, where the new criteria for
president of the Kuria required five years of experience.141 This was simply
128.
See id.
129.
DeCoste, supra note 1, at 660.
130.
App.
No.
20261/12,
¶
1
(June
23,
2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163113.
131.
Sandor Szemesi, Introductory Note to Baka v. Hungary, 56 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 273, 273 (2017).
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.; Baka, App. No. 20261/12, at ¶ 13.
135.
Szemesi, supra note 131, at 273; Baka, App. No. 20261/12, at ¶ 21.
136.
Szemesi, supra note 131, at 273.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Szmesi, supra note 131, at 273.
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an early example of Prime Minister Victor Orban’s systematic dismantling of
rule of law in Hungary to the point it is presently facing European Union
sanctions.142
The Trump Administration has, in its own way, curtailed the Rule of
Law by appointing federal judges based on their political ideology instead of
their qualifications.143 Selected for their conservative ideals, at least seven of
the Trump-appointed judges also served on his campaign or on his
administration.144 Trump appointed fifty-four federal appellate judges during
his four-year term of Presidency.145 His appointments fall one judge short of
the fifty-five that President Obama appointed over two four-year terms.146 The
numerous ideological appointments “‘flipped’ the balance of several appeals
courts from a majority of Democratic appointees to a majority of Republican
appointees.”147
His ideological influence and power did not end there; he also
appointed three justices to the nation’s highest court.148 The appointment of
Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett, makes
President Trump the third President to appoint an unusual number of justices
in a four-year period.149 “[Three Supreme Court justice appointments] are the
most by any president since Ronald Reagan (who appointed four) and the most
by any one-term president since Herbert Hoover (though Richard Nixon
appointed four in his first four years . . . .).”150
V.

JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN NON-U.S. LEGAL SYSTEMS: OVERVIEW

As discussed in the introduction to this Article, most non-U.S. legal
systems rely on a Civil Service Model, where judges are trained on a judicial
track immediately upon completing law school,151 emphasizing technical
142.
Jessica Parker, Hungary and Poland lose EU Funding Fight over Laws,
BBC (Feb. 16, 2022), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60400112.
143.
Ruiz et al., supra note 2.
144.
Id.
145.
John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in
Appointing Federal Judges, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2021), http://pewrsr.ch/2Zx21cQ.
146.
Id.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Gramlich, supra note 145.
151.
Samuel Spáč, Recruiting European Judges in the Age of Judicial SelfGovernment, 19 GERMAN L.J. 2077, 2082 (2018); Liptak, supra note 8, at 21; Volcansek, supra
note 5, at 371–72.
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skills and insulating judges from politicization.152 This model has been
adopted by countries such as Austria, France, Finland, Greece, Germany, Italy,
Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Spain, to cite a few examples.153 It
requires judicial education and preparation acquired in a non-partisan track,
and it avoids some of the blatant politicization characterizing Judicial
Appointment in the United States.154
Proponents of this professional judge career track argue that it protects
judges “from fickle political winds, and promot[es] the meritorious from
within the judiciary.”155 Thus, judges arguably maintain a professional and
non-partisan identity throughout their professional careers.156 This stands in
contrast to the United States’ varying systems of judicial training and
appointment, where lawyers can experience role-confusion while transitioning
to the role of a judge mid-career.157 Advocating for clients and/or causes is
markedly different from being an impartial arbiter of the court.158 Moreover,
lawyers transitioning to the judicial role are more likely to be involved in
partisan activities than judges who have been trained their entire professional
careers to be strictly neutral.159

[M]ost civil law countries have systems in which the largest number of
magistrates (a term used to connote both judges and prosecutors) are recruited
directly from among young university graduates who score well on competitive
examinations. . . . [T]he civil service model for appointing judges can be found in
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
and Sweden.

Volcansek, supra note 5, at 371–72.
152.
Elliot Bulmer, Judicial Appointments: International IDEA ConstitutionBuilding Primer 4, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE 4,
http://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/judicial-appointments-primer.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 28, 2022); Volcansek, supra note 5, at 371–72; Mary L. Volcansek, Judicial
Selection: Looking at How Other Nations Name Their Judges, 53 ADVOCATE 95, 95–96 (2010).
The civil or career service model for judicial selection can now be found
across continental Europe, including the newer democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe, and in many parts of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. . . .
The second exam determines on which court they will commence their judicial
careers. . . . [In Japan,] approximately 20,000 law graduates take the multiple choice
entrance exam, but only 700 of them will be accepted into a two year training
program. . . . Pakistan, Thailand, Nepal, Singapore, Indonesia and Bangladesh all
employ some variation of the civil service model . . . .

Volcansek, supra at 95–96.
153.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 372.
154.
See id. at 363.
155.
Id. at 375.
156.
Id. at 375–76; see also Spáč, supra note 157, at 2083.
157.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 375–76; see also Spáč, supra note 151, at 2083.
158.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 375–76; see also Spáč, supra note 151, at 2083.
159.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 371, 375.
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The judges of highest courts are usually appointed by
political authorities: the executive, as it occurs in United Kingdom,
Australia, Canada, Finland, Norway or Malta; the parliament, such
as in Germany or Ukraine; or by both according to a mixed system,
as, for instance, in [the] United States of America, Israel, Lithuania,
France, Greece or the Netherlands.160

While rejecting judicial elections, many societies elsewhere have
rejected the United States Constitution's approach of guaranteeing a lifetime
appointment when it comes to constitutional judges.161 Outside of the United
States, there are only two nations which adopt Judicial Appointment through
an election process and do so in a very limited fashion.162 Smaller cantons of
Switzerland elect judges, and Japanese Supreme Court justices are appointed
but are sometimes subjected to retention elections; however, many scholars
say those elections are simply a formality.163
Constitutional framers around the world have adopted different
Judicial Appointment methods.164 For example, in Germany two Reichstag
houses are authorized to select the sixteen constitutional court justices with the
limitation that six must be professional judges.165 Another example exists in
Bulgaria where the supreme courts, the president, and the parliament each
appoint one-third of the twelve justices.166
Just as the debate has intensified in the United States regarding
varying terms of Supreme Court justices, other countries presently differ from
each other in the terms for which constitutional judges serve.167 For instance,
in South Africa constitutional court justices are limited to serve a twelve-year
term and in Italy justices only serve a nine-year term.168 In other countries,
160.
Ana Martins, Size and Composition of Highest Courts Selection of Judges,
in THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 203, 205
(Ingolf Pernice et al. eds., 2006).
161.
EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 9 (citing GEORG VANBERG, THE
POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 85 (Randall Calvert & Thrainn Eggertsson
eds., 2005).
162.
See id.
163.
Liptak, supra note 8, at 21.
164.
See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 9 (citing VANBERG, supra note 167
at 85).
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.; Andrew Harding, The Fundamentals of Constitutional Courts, INT’L
INST.
FOR
DEMOCRACY
&
ELECTORAL
ASSISTANCE
1,
3–4
(2017),
http://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/the-fundamentals-of-constitutionalcourts.pdf.
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such as the Republic of Korea and the Czech Republic, justices serve a fixed
renewable term.169 A renewable term in the Czech Republic means that court
presidents may only be removed by a disciplinary panel.170
Although particularities may differ, there is a pattern familiar to
European countries regarding Judicial Appointment.171 In most European
countries, judges of the ordinary judiciary are appointed into free slots based
on fulfilling the formal requirements for the office rather than being elected.172
Further, to bolster the independence and impartiality of the judge, the judges
are appointed for an unlimited term.173 On the other hand, appointing judges
to European constitutional review bodies is generally a political rather than
administrative process.174 For example, constitutional judges frequently serve
a fixed term without a possibility of being re-appointed or re-elected.175 If the
United States adopted a judicial appointment system that required judicial
training, it would ideally deal with: (1) rule of law, i.e., judicial impartiality;
(2) judicial competence; and (3) to the extent, this training would be a
prerequisite to be being appointed, or arguably elected, it could avoid the tough
choice between expertise and accountability.176
VI.
A.

JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN SPECIFIC COUNTRIES

France

The Civil Service Model originated in France in the nineteenth
century and remains in place with only some minor modifications.177 After
169.
EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 9 (citing VANBERG, supra note 167 at
85); Harding, supra note 168, at 4; Judge Selection and Terms of Office: Counties Compared,
NATIONMASTER,
http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Government/Judicialbranch/Judge-selection-and-term-of-office (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
170.
David Kosai, Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability
in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law Between Court Presidents and the Ministry
of Justice, 13 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 96, 108 (2017).
171.
See Victor Ferreres Comella, The European Model of Constitutional
Review of Legislation: Toward Decentralization?, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 461, 466 (2004);
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 370, 372.
172.
See Comella, supra note 171, at 468; Volcansek, supra note 5, at 372–73.
173.
Comella, supra note 171, at 468.
174.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 367–68.
175.
Id.
176.
See Comella, supra note 171, at 468; Volcansek, supra note 5, at 367–68,
372–73.
177.
Philippe Bezes & Gilles Jeannot, The Development and Current
Features of the French Civil Service System, in CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS IN WESTERN

224

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

the French Revolution, the French courts were designed to be passive bodies
simply applying the Rule of Law in a mechanical fashion, not creating law, as
is the case with the Common Law.178 The French revolutionary government
deliberately did this to ensure that judges only interpreted the law as written,
and thus preserve an important aspect of the Rule of Law.179 This largely
derived from the French distrust of the judiciary, as traditionally a product of
the aristocracy.180 The French Constitution of 1958 included a Superior
Council of the Magistrate (Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature) that was
charged with disciplining and promoting judges.181
This effort to
professionalize and de-politicize the judiciary can be seen in the training of
judges as well.182
France provides an emblematic example of the Civil Service Model
of judicial training and subsequent appointment.183 To become a judge, the
candidate must first pass a concours—a competitive entrance exam—to obtain
admission into the Centre National d’Etudes Judiciaries—National Centre of
Judicial Studies—which was established in 1959 and was later renamed to the
École Nationale de la Magistrature (“ENM”).184 This institute was designed
to train those who passed the competitive examination, such as legal
EUROPE 4–5 (Van der Meer Frits ed., 2d ed. 2011), http://hal-enpc.archivesouvertes.fr/hal-01257027/document.
178.
See John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMPAR. L.
109, 111–12 (1996); Nemacheck, supra note 38, at 665–66. In France, a long history of favoring
the legislative body over the judiciary stems back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who believed that
executive and judicial authority were subordinate to the legislature. See APPOINTING JUDGES IN
AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 179–80 (Kate
Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD].
179.
Merryman, supra note 178, at 111–12.
180.
See id. at 110, 112–13.
181.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 372; 1958 CONST. art. 65 (Fr.).
182.
See Volcansek, supra note 5, at 372–73.
183.
Id. at 371–72; see also Bezes & Jeannot, supra note 177, at 14.
184.
CONST. ART. 14 of Act No. 58-1270 of 22 December 1958; Volcansek,
supra note 5, at 372; Luis Muñiz-Argüelles & Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and
Training of Judges in Spain, France, West Germany, and England, 8 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 3, 9, 13, 14 (1985); Kelly Buchanan, The French National School for the Judiciary,
LIBR. OF CONG.: IN CUSTODIA LEGIS (Jan. 26, 2011), http://blogs.loc.gov/law/2011/01/thefrench-national-school-for-the-judiciary/. The first concours is for graduates with legal
education and who are at least twenty-seven years of age. Muñiz-Argüelles & Farticelli-Torres,
supra. The second concours is dedicated to employees or agents of the state or local authority,
public institutions, community service, or holders of a master’s degree of law with at least four
years of work experience. Id. at 15. Finally, the third concours is reserved for professionals
with at least eight years of work experience in the private sector or as an elected member of an
assembly, a territorial authority, or a non-professional member of the judiciary. See id. at 14–
15; Buchanan, supra.
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practitioners with five years of experience and individuals in the civil service,
to be judges or magistrates.185 Admitted candidates are required to participate
in a thirty-one-month course, which covers both theoretical and practical
elements of judicial practices and later ends with an exit examination.186
Based on the results and the grades received throughout the training,
the candidates obtain their rank.187 Based on their rank, the candidates then
choose from a list of posts drawn up by the Ministry of Justice.188 The judges
are then appointed for an unlimited lifetime term.189 As discussed by Mary
Volcansek:
“Initial appointments are made [based on] examination scores, those
receiving the highest scores getting first pick of the positions. Most
of the graduates are appointed to a judgeship in the provinces at the
lowest level . . . .” Advancement within the judiciary is based on
seniority and merit, with actual promotions decided by either the
Superior Council of the Magistrature for the higher courts and on
the advice of the Council for the lower levels; in either case, the
formal appointment is made by the Minister of Justice.190

The French Conseil Constitutionnel—the Constitutional Council—
provides a different system for Judicial Appointment than that for lower court
judges.191 This system was established by the Constitution of the Fifth
Republic.192 This is connected to the specialized role that constitutional courts
play in most countries.193 Unlike the United States, where the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction is not substantively limited, the purpose of the
Constitutional Council is limited to supervising elections and ruling on
185.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 372.
186.
Id.; Buchanan, supra note 184.
187.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 372–73; Buchanan, supra note 184.
188.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 372; Buchanan, supra note 184.
189.
Art. 4 Ordonnance n° 58-1270 du 22 décembre 1958 portant loi organique
relative au statut de la magistrature [Art. 4, Ordinance No. 58-1270 of Dec. 22, 1958 on the
Organic Law Relating to the Status of the Judiciary] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LAW RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 23, 1958, p. 11551; Buchanan, supra
note 184; Types of Legal Professions: France, EUR. E-JUSTICE PORTAL, http://ejustice.europa.eu/29/EN/types_of_legal_professions?FRANCE&member=1 (last updated Jan.
10, 2022).
190.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 372–73 (quoting Doris Marie Provine &
Antoine Garapon, The Selection of Judges in France: Searching for a New Legitimacy, in
APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE
WORLD 176, 183 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
191.
1958 CONST. art. 56 (Fr.).
192.
Id.; see Volcansek, supra note 5, at 379.
193.
See Volcansek, supra note 5, at 376.
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statutes’ constitutionality.194 The Constitutional Council comprises nine
members.195 The term for a member of the Council is nine years, and the term
is non-renewable.196 The Council may also include former Presidents of the
Republic.197
Unlike in the United States or the Czech Republic, where an
appointment of a judge to a Constitutional or Supreme Court requires a
nomination by the President and approval by a legislative body, the French
system does not have this type of inter-branch cooperation.198 Instead, three
political bodies—the President of the Republic, the President of the National
Assembly, and the President of the Senate—each separately appoint three
individuals of their choosing.199 As a result, the French Constitutional Council
is one of the most politicized tribunals of constitutional judicial review.200
Perhaps this should not be surprising since the issues it deals with are mainly
political.201 However, one could argue that the political functions of the
Constitutional Court militate in favor of a non-political check on the political
system, which the French system does not look to provide, at least at the
Constitutional Council level.202 Thus, while the French judicial system
generally promotes non-politicization, independence, and the rule of law at
most levels of the judiciary, it could be argued that it fails to do so at the
Constitutional Council level.203
B.

Germany

Germany, like the United States, and unlike France, has a federal
system of government, requiring an analysis of the judicial appointment

194.
1958 CONST. art. 58–61, 61-1 (Fr.). Until March 1, 2010, the Council only
engaged in a priori review, since then, a party to a suit may also bring up a question whether the
statute to be used is in accordance with the Constitution. Id. art. 61, 61-1.
195.
1958 CONST. art. 56 (Fr.).
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České
Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic], art. 84 § 2.
199.
1958 CONST. art. 56. (Fr.); Volcansek, supra note 5, at 380.
200.
See F.L. Morton, Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis, 36
AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 89 (1988); Volcansek, supra note 5, at 380.
201.
Morton, supra note 200, at 91.
202.
Merryman, supra note 178, at 117–18.
203.
Id.

2022]

A CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

227

process at the state and the federal level.204 “[J]udicial authority is shared
between the Federation (Bund) and the sixteen ‘Länder’ which are states and
provinces.”205 Germany’s career judiciary is similar to the French Civil
Service model because judges enter the judicial hierarchy right after
graduation and spend the rest of their professional careers in it.206
German judges train through a three and a half year, governmentmandated law school curriculum, culminating with rigorous written and oral
examinations.207 After completion, students enter a state-funded mandatory
preparatory training internship for two years.208 The internship includes two
assignments: the first being selected for the candidate and the second selected
by the candidate herself.209 The candidate is assigned to an ordinary court—
which oversees both civil and criminal cases—an administrative authority, and
an attorney.210 Students are then eligible to take the Second Stage exam,
however, only those achieving a high score are eligible to apply and be
considered by the state’s ministry for that judiciary.211 This leaves the
remaining passing students eligible to join a branch of the legal service.212
Notably, only fifty percent of those entering legal studies pass this second
exam and enter legal service in the judiciary.213 This would seem to suggest a
considerable degree of competence for those lawyers making it to this level.214
The general recruitment process begins with the judicial candidates’
application to a Länder.215 Applicants present their application to the Länder’s
204.
See Morton, supra note 200, at 89; FIONA O’CONNELL & RAY MCCAFFREY,
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 3, 10 (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2012/justice/6012.p
df.
205.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 10 (citing Johannes Riedel,
Recruitment, Professional Evaluation and Career of Judges and Prosecutors in Germany, in
RECRUITMENT, PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION AND CAREER OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN
EUROPE: AUSTRIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND SPAIN 69, 69 (Giuseppe
Di Federico ed., 2005)).
206.
Id. at 11 (citation omitted).
207.
Id.; Volcansek, supra note 5, at 373.
208.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 11; Volcansek, supra note
5, at 373.
209.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 11; Volcansek, supra note
5, at 373.
210.
See O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 10.
211.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 373; Donald P. Kommers, Autonomy versus
Accountability: The German Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY
131, 143 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001).
212.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 373.
213.
Id.; Kommers, supra note 211, at 144.
214.
See Volcansek, supra note 5, at 373–74.
215.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 12.
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selection commission, which votes on the candidate.216 That vote is then taken
into consideration by the Minister of Justice or the President of the court who
then appoints the judge.217 However, only seven out of the sixteen regional
Länder courts include a selection commission in their judicial appointment
system.218 In Länder without a selection committee, the Minister of Justice or
the President of the court solely consider the application and the candidate’s
interview in his/her appointment decision.219 “Depending on the Länder, the
appointment may be subject to cabinet approval.”220 Some argue that “partypolitical loyalties are . . . openly introduced through the selection committees’
parliamentary influence and the preselection and co-determination powers of
the elected Minister of Justice.”221 When the appointment is at the complete
discretion of the States’ Ministry of Justice, the Länder political system and
biases are simply re-created at the judicial level.222
Judges are initially appointed on a three-year probationary period, and
according to the German Judiciary Act, may be easily dismissed by the internal
administrative supervisors within the first two years.223 Once surpassing the
probationary period, judges are eligible for promotion to higher courts.224
Promotion within the judiciary depends on the merits of the judge as
determined by the State Ministry of Justice as well as senior judges.225
Usually, judges begin at the Länder and move up the ladder, however,
some judges are immediately appointed to the higher courts.226 The Federal
Electoral Committee, in conjunction with the Federal Minister of Justice, are
responsible for electing judges to federal courts.227 The Committee comprises
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
218.
Volker G. Heinz, Speech at the Australian Bar Association Conference: The
Appointment
of
Judges
in
Germany
(July
7,
1998),
http://www.heinzlegal.com/sites/default/files/AppointOfJudgesInGermany.pdf.; O’CONNELL
& MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 12, 14; Volcansek, supra note 5, at 377.
219.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 12.
220.
Kommers, supra note 211, at 144.
221.
Heinz, supra note 223.
222.
See id.; Volcansek, supra note 5, at 373–74.
223.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374; O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note
204, at 11; JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES WITHIN EUROPE 115 (2006) (e-book); Deutsches
Richtergesetz [DRiG] [German Judiciary Act], Apr. 19, 1972, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I]
at 1755, § 22(1), last amended by Act of Nov. 22, 2019; see also Maximiliane Koschyk, How
Independent are German Judges?, DW (Aug. 5, 2017), http://p.dw.com/p/2hkcz.
224.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374.
225.
Id.
226.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 11; Volcansek, supra note
5, at 373–74.
227.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 15–16.
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sixteen Ministers of Justice from the Länder and sixteen other members who
are usually, but not required to be, Federal Parliament members with legal
expertise.228 Historically, there was a controversial debate about agents of the
Executive branch taking part in the promotional process because it was seen
as a method of political interference.229 However, this argument was rejected
because requiring judges alone to promote their fellow judges could result in
a self-perpetuating elite profession by insulating it from democracy.230
Appointment to the federal courts does not follow a formal
recruitment or application process as required at the Länder.231 Each member
of the election committee may propose a candidate, and judicial participation
may occur through advisory opinions on the personality and fitness of the
candidate who is being considered for a promotion to a higher court.232 Such
opinions are issued through the Prasidialrat—a body representing the
judiciary—which exists at each court level and is composed of a president and
judges.233 Promotion of federal judges is different from appointments at the
Länder because the election committee does not advise on it.234
Each member casts one anonymous vote and the decision for
appointment is made based upon a simple majority.235 Once the Committee
for the Election of Judges selects a judge, the Federal Minister of Justice
proposes the selection to the Federal President who then makes the
appointment.236 Appointed judges are set for a minimum probation period of
three years and no longer than five years.237 Once the judge completes the
probationary period, the judge is appointed for an unlimited term, or if given
an unlimited civil service tenure, she will be appointed as a public
prosecutor.238 Judges appointed for life must retire at the end of the month in
which they reach the standard retirement age based on a birth-year sliding
228.
Id. at 15; Volker Wagener, How Does Germany Choose its Judges? Always
the Best Pick?, DW (Sept. 27, 2018), http://p.dw.com/p/2hC14.
229.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 9.
230.
Id.
231.
Id. at 15.
232.
Id. at 15–16.
233.
Id. at 16.
234.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 17.
235
Wagener, supra note 228; Judges and Senates, FED. ADMIN. CT. SUP. CT.,
http://www.bverwg.de/en/das-gericht/organisation/richter-und-senate (last visited Apr. 28,
2022).
236.
Judges and Senates, supra note 235.
237.
See id.; O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 11; Deutsches
Richtergesetz [DRiG] [German Judiciary Act], Apr. 19, 1972, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I]
at 2145, § 12, last amended by Act of June 25, 2021.
238.
Deutsches Richtergesetz [DRiG] [German Judiciary Act] at § 124.
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scale.239 Judges must retire after turning sixty-two if the judge is severely
disabled.240
The
German
Federal
Constitutional
Court—
Bundesverfassungsgericht—comprises sixteen elected justices.241 Ten judges
are elected for a limited twelve-year term and the remaining six judges, chosen
from the judges of higher federal courts, are elected for an unlimited term.242
At this level, each legislative body—the Bundestag and the Bundesrat—elect
eight members of the Court.243 The Bundestag is the upper and main chamber
of the legislature whereas the Bundesrat is the lower chamber through which
the states participate in the legislative process.244
Candidates at this level must be “judges or professors qualified for
judicial office.”245 Electing the Constitutional Court judges begins with the
Federal Minister of Justice compiling two lists of potential candidates.246 The
first list is composed of judges from federal courts.247 The second consists of
individuals suggested by Parliament.248 The Bundesrat formally elects
candidates from these lists in plenary sessions, based upon the work done by
a committee of the Ministers of Justice from different Länder.249 The
Bundestag relies on a Parliamentary committee of twelve members composed
of individuals representing different chamber parties.250 After private
deliberation, a judge is selected by a two-thirds majority vote.251
Judges are required to retire from the federal judiciary at the standard
retirement age, unless special circumstances arise, such as having no suitable

239.
Id. § 48. For example, a judge born in 1955 must retire at age sixty-five
and nine months, whereas a judge born in 1963 must retire at age sixty-six and ten months. Id.
240.
Id.
241.
The
Federal
Constitutional
Court:
Structure,
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT,
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/DasGericht/Gericht-und-Verfassungsorgan/gericht-und-verfassungsorgan_node.html (last visited
Apr. 28, 2022); O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 16.
242.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 16; DONALD P. KOMMERS &
RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 21–23, (3d ed. rev. and expanded 2012).
243.
The Federal Constitutional Court: Structure, supra note 241.
244.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 16.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
Id.
248.
Id.; KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 242, at 8, 23.
249.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 16; see also KOMMERS &
MILLER, supra note 242, at 23.
250.
O’CONNELL & MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 16.
251.
Id.; BELL, supra note 223, at 159.
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successor.252 Critics of the German system claim the judicial appointment
process is highly politicized and opaque.253 They argue the reality behind the
Judicial Appointment process is shrouded in secrecy from the public.254 The
secrecy adds fuel to arguments that Judicial Appointment is more like political
horse-trading by the committee, rather than the paragon of judicial
independence it purports to be.255
C.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic adopts a career judiciary where professional
judicial candidates must undergo specialized training.256 Jury trials are nonexistent.257 However, laypersons—“Judges from the People”—have a limited
opportunity to participate in the judiciary as judges and community
representatives at large.258 Two lay judges may sit in on a non-specialized
case such as a criminal proceeding with a professional judge within a district
or regional court, but never on appellate or higher-level courts.259
The appointment of professional judges typically begins at a first
instance court and is later reassigned to Appellate and Supreme Courts.260 The
252.
Deutsches Richtergestz [DRiG] [German Judiciary Act], Apr. 19, 1972,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] at 2145, § 48(1)–(6), last amended by Act of June 25, 2021;
see, e.g., Jean-Michel Hauteville, Why Even Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court Has a
Politics
Problem,
HANDELSBLATT
TODAY
(Nov.
9,
2018,
2:51
PM),
http://www.handelsblatt.com/english/politics/handelsblatt-explains-why-even-germanysfederal-constitutional-court-has-a-politics-problem/23580560.html?ticket=ST-5473698o1yA5KFUam1b9LAFxJ7l-ap3. For example, politics played a factor in the delay of Justice
Ferdinand Kirchhof’s retirement when he remained in office despite having reached the
mandatory retirement age during his term due to a lack of suitable replacement from the
Christian Democratic Union—Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party. Hauteville, supra.
253.
Hauteville, supra note 252.
254.
Id.
255.
Id.
256.
Czechia: Judicial Academy, EUR. JUD. TRAINING NETWORK,
http://www.ejtn.eu/About-us/Members/Czech-Republic/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2022); Zákon o
soudech a soudcích [Act on Courts and Judges], Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 60(3) (Czech).
257.
Michael Bobek & Olga Pouperova, UPDATE: An Introduction to the Czech
Legal System and Legal Resources Online, GLOBALEX (July/Aug. 2018),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Czech_Republic1.html#_2.4._The_Judiciary.
258.
Id.
259.
Id.
260.
Michal Bobek, Judicial Selection, Lay Participation, and Judicial Culture
in the Czech Republic: A Study in a Central European (Non)Transformation, in 7 FAIR
REFLECTION OF SOCIETY IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS — A COMPARATIVE STUDY 121, 130 (Sophie
Turenne ed., 2015); Frans Viljoen, The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic: An
Introduction for South African Lawyers, 35 DE JURE 1, 7 (2002).
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judges sitting in Appellate and Supreme Courts chambers are only professional
judges.261 The systems used to select lay judges and professional judges differ
greatly from each other.262 Lay judges are elected through municipal or
regional assemblies.263 Professional judges, on the other hand, are appointed
by the President of the Republic.264 The respective courts’ corresponding
assembly selects each lay judge.265 After their election, the lay judges swear
the same oath as professional judges.266
Municipal or regional councils elect lay judges to district and regional
courts, respectively.267 Typically, there is no competition for a position as a
lay judge; the decision to participate as one is voluntary.268 The judicial
candidate voluntarily submits his name to the local assembly for election.269
Lay judges are elected for a renewable term of four years.270 However,
the number of lay judges elected to a respective district or regional court
depends on the number the president of that court determines is needed for
each term.271 The formula used to make this determination is to ensure that
each lay judge will not sit for more than twenty calendar days each year.272
The requirements to be a lay judge also differ greatly.273 Lay judges are not
required to have a legal education but must be a permanent resident or work
in the judicial district where he or she wishes to be elected.274 These
requirements are in addition to the other requirements for professional judges,
which are mentioned below.275 Lay judges who appear in a mixed panel with
a professional judge each get one vote.276 The professional judge serves as the
presiding chairman of the panel.277

261.
Bobek & Pouperova, supra note 257.
262.
Id.
263.
Id.; Zákon o soudech a soudcích [Act on Courts and Judges], Zákon č.
6/2002 Sb. § 64(1) (Czech).
264.
Bobek & Pouperova, supra note 257; Bobek, supra note 260, at 132.
265.
Bobek & Pouperova, supra note 257; see also Bobek, supra note 260, at
141.
266.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 141.
267.
Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 64(1) (Czech).
268.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 141.
269.
Id.
270.
Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 61(2) (Czech).
271.
See Bobek, supra note 260, at 132.
272.
Id. at 141.
273.
See id. at 140–41; Bobek & Pouperova, supra note 257.
274.
Bobek, supra note 265, at 140–41.
275.
See id.; see also Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 60(1) (Czech).
276.
See Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. §§ 30, 34 (Czech).
277.
See id. §§ 31(3), 35(3).
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[H]ypothetically, [it could happen that] the two lay judges [] outvote
the professional judge. However, this is a very unlikely scenario,
[considering] the huge . . . knowledge and [standing asymmetry]
between [the] professional, permanently sitting judge, and a lay
person sitting in just a few cases [in] up to 20 days a year.278

In the Czech Republic, professional judicial candidates must be
citizens of the country, at least thirty years of age at the date of appointment,
enjoy full legal capacity, and have no criminal record.279 Further, candidates
must have a five-year master’s degree in legal education from a Czech
university, pass the judicial bar examination, and be an individual of good
moral character to guarantee due performance of the judiciary.280 In 2002, the
Act. No. 6/2002 established the Czech Judicial Academy—the central
institution of justice where all target groups in the judiciary, such as judges,
lay judges, and state prosecutors, are trained.281
Twice a year, the Minister of Justice compiles a list of suitable
candidates.282 The President of a regional court with a vacancy in a district
court appoints judicial candidates from that list by recommending them to the
Ministry of Justice, which retains or rejects the proposed candidate.283
However, that appointment is checked by the Czech Republic Government.284
The Prime Minister, or a member of the Government selected by the Prime
Minister, must countersign the appointment.285 Appointed judges then take
the oath of office in the president’s hands.286
The Minister of Justice then assigns the judge to a district court.287
Judges who move to a higher court or move to a court within the court level in
which they sit are considered transferred or re-assigned, not appointed to that

278.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 141.
279.
See id.; Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 60(1) (Czech); Ivo Šlosarčík, Czech Republic
2006–2008: On President, Judges and the Lisbon Treaty, 16 EUR. PUB. L. 1, 10 (2010).
280.
See Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 60(3), (5) (Czech); Šlosarčík, supra note 279, at
10.
281.
Czechia: Judicial Academy, supra note 256.
282.
Bobek, supra note 260 at 132.
283.
Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the
Czech Republic], art. 63 § 3; Bobek, supra note 260, at 132.
284.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 132.
285.
Id.; Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of
the Czech Republic], art. 63 § 3.
286.
Zákon o soudech a soudcích [Act on Courts and Judges], Zákon č. 6/2002
Sb. § 62(3)(a) (Czech).
287.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 132; Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České
Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic], art. 67 §1.
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court.288 The Minister of Justice’s decision to permanently or temporarily
reassign or transfer the judge must also be done with the dual consent of the
judge appointed and the president of that particular court.289
All professional judges are appointed for an unlimited term and may
only be removed for disciplinary offenses following a proceeding conducted
by the special judicial disciplinary panel.290 The purpose of an unlimited term
is to support the judge’s independence and impartiality.291 Further, the judge’s
term expires if the judge reaches seventy years of age, commits an intentional
crime, or cannot perform her duties due to her health.292 After appointment,
judges are required to complete three years of specialized training within the
courts.293 Judges appointed to the appellate court level must meet the criteria
listed above and must also meet additional criteria.294 First, the judges must
have adequate experience in legal practice, which must be at least eight years
as a judge.295 Second, the judge must demonstrate high erudition and legal
expertise.296 The latter requirement is determined through a standardized
psychological test.297 Evidently, this test created problems because individuals
who did not answer in a manner corresponding with the answers of the average
normative group would be weeded out of the running.298 Today, psychological
testing of judicial candidates is still used to measure a judge’s high level of
erudition and legal expertise, but such candidates who answer questions with
non-conformist responses may still be nominated.299
The practice of bluntly equating the only evaluative
criterion with psychometric testing and making it a compulsory
condition for a judicial appointment [addresses] a two-fold problem.
First, in career judiciaries, appointment of young candidates to the
bench for life without them having any previous professional track
288.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 132.
289.
Id.; Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of
the Czech Republic], art. 67 § 1, 71.
290.
Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the
Czech Republic], art. 82 § 2; European Rule of Law Mechanism: Input – Czech Republic, at 2
(July 20, 2021), http://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/cz-input.pdf.
291.
See Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. §§ 61–62 (Czech).
292.
Id. §§ 91(a), (c), 94(a).
293.
See European Rule of Law Mechanism: Input – Czech Republic, supra note
290, at 2; Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 71 (Czech).
294.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 128; see also Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 71 (Czech).
295.
Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 71(3) (Czech); Bobek, supra note 260, at 128.
296.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 129; see also Zákon č. 6/2002 Sb. § 71 (Czech).
297.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 129.
298.
Id.
299.
Id.
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record will always mean, in a way, placing a bet on the character of
the candidate. Second, to this adds the uneasiness that transforming
societ[ies] have with the notion of good character and, on the whole,
with morality in the public space and office.300

To begin, people in power are not ready to discuss what “good
character” truly means.301 Conversely, when such criteria are established for
what constitutes “character” or “morality” by a legislator, it essentially
becomes a psychometric standard that is better “left to the experts.”302 For the
most part, judges at the appellate level are promoted to their positions through
re-assignment, as opposed to being newly appointed to that court.303 Appellate
court judges are rarely directly appointed.304
The Constitution established the Constitutional Court.305 It is a part
of the judiciary but is not a part of the courts of general jurisdiction.306 The
Constitutional Court consists of fifteen justices.307 A candidate for a justice of
the Constitutional Court must be a citizen of the Czech Republic, at least forty
years old, have no criminal record, have a university degree in legal education,
and be active in a legal profession for at least ten years.308 The appointment
to the Constitutional Court is more political than the judicial appointment
methods used at lower courts.309 The President selects a candidate he later
appoints with the approval of the Senate.310 A simple majority in the Senate—
an elected political body—is required to approve a candidate.311 Therefore,
the composition and profiles of the Constitutional Court justices vary, and a
candidate’s political standpoints and beliefs may determine whether she will

300.
Id.
301.
Id. at 129–30.
302.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 129–30.
303.
Id. at 133.
304.
Id.
305.
Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the
Czech Republic], arts. 83–85.
306.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 128; Viljoen, supra note 260, at 7.
307.
Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the
Czech Republic], art. 84, § 1.
308.
See id. arts. 19, § 2, 84, § 3.
309.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 133.
310.
Id.; Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of
the Czech Republic], art. 84, § 2.
311.
See Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of
the Czech Republic], arts. 39, § 2, 84, § 2.
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be approved.312 Many of these justices have not previously been judges of
ordinary courts.313 Many are former politicians, civil servants, and
academics.314 After the Senate’s approval, the candidate becomes a justice of
the Constitutional Court.315 Before the justice may start to perform her duties,
she must take an oath to the hands of the President.316 The justice is appointed
for a limited term of ten years and can be re-appointed.317
The current standing of the judiciary selection process is “in a sort of
limbo,” with conflicts between the Ministry of Justices and the presidents of
courts regarding the centralization of the judiciary selection process.318 The
broad discretion court presidents have in appointing judges, and the public
perception that a “narrow clique of judicial officials” controls the selection
process, contribute to public dissatisfaction with the judicial system.319 This
is consistent with the perception that appointed professionals are not on the
bench for their merit but rather for their good luck in societal connections.320
These factors result in a public both dissatisfied and distrustful of a judiciary
that does not represent the diverse Czech Republic community.321 The danger
is that the Czech Republic could suffer the kind of erosion of Rule of Law
evidenced in Poland and Hungary over the last decade.322

312.
See Bobek, supra note 260, at 133–34; History: The Constitutional Court,
ÚSTAVNÍ SOUD, http://www.usoud.cz/en/history (last visited Apr. 28, 2022). Similar to the
United States, the President may change the Court’s political balance by selecting the
candidates. Bobek, supra note 260, at 133–34; History: The Constitutional Court, supra. It is
therefore worth mentioning that because the Court was built from scratch in 1993, the first
Czech President, V. Havel, was in a unique situation to appoint all fifteen justices of the Court.
See Bobek, supra note 260, at 133–34; History: The Constitutional Court, supra.
313.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 134.
314.
Id.
315.
Id. at 133.
316.
Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the
Czech Republic], art. 85, § 1.
317.
Id. at art. 84, § 1; WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
14–15 (2005).
318.
Bobek, supra note 260, at 135.
319.
Id.
320.
Id at 136.
321.
Id.
322.
See Baka v. Hungary, App. No. 20261/12, ¶ 16–23 (June 23, 2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163113; Szemesi, supra note 131, at 273.
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Netherlands

The Dutch Judicial Appointment system adopts a judicial council that
only plays a limited role in selecting judicial candidates.323 The judicial
council particularly contributes by participating in decisions regarding
“recruitment, selection and training of judicial and court officials . . . [and] the
appointment of the members of the court boards.”324 Unlike in other countries,
such as France and Italy, the judicial council does not contribute to decisions
regarding the promotion or discipline of judges.325 This Judicial Council is
selected by the Ministry of Justice, the judiciary, and the legislature.326 The
Council includes four members: two members from the judiciary, and two
others who previously held senior governmental positions.327 The Council
serves as the spokesperson for the judiciary in political and public debates, and
it seeks to protect the interests of the judicial bodies while also overseeing
rules and regulations to be applied uniformly to all courts.328
The Netherlands judiciary system has also adopted a variation of the
French-Italian-German Civil Service Model.329
The system permits
individuals with a law degree to enter the judiciary through two unique routes,
creating two groups of judges—young recent university graduates and judges
who are long experienced members of the Dutch legal profession.330 The first
route requires an individual to participate in a six-year specialized judicial
studies program after completing a law degree.331
This program offers individuals an opportunity to gain practical
experience through an internship that can be completed at various legal
entities.332 The other potential route is for an individual who has earned her
323.
Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, The Comparative Law and Economics of
Judicial Councils, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 53, 59 (2009); European Commission for
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Judicial Appointments, at 6–7, Opinion No.
403/2006,
CDL-AD(2007)028
(June
22,
2007),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2007)028-e.
324.
The Judiciary System in the Netherlands, DE RECHTSPRAAK 14 (2010),
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/The-Judiciary-System-in-theNetherlands.pdf.
325.
Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 323, at 77.
326.
Id.; Cheryl Thomas, Judicial Appointments in Continental Europe, Lord
Chancellor’s Dept. Res. Series 6/97 (1997); see also Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374.
327.
The Judiciary System in the Netherlands, supra note 324, at 14–15.
328.
Id. at 14.
329.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374; see also Spáč, supra note 151, at 2082.
330.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374; Spáč, supra note 151, at 2082–83; Garoupa
& Ginsburg, supra note 323, at 77.
331.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374; Spáč, supra note 151, at 2092.
332.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374; see also Spáč, supra note 151, at 2092.
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law degree to apply for a judgeship after working at a law firm for a minimum
of six years.333 This system has raised no serious concerns regarding excessive
politicization.334
Once the mandatory requirements are completed, applicants entering
either path must complete an examination testing their legal knowledge and
are also subjected to psychological testing and assessment to determine their
competence.335
Applicants are also required to submit letters of
recommendation.336 Once these requirements are met, applicants must be
interviewed by delegates from the selection committee.337 This committee is
composed of seventy-one persons who are predominantly attorneys.338 It also
includes several high-ranking university and government officials and
representatives from other professions to a lesser degree.339 The selection
committee is self-perpetuating, as new members are constantly being
recommended to it by sitting members.340
The committee determines whether a candidate should be appointed
and looks at several specific criteria.341 However, only one of those criteria
relates to the candidate's knowledge of the law.342 The remainder refers
explicitly to the candidate’s character.343 Finally, when the committee
members agree on a candidate’s competency, the committee enters its
recommendation to the Minister of Justice, who makes the appointment.344 By
Royal Decree, the Minister of Justice is politically responsible for judicial
appointments and countersigning the Council’s recommendation before
making the appointment.345
Dutch judges are prohibited from challenging and reviewing the
validity of laws against the Constitution—changes are expected to be made by
politicians.346 Consequently, a Constitutional Court does not exist in the
333.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374.
334.
Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 323, at 78.
335.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374; Spáč, supra note 151, at 2092.
336.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374.
337.
Id.
338.
Id.
339.
Id.
340.
Id.
341.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 374.
342.
Id.
343.
Id.
344.
Id.
345.
Elaine Mak, Judicial Self Government in the Netherlands: Demarcating
Autonomy, 19 GERMAN L. J. 1801, 1806 (2018).
346.
Gerhard van der Schyff, The Prohibition on Constitutional Review by the
Judiciary in the Netherlands in Critical Perspective: The Case and Roadmap for Reform, 21
GERMAN L. J. 884, 884 (2020).
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Netherlands.347 “International treaties on the other hand may overrule Dutch
law, even the constitution, and judges are allowed in most cases to test laws
against them.”348
Supreme Court justices are appointed for life or until they turn seventy
years old.349 They must also be graduates of a Dutch law school, and there is
no required previous judicial experience or minimum age.350 The first step is
for the Supreme Court to notify Parliament’s Second Chamber of a vacancy
and provide a list of six candidates ranked from one to six.351 Then, the Second
Chamber votes on those six candidates to have a final list of three.352
Typically, the Second Chamber votes on the six who are recommended by the
Supreme Court, but it is not bound to that list.353 The Crown draws an
appointment of one new justice from this short list.354
Arguably, the appointment system at this level is facially susceptible
to political influence from the Second Chamber because it may select
individuals outside of the candidates recommended by the Supreme Court.355
E.

Italy

The ordinary judiciary of Italy presents another variation of the Civil
Service Model.356 After World War II, Italy’s Constitution provided for a
Superior Council of the Magistrature that would oversee various elements in
the judiciary, such as discipline and promotions.357 Although the Italian
judiciary is a career system, it differs from the systems adopted in Germany,
The Netherlands, and France because it does not implement the required

347.
See id. at 889.
348.
Dutch
Supreme
Court
(Hoge
Raad),
ACTION
GUIDE,
http://actionguide.info/m/orgs/206/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
349.
Mak, supra note 345, at 1815.
350.
See id. at 1810; Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 95 (Ger.).
351.
Philip M. Langbroek, Recruitment, Professional Evaluation and Career of
Judges and Prosecutors in the Netherlands, in RECRUITMENT, PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION AND
CAREER OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN EUROPE: AUSTRIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, THE
NETHERLANDS, AND SPAIN 159, 174 (Giuseppe Di Federico ed., 2005).
352.
See id.
353.
See id.
354.
Id.
355.
See id.
356.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 375; see also Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg,
Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
103, 107 (2009).
357.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 375; Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 356, at
106.
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extensive training that embodies the systems in these countries.358 Instead,
admission as a judge is solely based on a competitive standardized
examination, with a written and oral component, which requires a law
degree.359
Under the Constitution, judicial candidates are recruited through the
standardized test designed by the Minister of Justice.360 The Superior Council
of the Judiciary appoints the examining committee that administers the
entrance exam.361 Those who start their judicial career through this process
usually have not practiced as attorneys.362
However, there are some exceptions to the exam requirement.363 For
instance, honorary judges are not required to complete the exam and may be
appointed in certain cases.364 Honorary judges are people who act as a judge
and have similar powers to official judges—they can issue sentences, order
restitution, and much more.365 “L.D. No. 116 sets forth the qualification
requirements for a candidate for the office of honorary magistrate, which
include[s] Italian citizenship and age, professional ethics, experience, and
academic criteria.” 366
Law school professors and attorneys who have at least fifteen years of
experience may also be appointed by the Superior Council of the Judiciary to
the Supreme Court of Cassation—the highest court of appeal in Italy.367 “The
[Constitutional] Court [consists] of [fifteen] judges: one-third appointed by
the President of the Republic, one-third by [P]arliament, and one-third elected
by the ordinary and administrative supreme courts.”368

358.
See Volcansek, supra note 5, at 375.
359.
Id.
360.
See Art. 106 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.).
361.
See Giuseppe Di Federico, Recruitment, Professional Evaluation, Career,
and Discipline of Judges and Prosecutors in Italy, in RECRUITMENT, PROFESSIONAL
EVALUATION AND CAREER OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN EUROPE: AUSTRIA, FRANCE,
GERMANY, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, AND SPAIN 127, 132 (Giuseppe Di Federico ed., 2005).
362.
See id.
363.
See Italy: New Legislation on Honorary Judges, LIBR. CONG. (Sept. 28,
2017),
http://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2017-09-28/italy-new-legislation-onhonorary-judges.
364.
See id.
365.
See id.
366.
Id.
367.
Di Federico, supra note 361 at 130.
368.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BETTER
REGULATION IN EUROPE: ITALY 2012 50 (Revised ed. 2013); Di Federico, supra note 361 at
130; Simone Benvenuti, The Politics of Judicial Accountability in Italy: Shifting the Balance,
14 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 369, 378 (2018).
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Although the judges do not undergo specialized training, they are
arguably independent at the ordinary court level because their selection is
based only on merit—the public exam.369 The executive branch takes no part
in the selection process at this level.370
However, some criticize the magistrates and judges for being
politically influenced.371 This stems from the fact that they are represented by
unions that have strong political and ideological tendencies.372 These unions
run the slates—a group of candidates that run in elections with common
platforms—for members of the Superior Council of the Magistrature elected
by judges.373 Since the unions come from various political and ideological
backgrounds, the political currents of the judges at least cross the ideological
spectrum.374
The adoption of councils resulted from a need for judicial
independence after being ruled as a kingdom under the House of Savoy until
1922 and then suffering through a fascist regime under Mussolini.375 The
Italian Republic exited the period of undemocratic rule with the creation of the
Constitution in 1948.376 The Constitution ensured that the Italian government
remained
[U]nited around the principle of “republican allegiance,” which
involved fidelity to the republic, observance of the constitution and
of the laws, loyalty to an elected president and acceptance of the
republican form as a permanent institutional feature of the country
with no possibility of changing it since the republican order could
not (and cannot) be submitted to any constitutional revision.377

Previously, the Superior Council of Magistrature was explicitly in
charge of promoting judges, and because judges elected its members, there is
a plausible argument that they influenced the Council’s promotion

369.
Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 356, at 110.
370.
See id.
371.
Donatella Della Porta, A Judges’ Revolution? Political Corruption and the
Judiciary in Italy, 39 EUR. J. POL. RSCH., 1, 3–4 (2001).
372.
See Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 323, at 58, 76; Della Porta, supra note
371, at 4.
373.
See Della Porta, supra note 371, at 4.
374.
See id. at 3–4.
375.
See Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 356, at 110; SABINA DONATI, A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY IN ITALY, 1861–1950, 239, 256
(2013).
376.
DONATI, supra note 375, at 240.
377.
Id.; Art. 54 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.).

242

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

decisions.378 However, in April of 2005, new legislation was enacted to
govern the magistrature, which allowed judges of higher competence to reach
higher levels of seniority at a much faster pace based on educational
qualifications as opposed to the Council’s evaluation.379
Judicial appointment terms vary at all levels.380 Honorary judges are
appointed for four years and are eligible for an additional renewable term.381
Ordinary court judges, with the exception of honorary judges and Supreme
Court judges, are appointed for life.382 Only the Superior Council of the
Magistrature may remove, dismiss, or suspend for-life judges.383 Thus,
removing a judge without deliberate misconduct or egregious behavior is very
difficult.384 They are customarily appointed for nine years and may not be reappointed.385 Since Supreme Court justices are prohibited from quitting their
positions on their own terms, scholars such as Giacomo Bertolissi argue that
this is advantageous because it reduces the possibility of a party to control the
Court.386
Italy adopts a fixed-term system rather than following lifetime
appointments at the Constitutional Court level.387 The Italian judiciary
appointment structure for Constitutional Court justices preserves the
Separation of Powers principle and deters politicization of the court because it
diminishes the executive or legislative branches’ influence on the judiciary.388

378.
See Volcansek, supra note 5, at 375.
379.
Id.; Benvenuti, supra note 368, at 384.
380.
See Volcansek, supra note 5, at 370.
381.
Di Federico, supra note 361, at 130; D.Lgs. 13 luglio 2017, n. 116, G.U.
July 31, 2017, n. 177 (It.).
382.
See Italy: New Legislation on Honorary Judges, supra note 363; D.Lgs. n.
116/2017 (It.); Judge Selection and Term of Office: Counties Compared, NATIONMASTER,
http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Government/Judicial-branch/Judge-selectionand-term-of-office (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
383.
Art. 107 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.); see also Di Federico, supra note 367,
at 151.
384.
See Di Federico, supra note 361, at 151.
385.
Art. 135 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.).
386.
Giacomo Bertolissi, Judicial Appointments in the Italian and U.S. Supreme
Courts: A Brief Comparison, COLUM. J. EUR. L.: PRELIMINARY REFERENCE (Mar. 2, 2016),
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/cjel/preliminary-reference/2016/judicial-appointments-in-theitalian-and-u-s-supreme-courts-a-brief-comparison/.
387.
Art. 135 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.).
388.
Bertolissi, supra note 386.
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Canada

In Canada, all judges are appointed to the bench and have tenure until
the age of seventy-five unless otherwise removed.389 The Judges Act allows
judges to retire early, at the age of seventy.390 The Canadian judicial
appointment process is said to be merit-based, ensuring that all judges have
the experience and competence required for their positions.391 When a
position on a bench opens up, “the Attorney-General of the province, the Chief
Justice of the court concerned, the Law Society, Members of Parliament,
Senators, and [other] interest groups are always consulted.”392 Once a list of
potential candidates is created, background checks are completed “and a final
list of three or four [contenders] is submitted to the Canadian Bar Association
for [additional] screening . . . .”393 Most appointed judges are sought out and
offered their position by the Minister’s office because of their legal reputations
in their respective provinces.394 However, candidates interested in a judicial
appointment can also contact the Chief Justice, Attorney-General, a local
member of Parliament, the Minister of Justice, or the Judicial Affairs
Advisor.395 Most of the judges appointed in Canada are former practicing
lawyers or legal academics.396
The provincial trial judges, the lowest tier in the Canadian court
system, are appointed by the provincial cabinets on the recommendation of the
province’s attorney general.397 All higher tiers, including the superior trial
court level, the courts of appeal, federal courts, and the Supreme Court of
Canada, are appointed by the Prime Minister of Canada or the Federal Minister
of Justice.398 According to Section 96 of the Constitution Act of 1867, the
Governor General is responsible for appointing “the [j]udges of the Superior,
District, and County Courts in each province,” except the probate courts in
two provinces.399

389.
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.).
390.
Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, s. ns8 (Can.).
391.
L.A. Vandor, The Appointment of Judges in Canada, 7 ADVOCS.’ Q. 129,
130–31 (1986).
392.
Id. at 130.
393.
Id.
394.
Id. at 131.
395.
Id.
396.
Mark C. Miller, Judicial Activism in Canada and the United States, 81
JUDICATURE 262, 264 (1998).
397.
Id.
398.
Id.
399.
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.).
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The text of the Constitution does not say anything with respect to the
Governor General receiving a recommendation for appointment from the
Prime Minister.400 However, in practice, there is an informal and unwritten
procedural understanding that the appointment comes from the Prime
Minister. 401 Essentially, the Prime Minister recommends the justice, who is
later appointed, to the Governor General.402 There has never been a time that
the Governor General has rejected the Prime Minister’s recommendation.403
Thus, in effect, the Prime Minister has the final say in deciding who is
appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.404 There is no constitutional
requirement that the appointment even needs to be discussed with parliament
or the cabinet.405
The Supreme Court of Canada bench consists of nine judges,
including the Chief Justice of Canada.406 Due to the combined English-French
population in Canada, at least three judges on the Supreme Court of Canada
must be selected from judges or barristers of the Quebec Bar.407 This ensures
that the French population of Canada is represented in the Supreme Court.408
In addition, generally three Supreme Court judges are from the Ontario Bar,
one judge is from one of the Atlantic provinces, two judges come from the
Western provinces, and one judge comes from one of the Prairie provinces.409
Although this rule is not firmly established in an Act, it is often implemented
when selecting judges for appointment to ensure that Canada’s provinces and
territories are well represented in the Supreme Court of Canada.410
The Supreme Court Act states that any person may be appointed as a
judge in one of the following two ways: (1) by judicial appointment to a
province’s superior court or (2) by “a barrister or advocate of at least ten years
standing at a province’s bar.”411 The Supreme Court Act states that “the judges
shall be appointed by the Governor in Council by letters patent under the Great
400.
See id.
401.
See id.; Peter McCormick, Selecting the Supremes: The Appointment of
Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 12–13 (2005).
402.
Id.
403.
Id.
404.
Id. at 30.
405.
See id. at 29.
406.
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-26, s. 4(1) (Can.).
407.
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-26, s. 6 (Can.); McCormick, supra
note 401, at 13.
408.
See McCormick, supra note 401, at 6, 13.
409.
Id. at 13.
410.
See id.
411.
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-26, s. 5 (Can.); McCormick, supra
note 401, at 13.
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Seal.”412 However, the Governor General plays a more symbolic role in the
appointment process, whereas the Supreme Court judges are actually selected
for appointment by Canada’s Prime Minister.413 When appointing judges to
the Supreme Court of Canada, the Minister of Justice first identifies potential
candidates.414 The potential candidate pool consists of provincial Court of
Appeal judges, senior bar members, law professors, and any additional names
put forward for consideration.415 The Chief Justice sitting on the Supreme
Court of Canada, the eight other judges, the Attorney General of the province
or territory, and at least one senior member from both the Canadian Bar
Association and the Law Society from the relevant region are consulted in
compiling the candidate list.416 The federal cabinet, run by the Prime Minister
with the involvement of the Minister of Justice, ultimately tells the Governor
General whom to appoint.417
Historically, the Canadian judiciary struggles to separate itself from
418
politics.
However, Canada has put a system in place to de-politicize the
judiciary.419 There is a separation between Canadian judges and politics,
which results from the merit-based appointment system it has adopted.420
Because of this, Canadian judges boast about the country’s judicial
independence.421 Canadian judges have even gone as far as saying the main
difference between judges in the United States and the judges in Canada is
“the political nature of judicial selection and judicial decision making in the
United States. ”422
G.

India

The judicial system in India, like the United States, is a three-tiered
hierarchy—District Courts, High Courts, and the Supreme Court.423 Judges
412.
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-26, s. 4(2) (Can.).
413.
McCormick, supra note 401, at 30.
414.
Id. at 15.
415.
Id.
416.
Id.
417.
Id. at 13.
418.
Miller, supra note 396, at 262.
419.
Id.; see Guide for Candidates, supra note 124; The Judiciary, GOV’T CAN.,
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/05.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2021).
420.
See Miller, supra note 396, at 264; Guide for Candidates, supra note 124;
The Judiciary, supra note 419.
421.
Miller, supra note 396, at 264.
422.
Id.
423.
Sande L. Buhai et al., The Role of Law Schools in Educating Judges to
Increase Access to Justice, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 161, 172 (2011). The
District Courts are usually the court of first instance. Id.

246

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

appointed to District Courts are typically recent law school graduates who
have enrolled as advocates, passed the judicial examination, and undergone
the interview process.424 Experience as an advocate is not necessary as long
as the candidate is qualified to enroll as an advocate.425 Depending on the state
the age limit may be anywhere from twenty-one to thirty-five.426
However, judicial candidates with seven or more years of experience
as advocates are eligible for appointment to a higher judiciary in the District
Courts.427 Moreover, civil judges and magistrates recruited immediately after
graduation must wait at least ten years from completing their law school
degree to become eligible for promotion.428 Although law students in India
have the opportunity to enter a career judiciary immediately after graduation,
the educational system does not focus on training them to be judges.429 Rather,
the law school curriculum focuses on training lawyers-to-be.430 This is largely
because the Bar Council of India is charged with developing the curriculum
and maintaining the standards for law school.431
District Court judges may be directly appointed to the highest court in
the subordinate judiciary by the High Courts or the state Public Service
Commission.432 The District Court judge’s promotion to such courts is based
on their performance in the lower or higher judicial services exam.433 Judicial
appointment to the superior judiciary differs from this system because it occurs
by promotion or direct invitation, rather than judicial service exams.434 At all
higher court levels, High Court judges and Supreme Court judges are
appointed directly or through promotion.435 These judges are appointed
through the “collegium” system, a system made up of the Chief Justice and
four of the most senior judges of the Supreme Court.436
424.
Id. at 172.; Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970, Rule 9(a), (c), 14(b).
425.
Delhi Judicial Service Rules, Rule 14(b).
426.
Ashish Bhan & Mohit Rohatgi, Legal Systems in India: Overview,
PRACTICAL LAW (Mar. 1, 2021), http://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-017-5278.
427.
Buhai et al., supra note 42, at 172, 174.
428.
Id. at 172.
429.
Id. at 173.
430.
Id.
431.
Id. For example, the Bar Council of India is responsible for deciding “the
courses to be taught in law school.” Id.
432.
Buhai et al., supra note 423, at 172; see India Const. art. 233, cl.1, art. 320,
cl. 1, 2.
433.
See Buhai et al., supra note 423, at 172.
434.
Id. at 172–73.
435.
Id. at 173; Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970, Rule 8–9(b).
436.
See Delhi Judicial Service Rules, Rule 7(1)–(4); Abhinav Chandrachud,
Does Life Tenure Make Judges More Independent? A Comparative Study of Judicial
Appointments in India, 28 CONN. J. INT'L L. 297, 307 (2013).
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The Supreme Court of India is considered one of the largest and most
powerful in the world.437 This is mainly because India’s practice of judicial
appointments insulates the judicial branch from other branches of
government.438 Currently, the Supreme Court is made up of about thirty
judges, including the Chief Justice.439 India’s judicial appointment essentially
has two steps.440 First, the Chief Justice consults the four most senior justices
sitting on the Supreme Court.441 The collegium determines who is worthy of
the appointment through consultation.442 Second, after coming to a consensus,
the Chief Justice makes a recommendation to the President, who then makes
the appointment.443 Although the collegium’s unanimous recommendation is
not binding and the President may return the advice of the cabinet for
reconsideration, the President’s role is, in effect, merely ceremonial and
formal to ensure judicial independence.444
To be considered for appointment as a Supreme Court Justice, the
candidate must be “a citizen of India,” under sixty-five years old, “a Judge of
a High Court (or of two or more such Courts in succession) for [at least] five
years,” an Advocate of the equivalent “for at least ten years, or, in the opinion
of the President, a ‘distinguished’ jurist.”445 Essentially, Judges of the
Supreme Court can be appointed through “promotion from the High Court
or . . . direct appointment by advocates or renowned jurists.”446
Once appointed, a justice’s term is limited by the mandatory
retirement age of sixty-five.447 Although the justices are not explicitly given
a fixed term, the mandatory retirement age, and the common practice of
appointing justices, is between the ages of fifty-eight to sixty, which results in
437.
Chandrachud, supra note 436, at 309.
438.
Id. at 299, 316.
439.
Id. at 308–09; Chief Justice & Judges, SUP. CT. INDIA,
http://main.sci.gov.in/chief-justice-judges (last visited Apr. 28, 2022); Judges of the Supreme
Court of India:
A Ready Reckoner, BAR & BENCH (May 3, 2020, 2:47 AM),
http://www.barandbench.com/columns/judges-of-the-supreme-court-of-india-a-readyreckoner.
440.
See Chandrachud, supra note 436, at 307.
441.
Id.
442.
See id.
443.
Id.; Utkarsh Anand, In Posting of Judges, President’s Role Only
Ceremonial, Govt Tells SC, INDIAN EXPRESS, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indiaothers/in-posting-of-judges-presidents-role-only-ceremonial-govt-tells-sc/ (last updated June 9,
2015, 8:17 AM).
444.
See Anand, supra note 443.
445.
Chandrachud, supra note 436, at 307; Constitution, SUP. CT. INDIA,
http://main.sci.gov.in/constitution (last visited Apr. 28, 2022); India Const. art. 124, cl. 2–3.
446.
Buhai et al., supra note 423, at 173; India Const. art. 233, cl. 1.
447.
India Const. art. 124, cl. 2.
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an average tenure of three to seven years in office, although obviously younger
judicial appointees will serve for a more extended period.448
In addition, an appointed justice may only be removed during their
tenure for proven misbehavior or incapacity.449 And, even then, removal is
challenging because two-thirds of both houses of parliament must approve the
motion.450
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States, along with other democracies have struggled with
inherent tensions between judicial independence, maintaining a depoliticized
judiciary, and holding the judiciary accountable to the body politic.451 In many
cases, this tension cannot be resolved.452 For example, increasing judicial
independence almost necessarily results in less public accountability.453
However, certain aspects of non-U.S. legal systems would arguably improve
judicial independence and Rule of Law without sacrificing accountability.454
First, the preparation of judges in a professional and non-partisan
system of judicial track education, such as the Civil Service Model, would
decrease the problem in the United States where judges are being appointed
solely based on their previous political work.455 Such a system of professional
education is practiced in France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.456 The
advantages of a system of non-partisan judicial education are that it increases
judicial independence and promotes Rule of Law, while not affecting the
actual appointment process.457
Second, electoral appointment of judges presents a serious problem in
any legal system.458 At the appointment stage, judges are required to run for
office just like a politician, vastly reducing scrutiny of the judge’s professional
448.
Abhinav Chandrachud, Speech, Structure, and Behavior on the Supreme
Court of India, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 222, 234 (2012).
449.
Appointment and Removal of Judges of the Supreme Court of India, BYJU’S,
http://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/appointment-and-removal-of-supreme-court-judges/ (last visited
Apr. 28, 2022); India Const. art. 124, cl. 4.
450.
See Appointment and Removal of the Supreme Court of India, supra note
449; see, e.g., India Const. art. 124, cl. 4.
451.
See Milone, supra note 46.
452.
See id; Bierman, supra note 88, at 853.
453.
Bierman, supra note 88, at 855.
454.
See id. at 856; Liptak, supra note 8, at 4.
455.
See Volcansek, supra note 5, at 371.
456.
Id. at 368, 372.
457.
See id. at 371, 373.
458.
See id. at 366, 384–85; but see Shepherd, supra note 66, at 1607.
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qualification or other suitability for judicial office.459 Electoral retention of
judges vastly decreases judicial independence and Rule of Law, as judges have
to appease popular opinion just to retain their jobs.460 This represents a serious
problem with preserving judicial independence in the United States at both the
state and local levels.461
Third, an unchecked appointment process presents similar problems
as elections.462 Instead of being beholden to the whims of popular opinion,
judges, at least at the appointment stage, are beholden to those who appoint
them.463 Non-U.S. legal systems and states in the United States that employ
an appointments process with checks on the appointment power would seem
to best address this tension by simultaneously decreasing politicization of the
judiciary, while still retaining a political element to the appointment and
retention process.464
Fourth, the importance of non-governmental involvement in the
judicial appointment process cannot be overstated.465 Legal associations, such
as the American Bar Association, have provided an important screening
process that helps provide a more neutral screening of judges for
professionalism, as opposed to only looking at political credentials.466
Unfortunately, in the United States, the involvement of organizations, such as
the American Bar Association, has been curtailed, particularly under the
Trump Administration as judges are sought more for their fealty to a particular
political agenda than their adherence to professional standards and the Rule of
Law.467

459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 106, at 63–64.
See Shepherd, supra note 66, at 1607–08.
See id. at 1604–05.
See Liptak, supra note 8, at 2, 5.
Shepherd, supra note 66, at 1607.
Volcansek, supra note 5, at 383–84.
See Liptak, supra note 8, at 1, 2.
See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 21–22, 71.
Ruiz et al., supra note 2.
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INTRODUCTION

The year is 1938 and New Jersey residents have just turned on their
radios to hear Herbert George (“H.G.”) Wells broadcast fake news bulletins
that warn of an alien invasion.1 What the listeners do not seem to realize is
that Wells is performing a radio adaptation of his science-fiction novel, The
War of the Worlds.2 What results is nationwide hysteria that causes a flurry of
phone calls from anxious listeners to police stations, newspaper offices, and
other radio stations with fears of an imminent Martian maraud—a predictable
result of a population believing without seeing.3 Fast forward to the 21st
century, and now, even seeing is no longer believing; citizens can no longer

* Sergio E. Molina is a commercial litigator in Miami, Florida. Sergio obtained his Juris Doctor
from Nova Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad College of Law with the College's
concentration in Intellectual Property, Technology, and Cybersecurity Law, and his bachelor’s
degree in finance with minors in economics and psychology from Florida International
University.
1.
A. Brad Schwartz, The Infamous “War of the Worlds” Radio Broadcast
Was
a
Magnificent
Fluke,
SMITHSONIAN
MAG.
(May
6,
2015),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/infamous-war-worlds-radio-broadcast-wasmagnificent-fluke-180955180/.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
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trust their own eyes or ears.4 Claims such as these have moved out of the realm
of fake radio bulletins, hyperboles, or even hypotheticals and into what is now
our new, technologically-advanced reality.5 To what do citizens of today’s
society owe this belief in absolute disbelief?6 Enter “deepfakes,” a term that
combines the phrases “deep learning” and “fake,” that refers to a wide variety
of hyper-realistic images, videos, and audio recordings that are fabricated
through the use of machine learning.7
Deepfakes are synthetic audiovisual (“AV”) media with seemingly
limitless applications—a type of media that can do everything from the
recreation of voices to the swapping of faces from one person onto another.8
Below is a compilation of images that depict the manner in which deepfake
technology employs face-swapping methodology to create synthesized media
of Donald Trump and Elizabeth Warren.9

Deepfake Media of Donald Trump and Elizabeth Warren10
4.
See Holly Kathleen Hall, Deepfake Videos: When Seeing Isn't Believing,
CATH. U. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2018, at 51, 51.
5.
See Nicholas Diakopoulos & Deborah Johnson, Anticipating and
Addressing the Ethical Implications of Deepfakes in the Context of Elections, 23 NEW MEDIA
& SOC’Y 2072, 2073 (2021).
6.
See id.
7.
Id.; Elizabeth Caldera, Comment, “Reject the Evidence of Your Eyes and
Ears”: Deepfakes and the Law of Virtual Replicants, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 177, 178 (2019);
BRITT PARIS & JOAN DONOVAN, DATA & SOC’Y, DEEPFAKES AND CHEAP FAKES: THE
MANIPULATION
OF
AUDIO
AND
VISUAL
EVIDENCE
2
(2019),
http://datasociety.net/library/deepfakes-and-cheap-fakes/.
8.
PARIS & DONOVAN, supra note 7, at 2; Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note
5, at 2073.
9.
See Will Knight, Facebook, Google, Twitter Aren’t Prepared for
Presidential
Deepfakes,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Aug
6,
2019),
http://www.technologyreview.com/2019/08/06/639/facebook-google-twitter-arent-preparedfor-presidential-deepfakes/. Visual aids are used throughout this Article to assist the reader in
seeing the effectiveness of some of the deepfake media currently available to the public.
Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1709 (2014) (“On the
rare occasions where journals did include images, they were startlingly effective.”).
10.
Knight, supra note 9.
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With deepfakes already spreading throughout various facets of
society, the strongest embrace is most notable from both the arts and
entertainment fields.11 Given deepfakes’ ability to superimpose the faces of
actors onto the bodies of stunt doubles or even to simulate actors’ scenes
altogether, it is no surprise that Hollywood has taken notice of the vast
opportunities that the new technology presents.12 But, it does not stop there.13
The realms of art and entertainment have seen the uses of deepfakes taken as
far as to bring long-deceased actors or public figures “back to life.”14
Although deepfakes present numerous benefits to the creative arts,
they also introduce a concerning reality.15 As the number of online deepfakes
grows by the day, many have questioned the harmful implications of the
technology and the effects that it may have when compounded by current
social and political climates.16 However, the potential for harm is not
exclusively reserved for public figures, nor is it reduced only to simplified
forms of AV manipulation.17 As society continues to see the democratization
of more advanced technologies, deepfakes have begun to present individuals
with novel methods of “exploitation, intimidation, and sabotage.”18 The most
concerning example of this has perhaps been the widespread use of deepfake
technology to fabricate pornography with the images of both public figures
and private individuals without their consent.19 This is just the tip of the
iceberg.20 Data suggests that minority communities, particularly women, are

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2073.
See id. at 2074; Hall, supra note 4, at 57.
See Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2073.
Id.
See Marcus Baram, How Deepfakes Evolved So Rapidly in Just a Few
Years, FAST CO. (Oct. 8, 2019), http://www.fastcompany.com/90414479/how-deepfakesevolved-so-rapidly-in-just-a-few-years; Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2072; Bobby
Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and
National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (2019).
16.
Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2072; PARIS & DONOVAN, supra
note 7, at 3.
17.
Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2080; PARIS & DONOVAN, supra
note 7, at 5–6.
18.
Chesney & Citron, supra note 15, at 1754.
19.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-379SP, SCIENCE & TECH
SPOTLIGHT:
DEEPFAKES 1 (2020), http://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-379sp.pdf; Mika
Westerlund, The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, 9 TECH. INNOVATION MGMT.
REV., Nov. 2019, at 39, 43.
20.
See Robert Size, Publishing Fake News for Profit Should Be Prosecuted as
Wire Fraud, 60 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 29, 30–31 (2020).
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more greatly affected by the harms that deepfake technologies present.21 It is
likely that minority communities with a greater stake in information and
personal privacy, like the LGBTQ+ community, could stand to lose more in
the wake of misused deepfake technology.22
While some believe that the discussions surrounding deepfakes’
potential threats are overstated, it can hardly be denied that technology is better
today than it was yesterday, and yet still not as good as it will be tomorrow.23
This is a dynamic that necessitates a discussion on the law’s evolution in order
to effectively address technological advancements and the harms that they
may impose.24 In that regard, deepfakes do not provide an exception to this
claim, but instead serve to reinforce its validity.25
This Article serves to address the current landscape of deepfake
technology in modern culture and its impacts on marginalized communities,
particularly the LGBTQ+ community, in four subsequent parts.26 Part II offers
a technical glimpse into the creation of deepfakes; how deepfakes came into
being and why deepfakes circulate society with great frequency.27 Part III
looks at the threats that deepfake technology can pose when put in the hands
of individuals seeking to harm or extort members of marginalized
communities, such as the LGBTQ+ community, by providing a historical
overview of similar forms of exploitation that the LGBTQ+ community has
faced in the past.28 Part IV explores the existing regulatory frameworks that
serve to address the harms of deepfake technology along with the suggested
evolutions and amendments of those frameworks.29 This Article concludes by
21.
Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth Decay:
Deep Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National Security, 78 MD. L.
REV. 882, 886 (2019); Baram, supra note 15; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note
19, at 1.
22.
See Chesney & Citron, supra note 21, at 886; Baram, supra note 15; Sergio
E. Molina, DL and Looking? So Are the Data Miners, and They Already Know What You’re
Into, OUTSIDE INFLUENCE, Fall/Winter 2019, at 4–5.
23.
Russell Brandom, Deepfake Propaganda Is Not a Real Problem, VERGE
(Mar. 5, 2019, 12:25 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2019/3/5/18251736/deepfakepropaganda-misinformation-troll-video-hoax; Hayley Duquette, Note, Digital Fame:
Amending the Right of Publicity to Combat Advances in Face-Swapping Technology, 20 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 82, 103 (2020).
24.
Duquette, supra note 24 at 103; see also David Dorfman, Decoding
Deepfakes: How Do Lawyers Adapt When Seeing Isn’t Always Believing?, OR. ST. B. BULL.,
Apr. 2020, at 18, 20.
25.
Duquette, supra note 24, at 103; Dorfman, supra note 24, at 20.
26.
See discussion infra Parts I–III.
27.
See discussion infra Part II.
28.
See discussion infra Part III.
29.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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advocating for the adoption of an amended regulatory scheme via Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act30 and for the re-appropriation of
deepfake technology until such time that federal legislation better promotes
and protects the online privacy and personal safety of members of the
LGBTQ+ community.31
II.

DEEP DIVING INTO DEEPFAKES

Audiovisual manipulation is by no means a novel concept; however,
the newest stage in its evolutionary journey incorporates an added layer of
technological advancements that makes its existence not only more
widespread, but also more intricate.32 In order to develop a better sense of the
threats that deepfakes pose and the manners in which deepfakes may be
mitigated, it is important to understand exactly where deepfakes came from,
how they are made, and why their availability is growing.33
A.

Remember to Rewind

Society’s understanding of deepfakes has become popularized at a
time when “fake news”—or, as some define it, false, inaccurate, or misleading
information designed, presented, and promoted to further interests—is front
and center.34 It is important to note that fake news serves as an umbrella term
under which misinformation and disinformation exist35—misinformation
being the unintentional furtherance of misleading or inaccurate information
and disinformation being its intentional equivalent.36 While the root of these
concepts are ancient, social media structures and the rise of deepfakes have
helped these concepts branch out into a post-truth society where “objective
30.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 133
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1997)).
31.
See discussion infra Part V.
32.
See Chesney & Citron, supra note 21, at 884–85.
33.
Russell Spivak, “Deepfakes”: The Newest Way to Commit One of the
Oldest Crimes, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339, 342 (2019); Westerlund, supra note 19, at 40;
Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2074.
34.
See Cristian Vaccari & Andrew Chadwick, Deepfakes and Disinformation:
Exploring the Impact of Synthetic Political Video on Deception, Uncertainty, and Trust in News,
SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y, Jan.–Mar. 2020, at 1, 2.
35.
Fernando Nuñez, Note, Disinformation Legislation and Freedom of
Expression, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 783, 785–86 (2020).
36.
Kyle Anderson, Note, Truth, Lies, and Likes: Why Human Nature Makes
Online Misinformation a Serious Threat (and What We Can Do About It), 44 LAW & PSYCH.
REV. 209, 211 (2019–2020).
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facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and
personal belief.”37
Recent events have highlighted the manners in which all of these
concepts intersect.38 However, these concepts are the latest iteration of a
longstanding practice.39
For example, the earliest known surviving
photograph was taken in the mid-to-late 1820s.40 Since then, the practice of
photo editing has been almost as long-standing as the history of the photograph
itself.41 Although photo editing became a developed practice long before the
creation of the first computer, the emergence of photoshop in the 1980s
allowed for the practice to popularize among both professionals and amateurs
alike.42 The twentieth century saw a similar pattern occur in film—like the
development of the world’s first editing machine in the 1920s—the
development of the videotape recorder in the 1950s, and the introduction of
non-linear editing with the help of modern computers.43
Advancements in the ability to manipulate all of these forms of media,
in one way or another, could produce hundreds of takes and seamlessly string
them together into one desired output that, as far as the consumer of the media
knows, occurred in one attempt.44 These edits of audiovisual footage without
the use of machine learning are known as “cheapfakes,” or “shallowfakes,”
the most common of which include photoshopped images, recontextualized
media, and sped up or slowed down video.45 As technology advanced and
computers began running more intricate programs, the practice of physically
splicing reels of film fell out of practice, and the adoption of more cuttingedge techniques like computer-generated imagery (“CGI”) became the norm.46
Today, deepfake technology has brought society face-to-face with the
latest version of the tried-and-true practices of its predecessors.47 One of the
37.
Hall, supra note 4, at 54.
38.
See Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2073.
39.
Chesney & Citron, supra note 21, at 884–85.
40.
Spivak, supra note 33, at 341.
41.
See Michael Scott Henderson, Note, Applying Tort Law to Fabricated
Digital Content, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2018).
42.
Spivak, supra note 33, at 341.
43.
Henderson, supra note 41, at 1149.
44.
See PARIS & DONOVAN, supra note 7, at 14–15 (explaining that consumer
software and free mobile apps allow for this manipulation).
45.
Id. at 5–6.
46.
See Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2074; Marie-Helen Maras &
Alex Alexandrou, Determining Authenticity of Video Evidence in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence and in the Wake of Deepfake Videos, 23 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 255, 256
(2019); David Song, A Short History of Deepfakes, MEDIUM (Sept. 23, 2019),
http://www.medium.com/@songda/a-short-history-of-deepfakes-604ac7be6016.
47.
See Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2074.
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more notable uses of deepfake technology and synthetic media is its use by the
Dalí Museum to “resurrect,” or rather, “reincarnate” Salvador Dalí for a more
immersive, interactive guest experience that the museum’s website describes
as allowing “visitors an opportunity to learn more about Salvador Dalí’s life
from the person who knew him best: the artist himself.”48 But the technology
is not limited only to living things.49 For example, whereas the Dalí Museum
in St. Petersburg, Florida, uses deepfakes to reproduce Salvador Dalí himself,
Russian researchers have used similar software to animate intimate subjects
that include the works of other great artists, such as Johannes Vermeer’s Girl
with a Pearl Earring, and Leonardo DaVinci’s Mona Lisa, as depicted
below.50

Image of Works of Art Animated with Deepfake Technology51
Much like copies of the works produced by some of art’s great
masters, deepfakes have been described as forgeries of photos, videos, and
audios made with the assistance of artificial intelligence.52 In many ways,
referring to deepfakes as forgeries is a misnomer of sorts in that, at least in the
colloquial sense, forgeries are almost exact copies of works already in
existence.53 Deepfakes, on the other hand, operate more as a hyper-realistic
collage in that they synthesize a wide number of already existing works to

48.
Dalí Lives (Via Artificial Intelligence), SALVADOR DALÍ MUSEUM,
http://www.thedali.org/exhibit/dali-lives/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
49.
See Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Deepfakes: More Frightening Than Photoshop
on Steroids, JUDGES’ J., Summer 2019, at 35, 36.
50.
Id.
51.
Gregory Barber, Deepfakes Are Getting Better, but They’re Still Easy to
Spot, WIRED (May 26, 2019, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/story/deepfakes-getting-bettertheyre-easy-spot/.
52.
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 19, at 1.
53.
Forgery,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/forgery (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
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create an entirely new product that looks seamless and real.54 Deepfakes fall
under the larger umbrella of audiovisual manipulation, which is generally
identified as the means for influencing the interpretation of media.55
Audiovisual manipulation splits into two branches: either deepfakes, which
incorporate artificial intelligence, or cheapfakes, which, as mentioned before,
employ less technologically-advanced techniques.56 Cheapfakes require that
individuals upload media onto a computer and manually make adjustments—
a process that, although still yielding a realistic product, can be incredibly
labor-intensive and time-consuming, given its less technical nature.57
However, the introduction of artificial intelligence, described in more detail
below, provides a solution that cuts down on the time, as well as the amount
of manual work needed to create a convincing product.58
It is important to note that “artificial intelligence” is often
synonymized with “machine learning,” however, the two terms are distinct.59
Artificial intelligence is modeled after the human brain and reacts to incoming
data, rather than relying on programmed rules, in order to operate rationally
and intelligently.60 To do this, artificial intelligence incorporates both
algorithms—instructions or sets of instructions—and machine learning.61
Machine learning is a branch of artificial intelligence that resembles the human
trial and error process by allowing computer systems to learn directly from
observing examples, data, and experiences.62
Deepfakes are created with a similar process that incorporates “deep
learning,” a deep neural network that takes in a multitude of data from an input
layer and autonomously runs it through various nodes until it produces an
output layer.63 Oftentimes, this is done either with an autoencoder, which is
an artificial neural network trained to reconstruct inputs from a simpler
representation, or with a Generative Adversarial Network (“GAN”).64 GANs
54.
KELLEY M. SAYLER & LAURIE A. HARRIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11333,
DEEP
FAKES
AND
NATIONAL
SECURITY
(2021),
http://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11333.
55.
PARIS & DONOVAN, supra note 7, at 5–6.
56.
Id.
57.
Jessica Ice, Note, Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First
Amendment, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 417, 420 (2019).
58.
Id. at 421.
59.
Herbert B. Dixon Jr., What Judges and Lawyers Should Understand About
Artificial Intelligence Technology, JUDGES J., Winter 2020, at 36, 36 (2020).
60.
Maras & Alexandrou, supra note 46, at 256.
61.
Dixon, supra note 59, at 36.
62.
Maras & Alexandrou, supra note 46, at 256.
63.
Ice, supra note 57, at 421.
64.
Id. at 421–22.
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the subject as it, but moves it in accordance with the movements of another
individual.74 Voice synthesis techniques follow a similar pattern where the
product will either mimic an audio recording and use it to create a video that
matches up perfectly to the sound, or use a small clip of audio to then dictate
any form of speech that is read in the voice of the subject.75
B.

Spreading like Wildfire

In today’s techno-feudalistic society—the technology creators are the
sovereign, its regulators are the nobility, its owners are the vassals, and its
users are the peasants.76 While the internet has provided history with a new
dimension, it has also amplified previously restrictive notions of
accessibility.77 This has not only led to the democratization of technology, but
also to the potential for harm that it brings.78 In this techno-feudalistic world,
although the simplicity with which technology has allowed deepfakes to be
made is a concerning thought, one of the more troubling traits of deepfake
technology is its recent and continued attainability.79 After all,
Modern technology has not only provided new,
convincing, false content, it has also facilitated its dissemination.
Social media platforms have made sharing content faster than ever
by the retweeting, sharing, or reposting mechanisms they have
implemented. This may not be a problem on its own, but recent
research suggests that not all content spreads at the same rate.
Research from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
suggests that false content spreads up to six times faster than factual
content on social media sites and false news stories are seventy
percent more likely to be shared.80

74.
Id.; see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 19.
75.
Spivak, supra note 33, at 352.
76.
Alex Hagan, Comment to Future of Work: What Is "Techno-Feudalism"?,
QUORA (July 6, 2015, 1:37 AM), http://www.quora.com/Future-of-Work-What-is-technofeudalism.
77.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of L., Univ. Cal. Berkley Sch. L., Fake News,
Weaponized Defamation and the First Amendment, Keynote Address at Southwestern Law
School (Jan. 26, 2012), in 47 SW. L. REV. 291, 291.
78.
Id.; Nuñez, supra note 35, at 786, 788.
79.
Katarina Kertysova, Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation: How AI
Changes the Way Disinformation is Produced, Disseminated, and Can Be Countered, 29 SEC.
& HUM. RTS. 55, 63–64, 67 (2018).
80.
Nuñez, supra note 35, at 786.

2022]

DEEPFAKES AND THE LGBTQ+ COMMUNITY

261

Importantly, the hurdles on the path to mastering the creation and
dissemination of deepfake media are not the technical skills required to create
deepfakes, per se, but rather the attainability of processors with sufficient
capacity to run large programs.81 Because GANs make outputs a product of
inputs, the greater its data training set, the easier it is for the program to
develop a credible piece of deepfake media.82 This requires that a creator
obtain a graphic processing unit (“GPU”) sizeable enough, and with a vast
amount of memory, to work through the large quantities of photos, videos, or
audios of the target.83 More specifically, to perform deep learning, train a
neural network to reconstruct patterns effectively, and ultimately create
deepfake media, one would need a GPU greater than those found in
commercially available laptops (at least as of 2019), and would require an
understanding of “torrenting, path configuration, file structures, and
application versioning.”84
In reality, to create an effective deepfake, a user need only a computer
comparable to a high-quality gaming laptop that retails for well under
$3,000—a far smaller technological obstacle for gamers and avid computer
hobbyists.85 In fact, even that may not be entirely necessary, as anyone with
basic computer skills has the means by which to create deepfakes.86 What
makes this heightened accessibility of creative processes possible is the rise of
more readily available software in the open market and internet tutorials on
the deepfake-media-making process that, together, work to lift technological
constraints.87 For example, FakeApp is a relatively accessible program that
does not require complex equipment and creates deepfake media in as little as
eight to twelve hours.88
Today, more programs are being cheaply sold, with some of the GPUs
needed to make deepfake media selling for as low as $160 USD.89 For those
that do not have the financial means or interests to purchase, these types of

81.
See Dorfman, supra note 24, at 20; SAYLER & HARRIS, supra note 54.
82.
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84.
Ice, supra note 57, at 425–26.
85.
See id. at 426; Maras & Alexandrou, supra note 46, at 256.
86.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 19.
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supra note 19.
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Hall, supra note 4, at 57.
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GPUs are also available to rent.90 But even absent the necessary GPUs
altogether, most people already have access to programs that can develop
deepfake media.91 Mobile applications like Snapchat, Doublicat, and Reface
are allowing users to make deepfakes right from the palms of their hands.92
This may help explain the growing interest that social media users have in the
use of deepfake technology.93 TikTok—one of the newer social media
platforms circulating in popular culture—has seen its own buzz around
deepfake media with the videos posted by a user very credibly impersonating
actor Tom Cruise with deepfake technology.94 As of the writing of this Article,
that TikTok account, @deeptomcruise, now has over 943,600 followers and
an approximated forty million views across only six videos.95
TikTok does not stand alone, as there are other social media sites with
deepfake capabilities.96 There is a wide field of social media platforms, all of
which have seen a fair share of deepfake media uploads, along with, a vast
body of literature addressing the issue and the factors that aggravate it.97 Deep
Trace, self-described as the world’s first visual threat intelligence company,
identified the existence of at least 14,678 deepfakes circulating online at the
time of its report—a statistic that shows not only the ease with which
deepfakes can be created, but also the simplicity with which social media
platforms disseminate them, or at least play a substantive role in doing so.98
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1, 22.
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See Citron, supra note 96, at 1081; Diakopoulos & Johnson, supra note 5,
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THE FOE WITH A THOUSAND FACES

There are two sides to every coin, and with the good, there comes
bad.99 Deepfakes first hit the scene on Reddit for a troubling purpose:
Creating synthetic pornography that featured the faces of well-known
celebrities superimposed on existing pornography videos, all without their
knowledge or consent.100 As time went on, this function of deepfake
technology became more and more prevalent, and targeted even those not
operating as public figures in society.101 In fact, research suggests that
deepfake technology seems to be disproportionately impacting women,
whether public figures or private individuals.102 As one Article author put it,
“[t]he harm wrought by [deepfakes] is not simply that a viewer might be
deceived into believing that they are watching a video that actually portrays
the subject (although, that harm may also exist). Rather, it is the dignitary
harm inflicted on the subject herself.”103 Greater still is the disproportionate
impact that deepfakes can have when used to blackmail people within
vulnerable populations, like the LGBTQ+ community, that oftentimes find
themselves hiding in the shadows.104 The concept of data exploitation for the
purposes of blackmailing or harming the LGBTQ+ community is not a new
one, and historical data, in addition to modern concerns over dating apps,
seems to suggest that the threat is magnified for such communities.105
This kind of data exploitation is very much in line with the more
archaic forms of data exploitation that have threatened the LGBTQ+
community throughout various points in history.106 During the height of the
Nazi regime, the Gestapo raided sex research institutions and confiscated
extensive lists containing the names and addresses of local homosexuals.107
Those listed became the targets of the Reich Central Office for the Combatting
of Homosexuality and Abortion.108 The Nazis arrested over 100,000 men as
homosexuals and took some of these men to concentration camps where they
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were denied support groups, experimented on, and murdered.109 Similarly, in
the United States, during the McCarthyist anti-communist campaign of the
mid-1900s, the federal government gathered data on homosexuals through
community member interrogations and raided community safe spaces to
investigate “the alleged employment of homosexuals in the government
service” through a congressional subcommittee created for that particular
purpose.110 Any federal employee suspected of being homosexual was
terminated and outed publicly—exposing hundreds to lost livelihoods,
financial instability, and reduced esteem among their fellow peers and
community members, among many other concerns.111
As technology advanced, more and more LGBTQ+ individuals have
been antagonized by breaches of online privacy and information
exploitation.112 Tragedies like those of Tyler Clementi,113 Channing Smith,114
and many others share that common factor.115 In 2017, LGBTQ+ Chechens
saw the latest iteration of this problem.116 During the last week of February
2017, Chechen officials detained a young man who was suspected of being
under the influence of a controlled substance.117 At the time, Chechen officials
searched the man’s phone without permission and discovered intimate
photographs and messages exchanged with other men which led to the
investigation of his social media platforms.118 The Chechen Officials raided
the man’s private electronic communications and tortured him to compile a
list of other suspected Chechen homosexuals who were then tortured for the
same purpose.119 This sparked the Chechen anti-gay purges, which included
the unofficial detention, humiliation, starvation, and torture of Chechen men
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111.
See id.
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suspected of being gay.120 While many of these men were returned to their
families, release was often coupled with suggestions that forced
disappearances and honor killings be carried out.121
Although technology has provided, for many in the LGBTQ+
community, access to resources and communities that they once worked
secretly to identify, it has also been shown to serve as the target that many in
society place on the backs of LGBTQ+ members, as well as the key with which
others gain access to them.122 The abuse of the LGBTQ+ community that we
have seen throughout history makes this clear and offers a warning as deepfake
technology begins to circulate more prevalently.123 However, recent events
indicate that we need not engage in extensive thought experiments to identify
the harms that deepfakes can pose to the LGBTQ+ community.124
In 2019, a sex tape was made public of Azmin Ali, the Malaysian
Minister of Economic Affairs, engaging in an intimate relationship with the
male aid of a rival minister.125 Aware that homosexuality is illegal in
Malaysia, Ali and his allies downplayed the tape and its insinuation by
claiming that it was fabricated with deepfake technology and not real.126 Some
digital forensic professionals have yet to find any evidence to suggest that the
footage is a deepfake.127 This circumstance exposes what experts call the
“liar’s dividend,” or when a skeptical public aware of deepfake technology
becomes primed to doubt the authenticity of real audio and video evidence.128
Putting aside questions as to the veracity of the footage, the Ali controversy
serves as a reminder that many members of the LGBTQ+ community still live
in locations where the exposure of their sexual and gender identity can deny
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them opportunities, employment, liberty, and even life.129 However, whether
the Ali video is ultimately identified as real or a deepfake is irrelevant in this
discussion as the possibility alone highlights the reality that many in the
LGBTQ+ community might soon face.130 Even if no scandalous footage
exists, any maliciously-intentioned individual could create a deepfake of a
target that depicts them engaging in homosexual acts, and use it either to have
them denied opportunities altogether or have them extorted for their own
purposes.131
IV.

STOP, DROP, OR ROLL WITH IT

While numerous scholars, technologists, and government
representatives have advocated for the development of new policy initiatives
to specifically address the growing concern surrounding deepfake media and
its implications, this Article focuses more squarely on the adaptation of current
laws in order to provide recourse to those harmed by deepfake media, and on
the legislative efforts that can be taken to secure the privacy and safety of
members of the LGBTQ+ community in light of the potential for that content’s
misuse.132
A.

The Regulation Race

With the public’s understanding of deepfake technology continuing to
grow, and its concerns for its misuse growing with it, one question has become
more prevalent among many others—if technology created the problem,
shouldn’t technology be the thing to offer the solution?133 In 2020, Congress
passed the first deepfake-specific statute—not one addressing any regulatory
structure, but rather one incentivizing research into the development of
deepfake detection software similar to the one depicted below that uses a blue
box to track head rotation, red dots to map facial expressions, and green beams
to detect the direction of eye movement.134
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accountability is not without its difficulties.143 For example, it is likely that an
outright ban of deepfake media would survive constitutional muster under the
First Amendment.144
Additionally, one of the more challenging obstacles that deepfakes
present to those that wish to challenge them in the civil arena is the fact that
finding their creators is very difficult given that the metadata needed to
determine a deepfake’s provenance may be inadequate for proper
identification of its creator.145
Moreover, although deepfake media
necessitates the exploitation of copyrighted material for its development, a
would-be challenger would still have to take on the herculean task of locating
the large quantities of input media, sifting through all of the inputs to
determine if they have rights in any one, or a few, of the materials used and, if
so, still overcome arguments of fair use and transformative use.146 By that
same token, even if the creator of a deepfake is identified, given the
geographically diverse nature of the internet, it may be likely that a deepfake
creator is domiciled outside of the United States making the exercise of
jurisdiction over the creator yet another difficult hurdle to overcome.147 And
of course, civil suits often come at a high cost to both the plaintiff’s financial
interests as well as to their regard in the public eye, ultimately introducing the
possibility of exacerbating their harms.148 While overcoming these initial road
bumps is not impossible, the current legal landscape seems to be a difficult
one under which a would-be plaintiff could find the solution they seek.149
However, that is not to say that there may not be an effective path forward.150
B.

Hope on the Horizon: Amending and Modifying Section 230

Much of what makes deepfakes so harmful is not just the content
itself, but also its ability to spread so rapidly on social media platforms.151
However, what makes the latter of those two issues possible is not so much
the product of the deepfakes themselves as it is the platforms that house them
and the laws used to regulate them.152 The most relevant among them is the
143.
144.
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148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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Id. at 1795.

2022]

DEEPFAKES AND THE LGBTQ+ COMMUNITY

269

Communications Decency Act,153 a federal law passed by Congress in 1996—
particularly, Section 230 of the Act.154 Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act states in pertinent part:
(c)

Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening
of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content
provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material
is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1).155

Prior to the enactment of Section 230, websites that sought to
moderate harmful or offensive material posted by third parties were treated as
publishers and would be held liable if they were unsuccessful in removing the
harmful material.156 However, this presented an interesting loophole as it
allowed for websites to stick their heads in the sand, so to speak, and evade
the imposition of liability by ignoring any harmful content that they knew

153.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 110 Stat.
133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1997)).
154.
Citron, supra note 96, at 1088.
155.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
156.
Brown, supra note 96, at 43.
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existed on their platform.157 This was seen in action in 1994 when an
individual accused Stratton Oakmont of fraudulent and illegal securities
trading practices on Money Talk, a message board run by Prodigy
Communication Corporation—a leading Internet Service Provider at the
time.158 Stratton responded by suing both Prodigy and Money Talk’s
administrator for libel.159 The court concluded that Prodigy was a publisher
because it held itself out to the public as controlling the content of its computer
bulletin boards and practiced such control through its use of an automatic
software screening program.160 Following the ruling in the Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,161 Congress members grew concerned that the
court’s ruling would disincentivize the moderation of offensive content posted
to internet service providers by third parties.162 As a result, Congress passed
the Communications Decency Act and included in it, Section 230, which
offers internet service providers a broad shield of immunity from liability for
moderating too much or too little of their third party users’ speech.163
However, the absence of narrow language in Section 230’s immunity
clauses has come to be interpreted in a manner that is so broad that it has
created yet another problem—immunity remains available even if an internet
service provider intentionally encourages the posting of harmful content.164 In
fact, when it has been applied, this expansive immunity has allowed internet
service providers to republish content with the knowledge that it violates the
law, alter their platform to prevent the capture of criminals, and allow the sale
of illegal or dangerous products.165 For example, Grindr, a dating app
marketed primarily to the gay community, often sees fake profiles on its
platform wherein a user appropriates the images, whether more commonplace
or intimate, of another (“catfishing”).166 Recently, one of Grindr’s users,
Matthew Herrick, sued the company for the negligent design of its application
after Herrick’s ex-boyfriend began impersonating him on the app by creating
a fake profile in his name, spreading his nude photographs, and sharing rape
157.
See id.
158.
Spivak, supra note 33, at 387.
159.
Id.; Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
160.
Spivak, supra note 33, at 387–88; Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL
323710, at *4.
161.
No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
162.
Citron, supra note 96, at 1088–89.
163.
Id. at 1089.
164.
See Chesney & Citron, supra note 15, at 1797.
165.
Id. at 1798; see also Citron, supra note 96, at 1089.
166.
See Chris Fox, Why Do Gay Apps Struggle to Stop Catfish?, BBC (Oct. 28,
2019), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50138390; Citron, supra note 96, at 1089.
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fantasies with other users, among many other things.167 Herrick notified
Grindr of his ex-boyfriend’s behaviors over one hundred times to no avail.168
At one point, Herrick’s ex-boyfriend shared Herrick’s address publicly on the
app, which led to over twenty strangers coming to his apartment on any given
day, totaling more than a thousand trespassers.169 The court dismissed
Herrick’s suit against Grindr on the grounds of Section 230 immunity, noting
that his claims were all based on content provided by another Grindr user, not
by Grindr itself, and that to the extent that Grindr had contributed to the
profiles impersonating Herrick, it was only through “neutral assistance,” for
which Section 230 has been interpreted to provide immunity.170 The ruling
was later affirmed on appeal.171
Looking more directly at the role of Section 230 in the perpetuation
of the threats that deepfake technologies present particularly to the LGBTQ+
community, the facts of Herrick v. Grindr, LLC172 can be adapted to illustrate
the point in action.173 User A of a social media platform either creates or
obtains a deepfake that impersonates User B, and depicts B in some intimate
act without their knowledge or consent.174 User A uploads the harmful or
offensive deepfake to a social media platform, where the content spreads and
gets shared.175 Upon discovery of the deepfake content, B requests that the
platform remove it on account of the professional, reputational and
psychological harm that the synthetic media creates.176 The platform never
removes the content, it continues to spread and harm B, and B sues the
platform.177 Under the current framework of Section 230, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the adapted facts would yield a conclusion
different than the one in Herrick, despite the platform’s actual knowledge of
the harmful or offensive nature of the content in question and of the damage
that it causes.178 Herein lies the heart of the problem, worse even, when the
167.
Citron, supra note 96, at 1089.
168.
Id.
169.
Id. at 1089–90.
170.
Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2018),
aff’d, 765 F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019).
171.
Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 765 F. App'x 586, 593 (2d Cir. 2019).
172.
306 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 765 F. App'x 586 (2d Cir.
2019).
173.
See id. at 585; Citron, supra note 96, at 1089, 1091; Chesney & Citron,
supra note 21, at 884–85.
174.
See Herrick, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 584–85.
175.
See id. at 585.
176.
See id.
177.
See id.
178.
See id. at 589.
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facts are adapted once more so that B is a closeted LGBTQ+ community
member whom A exploits and extorts financially or professionally on social
media platforms through the use of the deepfake media.179 The risks seem
endless and could even magnify to implicate national security.180
As it stands now, Section 230 provides nearly no incentive for social
media platforms to monitor and moderate the content on their interfaces, even
in the face of actual knowledge of their harmful and offensive nature.181
However, growing calls to amend Section 230 could provide a solution that
not only opens the door to the imposition of liability on account of deepfake
media perpetuation, but also more broadly offers recourse for those harmed by
it.182 After all, amendments to Section 230’s immunity clauses are not a
foreign or far away idea.183 Only three years prior to the time of this writing,
Section 230’s text was amended by the passage of the Allow States and
Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”).184 More
recently, legislators on both sides of the aisle—like current Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi, Senators Ted Cruz and Josh Hawley, and even a former
White House technology advisor—have all suggested repealing or amending
Section 230.185 There is merit in Section 230’s interest in fostering free
speech, and making a blanket repeal could be costly with regard to social
discourse; however, modification presents an appealing solution that allows
for the maintenance of both the free speech and privacy protection interests.186
As Jon M. Garon, Professor and former Dean at Nova Southeastern
University’s Shepard Broad College of Law, has noted, there are two ways in
which Section 230 can be modified to strike a more equitable balance between
the two interests.187
First, once content has been determined by a court to be libelous or
harassing, the [Internet Service Provider] should have an obligation
to remove that content immediately upon notification. Second, if an
[Internet Service Provider] refuses to remove content someone
179.
See Herrick, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 585, 589; Molina, supra note 22, at 4.
180.
See Herrick, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Chesney & Citron, supra note 15, at
1783; Molina, supra note 22, at 4.
181.
See Citron, supra note 96, at 1088–89.
182.
Chesney & Citron, supra note 15, at 1799.
183.
See id. at 1798–99.
184.
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub.
L. No. 115–164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A); Brown,
supra note 96, at 45.
185.
Brown, supra note 96, at 44–45.
186.
See Jon M. Garon, How to Fix the Internet, LAW360 (Feb. 17, 2017, 4:41
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/889115/how-to-fix-the-internet.
187.
Id.
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believes to be defamatory or an invasion of privacy, that person
should be permitted to go to court to have the content removed. If
a court determines the speech is harmful, then the [Internet Service
Provider] should be obligated to take down or block the speech.
That order would then apply to other [Internet Service Providers] as
well.188

A similar proposed modification has been offered by Danielle Citron
and Benjamin Wittes—both leading voices in the area of deepfake technology
and its proposed regulation—that conditions immunity on reasonable content
moderation practices 189 As suggested by Citron and Wittes, the proposed
amendment to Section 230(c)(1) would read:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service that
takes reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful uses of its
services shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider in
any action arising out of the publication of content provided by that
information content provider.190

Although there is no simple legislative solution to specifically address
the complications that deepfakes present, there is no shortage of reasonable
amendments to Section 230’s existing language that could remedy the present
situation.191 Amending Section 230 to at least allow individuals threatened by
the posting of deepfake media to more fairly challenge its presence, not only
establishes recourse where there currently seems to be none, but also shelters
individuals, like those in the LGBTQ+ community, whose privacy and safety
are at a heightened risk of exploitation and extortion.192
C.
Embracing our New Reality: The LGBTQ+ Community’s Information
Anonymization Efforts with Deepfake Technology
The LGBTQ+ community has long been a champion of
reappropriating the tools of its oppressors for purposes of finding

188.
Id.
189.
See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break:
Denying Bad Samaritans Sec. 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 419 (2017).
190.
Id.
191.
See Garon, supra note 186; Citron & Wittes, supra note 189, at 419.
192.
See Spivak, supra note 33, at 399; Garon, supra note 186; Citron & Wittes,
supra note 189, at 419.
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empowerment and freedom.193 For a community in which the pendulum
between its two driving values—visibility and privacy—swings quickly from
one side to the other, it comes as no surprise that some of its members have
now embraced deepfake technology.194 Despite deepfakes posing potential
privacy and safety threats, members of the LGBTQ+ community have been
quick to get in front of deepfake technology and adopt it for anonymization
and privacy protection purposes.195 As of the time of this writing, the most
notable use of such a tactic was by the creators of Welcome to Chechnya, a
documentary exposing the realities of the victims of the Chechen anti-gay
purges that uses deepfake technology to mask and protect the identities of the
victims and informants featured in the film.196
Visual effects expert Ryan Laney described Welcome to Chechnya’s
technological endeavor as “a digital prosthetic where 100[%] of the motion,
the emotion, and the essence of what the subject is doing is there.”197 In order
for the documentary’s visual effects team to develop this advanced form of
anonymization, individuals volunteered a personal image and consented to its
application on the content of the film’s subjects, ultimately resulting in a sort
of digital marionette puppet.198 Two things make this process different than
the ones in which other deepfakes are usually seen.199 First, the deepfakes
were created with the consent of both the subject—the person on which the
altered image is placed, or, in other words, the person anonymized—and the
target—the person whose image is being transposed on the subject, or, in other
words, the anonymizer.200 Second, the purpose of such a deepfake is to
safeguard the interest of the subject rather than to exploit it.201

193.
See Juliette Rocheleau, A Former Slur is Reclaimed, and Listeners Have
Mixed
Feelings,
NPR
(Aug.
21,
2019,
10:33
AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/publiceditor/2019/08/21/752330316/a-former-slur-is-reclaimedand-listeners-have-mixed-feelings.
194.
Rebecca Heilweil, How Deepfakes Could Actually do Some Good, VOX
(June
29,
2020,
11:10
AM),
http://www.vox.com/platform/amp/recode/2020/6/29/21303588/deepfakes-anonymousartificial-intelligence-welcome-to-chechnya.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
See Heilweil, supra note 194.
200.
See id.
201.
See id.
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Image of Deepfake Technology used to Disguise Source Featured in
Welcome to Chechnya202
Welcome to Chechnya has reappropriated technology that is
potentially dangerous to members of the LGBTQ+ community around the
world and turned that sword, and its threat, into the shield behind which they
can find privacy and protection.203 In fact, this may already be a growing trend
that members of the LGBTQ+ community can jump on board with.204 Laney
and other startups such as D-ID and Alethea AI have begun to take an interest
in developing entities that facilitate and democratize the creation of “digital
veils” to cloak individuals in danger.205 Until legislation is created or amended
to better protect against the threats that deepfake technology could pose to
individuals like those in the LGBTQ+ community, the adoption of these
“digital veil” programs could not only help to bring about peace of mind,
security of liberty, and protection of life to members of the LGBTQ+
community.206 It could also introduce them to the next evolutionary chapter
in its long history of adaptation and self-preservation.207
V.

CONCLUSION

As society ventures into a new world where technology develops at
an evolutionary rate faster than usual, society must remain mindful, in addition
to being cautious, not only of the many implications that advancements have
on the technical aspect of our society but also on the social implications that
may arise as the natural byproduct.208 While deepfakes present the newest, in
202.
Id.; Joshua Rothkopf, Deepfake Technology Enters the Documentary
World, NY TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/movies/deepfakes-documentarywelcome-to-chechnya.html (July 29, 2020).
203.
See Heilweil, supra note 194.
204.
See id.
205.
Id.
206.
See id.
207.
See id.
208.
Chesney & Citron, supra note 21, at 889–90.
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a long history, of audiovisual manipulations, a closer look at society’s
response to deepfake technology through an equally evolutionary perspective
is necessary.209 The most effective manner of doing this is in the same way
that we have for all other challenges that we face in our day-to-day lives: with
the guidance of the law, whose essential function is to provide recourse where
individuals are harmed, to carve out a path to such an outcome where there
does not exist such a form of redress, and to disincentivize malicious
wrongdoers from their misdeeds.210
Society must remain hopeful that experts, scholars, technologists, and
legislators will move to introduce specific policies that help society counteract
the potentially negative implications that deepfake technology may present.211
However, until a one-size-fits-all policy is adopted, it is necessary to adapt
existing regulatory frameworks like Section 230 so as to effectively face
deepfakes’ problems as they come and protect the interests of those
communities like the LGBTQ+ community that remain vulnerable to them.212

209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 889.
Citron, supra note 96, at 1074.
See id. at 1087.
See id. at 1090.
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INTRODUCTION

Countless novels, movies, and television shows depict a dystopian
image of a bleak, dusty, technologically advanced, submissive society ruled
by an authoritative and oppressive government who punishes its citizens for
speaking contrary to the government’s narrative.1 The Orwellian Big Brother
keeps control of his citizens through the use of in-home surveillance, doctoring
history, and records to fit his current narrative and remove dissidents from
society.2 He does this in order to portray an image of an absolute, all-knowing,
* Logan Beckman earned his bachelor’s degree in International Affairs and Spanish with
Business at Florida State University in 2017. He is currently a 3L Juris Doctorate Candidate at
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law. Logan would like to thank his
friends, family, and professors for their encouragement and support. Specifically, Logan would
like to thank his wife, Jaimie, his parents, Thomas and Linda, his brothers, Dan and Jordan, and
his father-in-law Wyn, for their patience, sacrifice, and love. Logan would also like to thank his
colleagues on Nova Law Review, Volume 46, for working to help refine and perfect this
Comment.
1.
See, e.g., RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451, at 11 (Simone & Schuster
2012) (1951); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 3–5 (Signet Classics 1977) (1949).
2.
ORWELL, supra note 1, at 259–60.
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and infallible figurehead to lead the country into prosperity and happiness.3
Big Brother is able to control the societal narrative by constantly making
revisions and corrections to textbooks and news articles to ensure that, at any
given time, the information being disseminated is in accordance with the
narrative that Big Brother seeks to push.4 He effectively employs this through
constant changes that only provide one version of events throughout history.5
Another familiar image is the pile of books engulfed in flames, the
constant smell of kerosene, and the fear of constant government monitoring,
as seen in Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451.6 These types of images, often
associated with limited communication and information access, seem so farfetched in today’s world because of the use of the internet and the ease in
which information can be instantly transmitted.7 However, monopolization
and inconsistent application of regulations can affect how society receives and
perceives the world around them.8 Giving companies unfettered power to
monitor and restrict content can potentially create echo-chambers where the
voice of corporations, not the citizens, control what is important to society.9
Countries like Cuba and China are arguably in the early stage of
controlled dissemination of information through censorship perpetrated by the
government.10 The governments of these countries, among others, are able to
influence the societal narrative by restricting access to speech that opposes the

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See id. at 262.
See id. at 54–55.
See id.
BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 52; see also ORWELL, supra note 1, at 36–37.
See Simon Kemp, Digital 2020: The United States of America,
DATAREPORTAL (Feb. 11, 2020), http://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-united-states-ofamerica (“There were 288.1 million internet users in the United States of America in January
2020”).
8.
John Samples, Why the Government Should Not Regulate Content
Moderation of Social Media, CATO INST. (Apr. 9, 2019), http://www.cato.org/policyanalysis/why-government-should-not-regulate-content-moderation-social-media.
9.
Lee Rainie et al., The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake
News
Online,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Mar.
29,
2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-speech-trolls-anonymityand-fake-news-online/.
10.
See Cuba: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report, FREEDOM HOUSE,
http://freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-world/2021 (last visited Apr. 1, 2022). Cuba is
listed as 13/100 on their internet freedom score. Id. China is listed as a 9/100. China: Freedom
in
the
World
2021
Country
Report,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
http://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2021 (last visited Apr. 1, 2022). In
contrast, the United States scored an 83/100. United States: Freedom in the World 2021
Country Report, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedomworld/2021 (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
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will of the government.11 For instance, the Chinese government can block
individuals from accessing certain websites.12 The government can affect an
individual’s ability to buy a plane ticket.13 The government can even jail
people for anti-government rhetoric.14 Engaging in anti-government rhetoric
can result in citizens being tortured in a concentration camp simply for
worshipping a certain deity.15 Or worse, the government can just make you
disappear without a trace.16 This is the grim reality for people in a country just
across the Pacific.17 A country that is becoming increasingly powerful and is
slowly scooting their way forward to take place as the new hegemon, as they
lead in technological adoption.18
To ensure the highest degree of a free and functioning democracy, the
United States needs a consistent application of internet regulations, rather than
simply updating legislation every time it suits an incumbents’ need.19 In
essence, this means that Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) should provide
equal, uninhibited access to their customers with few exceptions.20 The recent
trend of repealing executive orders is inefficient and ultimately results in
inconsistent applications of the standards in which ISPs are held to and how

11.
See Katie Canales, China’s ‘Social Credit’ System Ranks Citizens and
Punishes Them with Throttled Internet Speeds and Flight Bans if the Communist Party Deems
Them Untrustworthy, BUS. INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/china-social-creditsystem-punishments-and-rewards-explained-2018-4 (last updated Dec. 24, 2021, 11:00 AM);
Cuba: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report, supra note 10.
12.
China: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report, supra note 10.
13.
Canales, supra note 11.
14.
Chun Han Wong, World News: China Jails Twitter Users to Stifle Critics,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2021, at A8.
15.
See Darren Byler, For China’s Muslim Minority, the Internet Was a Safe
Haven
—
Until
It
Wasn’t,
FAST
CO.
(Sept.
23,
2019),
http://www.fastcompany.com/90405715/for-chinas-muslim-minority-the-internet-was-a-safehaven-until-it-wasnt; Tracey Shelton & Bang Xiao, China ‘Disappeared’ Several High-Profile
People in 2018 and Some of Them are Still Missing, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP.,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-06/the-people-who-china-disappeared-in-2018-andwhere-they-are-now/10676016 (last updated June 5, 2019, 5:41 PM).
16.
See Shelton & Xiao, supra note 15.
17.
See Byler, supra note 15.
18.
See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Changing Nature of World Power, 105 POL. SCI.
Q. 177, 185 (1990).
19.
See discussion infra Part VI.
20.
See discussion infra Sections IV.A, V.A. These exceptions—which will
not be detailed in this article—include internet service to first responders, hospitals, law
enforcement, military, and other public functions which public interest would best be served by
prioritizing their internet access. See discussion infra Sections IV.A, V.A.
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the laws are applied.21 Part VI of this Comment will discuss an alternative to
the current internet regulations, as well as the implications involved in
changing the current laws and executive orders.22
Part VI of this Comment will also explain that the current legislation
for internet regulations should require ISPs to provide equal internet access to
everyone, while at the same time working toward shedding the cloak of
protection that ISPs, social media companies, tech companies, and media
companies are afforded, when it comes to censorship on their platforms.23 The
purpose of Section VI.B of this Comment is to highlight the potential for abuse
and erosion of the First Amendment by analyzing current trends and their longstanding implications.24 Additionally, Section VI.B of this Comment proposes
alternatives to the current and recent trends in internet regulation.25 In so
doing, I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of government
regulation of private tech businesses, specifically ISPs, social media
companies, and other current tech giants.26 Section VI.A of this Comment will
compare similar situations of censorship going on internationally and
domestically, demonstrating how removing liability has caused damage, and
connecting the dots between what is going on now with social media liability
and the network neutrality debate which has been inconsistently applied over
the years.27 Ultimately, this Comment will suggest that the problem boils
down to providing a necessary utility to citizens and ensuring that universal
internet access is not prioritized or restricted on any basis.28
II.

EVOLUTION OF COMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS

The internet, like the radio and television, is a form of
communication.29 Accordingly, the function of the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) is to act as a regulator for all recognized forms of
21.
See Lauren Feiner, Net Neutrality Foe and Trump’s Former FCC Chairman
Ajit Pai Stands by Repeal as Democrats Take Over, CNBC (Jan. 26, 2021, 2:21 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/26/net-neutrality-foe-and-departed-fcc-chairman-ajit-paistands-by-repeal.html.
22.
See discussion infra Part VI.
23.
See discussion infra Part VI.
24.
See discussion infra Section VI.B.2
25.
See discussion infra Section VI.B.
26.
See discussion infra Section VI.B.
27.
See discussion infra Section VI.A; H.R. REP. NO. 104–458, at 194 (1996)
(Conf. Rep.).
28.
See discussion infra Part VI.
29.
See What We Do, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutfcc/what-we-do (last visited Apr. 1, 2022); NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, REALIZING THE
INFORMATION FUTURE: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 21 (1994) (ebook).
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communication.30 As the mediums of communication became more
widespread, the necessity for regulations became increasingly apparent.31
Various legislation regulating communications has evolved throughout the
history of the United States and the next Section of this Comment provides a
brief insight into each.32
A.

The Early Days of Radio Regulations

The year was 1912 and the world was starting to get a larger glimpse
into the utilization of radio communication.33 At the time, radio signals were
not well established and radios were not widely used by United States
citizens.34 Many frequencies were used for United States military personnel,
but the United States government did not have exclusive control over radio
waves.35 In fact, the majority of radio frequencies led to overlapping, and
consequently ineffective, signals.36 A lack of formal regulation meant
interfering frequencies and many inconsistencies.37
The watershed moment for realizing the need for radio
communication regulation was arguably the sinking of the Titanic in the
Northern Atlantic Ocean.38 The Royal Mail Ship (“RMS”) Titanic sent out a
distress call that was heard in the northern regions of Canada, specifically in
Newfoundland.39 However, the distress call was masked by interference from
amateur, unregulated radio stations throughout the east coast of the United
States.40 These interfering frequencies caused a delayed emergency response
30.
What We Do, supra note 29; see also 47 U.S.C. § 151.
31.
See 47 U.S.C. § 609; What We Do, supra note 29.
32.
See discussion infra Sections II.A–B.
33.
See Sharon Morrison, Radio Act of 1912, FREE SPEECH CTR.: FIRST AMEND.
ENCYC.
(2009),
http://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1090/radio-act-of-1912
[hereinafter Radio Act of 1912].
34.
See id.; Carole E. Scott, The History of the Radio Industry in the United
States to 1940, ECON. HIST. ASS’N, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-history-of-the-radio-industryin-the-united-states-to-1940/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
35.
See Thomas H. White, Pioneering Amateurs: (1900–1917), U.S. EARLY
RADIO HIST., http://earlyradiohistory.us/sec012.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
36.
See Sean Coughlan, Titanic: The Final Messages from a Stricken Ship,
BBC (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17631595; Morrison, supra note
33.
37.
Radio Act of 1912, supra note 33.
38.
See id.; Coughlan, supra note 36.
39.
Marc Montgomery, Canada History: April 15, 1912, Titanic Disappears
off
Newfoundland,
RADIO
CAN.
INT’L
(Apr.
15,
2021,
2:13
PM),
http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2019/04/15/canada-history-april-15-1912-titanic-disappears-offnewfoundland/.
40.
See Coughlan, supra note 36; Radio Act of 1912, supra note 33.

282

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

because of the lack of communication.41 This tragic incident represented the
reality that certain radio frequencies must be accessible in case of emergency.42
The Radio Act of 1912 was passed a few months later and vested the
United States Government with the power to require radio stations to obtain
licenses that would allow the government to broadcast a signal to the general
public.43 The United States Government effectively took complete control
over broadcasting, requiring licensing and restricting frequencies.44 Following
the end of the First World War, radios became a household staple for American
citizens.45 For the first time ever, people could use radios to do things like
listen to music without needing a record player, hear news stories without
needing to read the paper, and listen to sports without having to watch it live.46
However, the United States Government did not anticipate how widespread
radio would become in the 1920s; thus, new legislation was required to keep
up with the times.47
In order to handle the unforeseen widespread usage of radio
communication, the Radio Act of 1927 was passed, creating a governmental
body to manage the service.48 This act created a new body called the Federal
Radio Commission (“FRC”), which was vested with the power to regulate
radio communication.49 The FRC, initially created as a temporary agency,
quickly realized that its duties could not be performed in the preliminary time
frame that was suggested.50 Radio soon competed with the newspaper
industry, not only as a means of entertainment, but also as a news source and
41.
See Coughlan, supra note 36; Radio Act of 1912, supra note 33.
42.
See Coughlan, supra note 36.
43.
An Act to Regulate Radio Communication, Pub. L. No. 62-264, § 6412, 37
Stat. 302, 302 (1912); Radio Act of 1912, supra note 33.
44.
See Radio Act of 1912, supra note 33.
45.
Joe Wood, History of the Radio: From Inception to Modern Day, TECH.
WHOLESALE, http://www.techwholesale.com/history-of-the-radio.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2022).
46.
Id.; First Radio Broadcast of the Olympics, GUINNESS WORLD RECS.,
http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/first-radio-broadcast-of-the-olympics
(last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
47.
See Wood, supra note 45.
48.
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 4, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163–64; Keith
Masters, Construction of the Equality Clause in the Davis Amendment, 1 J. RADIO L. 1, 1–2
(1931); Sharon L. Morrison, Radio Act of 1927 (1927), FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1091/radio-act-of-1927 (last visited Apr. 1,
2022) [hereinafter Radio Act of 1927].
49.
Radio Act of 1927, supra note 48.
50.
See FED. RADIO COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL RADIO
COMMISSION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,
1927, at 8 (1927).
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a more efficient form of communication.51 The number of radio stations had
risen exponentially and long-distance signals were becoming more widely
adopted.52 The ability to reach a larger audience presented valuable potential
for many forms of entertainment.53 Additionally, spending on radio
advertisements had risen and new forms of entertainment programs were
making their way onto the radio.54
Other than granting the power to require and delegate radio licenses
to broadcast, the Acts55 also denoted radio waves as public property and
therefore became subject to the United States Constitution.56
This
classification would be described in greater detail seven years later, when new
legislation was passed.57
B.

The Communications Act of 1934

By 1934, sixty percent of the households in the United States had
radios.58 However, Congress realized that a more constitutionally-favorable
method of radio communication regulation could be established by utilizing
its Commerce Clause powers vested by the United States Constitution.59
Consequently, President Roosevelt signed the Communications Act of 1934,60
which created the FCC to replace the FRC.61 The newly created FCC was
granted the power to oversee radio, telephone, and television
communications.62 The Communications Act incorporated several titles for
services, but most notably Title I and Title II.63 The titles represent different
51.
See Rhonda Jolly, Media Ownership and Regulation: A Chronology,
PARLIAMENT
AUSTL.,
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library
/pubs/Media_ownership/19938 (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
52.
Scott, supra note 34.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
See Radio Act of 1912, supra note 33; Radio Act of 1927, supra note 48.
56.
See Radio Act of 1927, supra note 48.
57.
See id.; Brian Caterina, Communications Act of 1934 (1934), FIRST AMEND.
ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009), http://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1044/communicationsact-of-1934.
58.
Scott, supra note 34.
59.
See Caterina, supra note 57; Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 734165, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064.
60.
§ 1, 48 Stat. at 1064.
61.
See id.
62.
See id.; Caterina, supra note 57.
63.
See id.; Kia Kokalitcheva, The Most Important Internet Law Was Written
in 1934, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 13, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/11/13/themost-important-internet-law-was-written-in-1934/.
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standards subject to different standards of regulation.64 For example, Title II
services are subject to “common carrier” rules, whereas Title I services are
subject to fewer restrictions.65
Pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, a single corporation was
limited in the amount of radio station ownership in a given market.66
Additionally, a single corporation was not allowed to own and operate more
than a designated amount of television stations in a given market.67 These
numbers were adjusted as more stations began to emerge.68 However, the
purpose behind the ownership restrictions was to encourage competition and
ensure that media sources had the opportunity to spread their forms of
communication equally among United States citizens.69
Additional
regulations from the Communications Act that were present created limits on
the amount of audience-reach to households a given media company could
have.70 Consistent with First Amendment, the public policy reasoning behind
that limitation was to ensure diversity in information dissemination as well as
to ensure the information being broadcasted was relevant and equally
accessible.71 These restrictions, although seemingly arbitrary, were created in
accordance with constitutional interests in mind.72 Ultimately, it would be six
decades before new laws were created that would regulate communications.73
III.

THE RISE IN INTERNET USAGE

The internet began to see commercial use in the late 1980s and early
1990s.74 “In 1989, [The World became] the first commercial [ISP] on the

64.
See § 1, 48 Stat. at 1064.
65.
See id.
66.
§ 301, 48 Stat. at 1081; see also Jonathan A. Obar, Beyond Cynicism: A
Review of the FCC’s Reasoning for Modifying the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership
Rule, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 479, 484–85 (2009).
67.
Obar, supra note 66, at 485.
68.
Id. at 487.
69.
See id. at 487 n.42.
70.
See § 303(h), 48 Stat. at 1082; Rev. of the Comm’n’s Reguls. Governing
Television Broad., 10 F.C.C. Rcd. 3524, 3560 (1995).
71.
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624, 662 (1994); id. at
686 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72.
Id. at 663 (majority opinion); id. at 686 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
73.
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, supra note 27.
74.
Who Invented the Internet — A Full Story, BROADBAND SEARCH,
http://www.broadbandsearch.net/blog/who-invented-the-internet-full-history (last visited Apr.
1, 2022).
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planet for the general public.”75 As the use of the internet became more
widespread, it became clear that there was a need to appropriately regulate the
internet, without giving the government too much power over what
information was available and without leading to monopolies who controlled
the information that was accessible to citizens.76 At that time, it was clear that
researchers were aware of the concern that government could control the
information it generates, which could result in a monopoly over information
made available to the public.77 Although the National Research Council was
giving their preliminary findings regarding the regulation of the internet, it was
clear that the regulations would have to evolve and adapt as the usage of the
internet did as well.78 Ultimately, the National Research Council’s
preliminary findings along with several cases helped form the legislation
which led to a momentous change in the realm of communications
regulation.79
A.

The Rise of the Internet

In the 1990s, while the internet was still in its infancy, a connection
was established using a dial-up connection.80 A dial-up connection was
created by using a telephone line to change how communication was
transmitted.81 Because dial-up was the only mode of internet accessibility for
most people, the FCC impliedly received the power to regulate the internet.82
As the internet gained more users, people began to access it through other
methods, like cable modems.83 Ultimately, the FCC would maintain the power

75.
History
of
the
World
—
Our
Version,
WORLD,
http://theworld.com/world/about/history/our_version (last updated July 31, 2010); Who
Invented the Internet – A Full Story, supra note 74.
76.
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 158. The National Research
Council, with regard to First Amendment challenges, stated: “the First Amendment suggests
that government should permit no one to exercise monopoly control over the content carried
over the network; content determination and editorial control issues should be the province of
competing information providers.” Id.
77.
Id. at 154.
78.
Id. at 84.
79.
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, supra note 27.
80.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 967 (2005).
81.
Id.
82.
See id. at 967, 970.
83.
John B. Horrigan, Part 1. Broadband Adoption in the United States, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (May 28, 2006), http://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2006/05/28/part-1broadband-adoption-in-the-united-states/.
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to create and enforce internet regulations and went on to classify it as
information service.84
This classification was different from radio, television, and telephone
communications, and therefore was subject to different regulations.85
However, the legislators and the FCC did not predict how important internet
access would become and how foundational it would be in society today.86
Several cases, however, led the charge when it came to how the internet, as an
information service, would be regulated.87 One of the first issues presented
with internet regulation was whether websites or Internet Service Providers
would be considered publishers or distributors of the information on their
websites.88 The reason this was so important was because it helped to
determine how defamation law would be addressed in the new medium of
communication.89
In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,90 the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York was tasked with determining whether a
website is responsible for statements written in one of its forums.91 The
plaintiff sued the defendant after several defamatory comments were made
about the plaintiff on a forum hosted on the defendant’s website.92 The court
noted that the defendant-website did not have editorial control over the
comments made on the message boards and thus could not be considered a
publisher of the defamatory speech.93 Rather, the defendant acted as a
distributor of the speech.94 In coming to their conclusion, the court drew an
84.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 968.
85.
See id. at 967.
86.
See Emily Stewart, Give Everybody the Internet, VOX (Sept. 10, 2020, 8:30
AM), http://www.vox.com/recode/2020/9/10/21426810/internet-access-covid-19-chattanoogamunicipal-broadband-fcc.
87.
See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Act of 1934 tit. II
(codified as 47 U.S.C. § 230).
88.
See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp at 137, 139.
89.
Id. at.135.
90.
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
91.
Id. at 137–38.
92.
Id. at 138.
93.
Id. at 140.
94.
Id. Interestingly, the Cubby court also referenced the famous First
Amendment case, Smith, in which the Court struck down an ordinance which imposed liability
on the owner of a bookstore for possessing a book with obscene content because it would be
unreasonable to require a bookstore owner to know the intimate contents of each book on their
bookshelves. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 139–40; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152–53
(1959).
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interesting comparison between the website and traditional sources of
information:
A computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more
traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower
standard of liability to an electronic news distributor such as
CompuServe than that which is applied to a public library, book
store, or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow
of information.95

Another significant ruling was made a few years later in Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,96 where the New York Supreme Court
was again tasked with determining whether a website should be held as a
publisher of statements made by an anonymous user on an online forum.97 The
Plaintiff-brokerage firm—which ultimately dissolved because it defrauded
shareholders resulting in many shareholders being arrested and
incarcerated98—sued the defendant-website for defamatory comments that
were made anonymously on a message board.99 The plaintiff asserted that the
defendant should be held responsible as a publisher because the defendant held
itself out as a moderator of the content that was published on its message
boards.100 In fact, the defendant used a software screening program to
automatically prescreen board postings for offensive language.101 The New
York court agreed with the plaintiff and granted summary judgment in its favor
on the issue of whether the defendant acted as a publisher of speech.102 In
doing so, the court distinguished the facts from Cubby by noting that the
defendant, in that case, had little to no editorial control over the content of
those publications, whereas the defendant, in this case, made decisions as to
the content, and such decisions constituted editorial control.103 This ruling,
along with Cubby, helped set the stage for the Communication Decency Act,
which was incorporated under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.104
95.
Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 140.
96.
No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
97.
Id. at *2.
98.
See THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (Paramount Pictures 2013).
99.
See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
100.
Id. at *2.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at *1.
103.
Id. at *4; see Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 140.
104.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, supra note 27 (indicating that one of its specific
purposes was to overrule Stratton Oakmont, Inc., and any other similar decisions, which have
treated providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996

In February 1996, the Communications Act of 1934 was amended by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.105 Once again, the United States was in
the midst of a technological boom as mobile telephones and the internet
became household staples.106 The purpose of the Act was to help stimulate
economic growth and technological innovation, increase diversity, and
decrease costs.107 This Act not only created new standards for internet
regulations, ISPs, and websites, but it also affected previous regulations for
other forms of communication.108 Furthermore, the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 loosened restrictions against media companies on the ability to
purchase additional radio and television stations.109 President Clinton, who
signed the bill, stated that the bill “promotes competition as the key to opening
new markets and new opportunities.”110 He further stated that the bill would
“protect consumers by regulating the remaining monopolies for a time and by
providing a roadmap for deregulation in the future.”111 Ultimately, the Act
focused largely on updating and establishing classifications for radio, cable,
and ISPs.112
With those restrictions being lifted, media corporations were able to
fast-track the monopolization of radio, television, and telephone
communications.113 Twenty-five years after its passage, media giant
iHeartRadio, f/k/a Clear Channel, owns more than 850 radio stations operating
they have restricted access to objectionable material); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56; see Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 140.
105.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N,
http://www.fcc.gov/general/telecommunications-act-1996 (last updated June 20, 2013);
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-4165, 48 Stat. 1064.
106.
A Brief History of the Telephone: 1990–2000, PHONES - THEN AND NOW,
http://phones-thenandnow.weebly.com/1990-2000.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
107.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 105.
108.
See id.; David McCabe, Bill Clinton’s Telecom Law: Twenty Years Later,
HILL (Feb. 7, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/268459-bill-clintonstelecom-law-twenty-years-later.
109.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 105.
110.
McCabe, supra note 108; see Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56
111.
Id.
112.
Christopher H. Sterling, Transformation: The 1996 Act Reshapes Radio,
58 FED. COMMC’N L.J. 593, 593 (2006); Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 105.
113.
Sterling, supra note 112, at 593; Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra
note 105; see also COMMON CAUSE EDUC. FUND, THE FALLOUT FROM THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED 5
(Mary Boyle ed., 2005).
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in the United States, and Sinclair owns over 190 television stations.114
Accordingly, critics of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 have argued that
the law was a complete failure because it endorsed censorship by creating
powerful media companies which allowed for selective information
dissemination.115 Alternatively, proponents of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 argued that monopolization does not necessarily limit market reach
because the monopoly owner seeks the widest possible audience reach.116
Another major effect of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the
incorporation of section 230, the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).117
As opposed to regulating access to the internet as a form of communication,
this Act represented the first attempt at regulating access to information on the
internet.118 Additionally, the CDA had the effect of establishing operators of
internet services as distributors, rather than publishers of information.119 This
further defined legal culpability, as it related to holding operators liable for
speech by users of their services.120
Almost immediately after the CDA’s enactment, federal courts had
several challenges regarding the CDA.121 In Reno v. ACLU,122 the Supreme
114.
See
Who
Owns
What,
INSIDE
RADIO,
http://www.insideradio.com/resources/who_owns_what/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2022); Number of
Radio Stations Owned by iHeartMedia in the United States from 2014 to 2020, STATISTA (June
4, 2021), http://www.statista.com/statistics/603256/iheartmedia-radio-stations/; Alvin Chang,
Sinclair’s Takeover of Local News, in One Striking Map, VOX (Apr. 6, 2018, 8:20 AM),
http://www.vox.com/2018/4/6/17202824/sinclair-tribune-map.
115.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56; see
Ernie
Smith,
Not-So-Clear
Channel,
TEDIUM
(Apr.
21,
2020),
http://tedium.co/2020/04/21/clear-channel-911-memorandum-history/. While operating as
Clear Channel and following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, iHeartRadio created a
blacklist of songs which they strongly discouraged their affiliate stations from playing on the
air. Id. For instance, the group Rage Against the Machine had their entire catalog of music
blacklisted from Clear Channel stations. Id. Additionally, several other artists were blacklisted,
thought to be for political reasons. Id.
116.
Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability
of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 207 (1952); see also Steven T. Berry
& Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Program Variety? Evidence from Radio Broadcasting,
116 Q.J. ECON. 1009, 1010 (2001) (concluding that consolidation reduces station entry but
increases product variety); Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 105.
117.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230; Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56.
118.
47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997).
119.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
120.
See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
121.
See Reno, 521 U.S. at 845; Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328
(4th Cir. 1997); 47 U.S.C. § 230.
122.
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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Court struck down several portions of the CDA, holding that they improperly
infringed upon constitutional rights.123 In Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,124 the
federal appellate court held that the CDA granted ISPs immunity from libel
suits because they were acting as distributors, rather than publishers of the
speech.125 Therefore, ISPs were effectively granted immunity from such a suit
pursuant to the broad power bestowed upon them pursuant to the CDA.126
Thus, it was becoming increasingly clear that the original regulations set in
place for the internet would need to be further defined and adjusted as they
became more widely adopted.127
IV.

NETWORK NEUTRALITY

One of the first cases dealing with the concept of net neutrality created
the ability for the FCC to classify and regulate the internet.128 In Nat’l Cable
& Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,129 the Court held that ambiguity
in the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, could be resolved by the appointed agency whose role was to
carry that statute out.130 This ruling allowed the FCC to fill in gaps and assume
authority that was not explicitly vested in both the Communications Act of
1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.131 Therefore, because
broadband internet access was not as accessible during either communications
enactment, the FCC and President Obama began the process of reclassifying
broadband access over a series of executive orders and various litigations.132
A.

The Open Internet Order

Prior to 2015, broadband internet was classified as a Title I service
under the Communications Act, which treated the internet as an information

123.
Id. at 844, 879, 882; 47 U.S.C. § 230.
124.
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
125.
Id. at 331–32; 47 U.S.C. § 230.
126.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; 47 U.S.C. § 230.
127.
See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17905, 17907 (2010).
128.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 982–83, 1003 (2005).
129.
545 U.S. 967 (2005).
130.
Id. at 1003; Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56.
131.
Id. at 983–84; Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 105.
132.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
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service.133 Title I standards granted ISPs a greater amount of discretion in how
they managed customers’ data, the types of websites customers could access,
and the bandwidth speeds they provided to their customers.134 The initial
classification was ultimately reevaluated by the FCC with the purpose of
ensuring network neutrality by equally distributing data speeds and access to
the internet.135
The Open Internet Order (“OIO”) or “net neutrality” was an order
passed by the FCC in 2010 that changed the standard of care that ISPs were
held to maintain.136 However, one of the unintended consequences of the order
was that it allowed ISPs to charge more for high-speed access, which
ultimately did not create a truly neutral network.137 In fact, the OIO allowed
ISPs to create internet fast lanes, in which data could be prioritized, thus giving
unequal access speed to various persons and entities.138
In Comcast Corp. v. FCC,139 the United States Court of Appeals was
tasked with determining whether the FCC had authority to enforce the OIO
and regulate ISPs that had interfered with customers’ internet access.140 The
court held that the FCC did not have authority to regulate ISPs because the
internet was classified under Title I of the Communications Act.141 This ruling
was quintessential in developing net neutrality principles because, in their
explanation, the court laid the foundation for how the FCC could ultimately
acquire authority over ISPs.142 The court reasoned that the FCC could not
enforce the net neutrality regulations while the internet was classified as an
133.
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-4165, 48 Stat. 1064; see
Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Votes to Regulate Internet as Utility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 2015, at B1.
134.
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-4165, 48 Stat. 1064; Ruiz &
Lohr, supra note 133.
135.
See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601,
5603, 5607–08 (2015).
136.
See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17905, 17907 (2010).
Because a common carrier is held to the highest standard of care, reclassifying the internet had
the effect of changing the standard of care ISPs had to give their customers in handling their
data and broadband access. Id. at 17981.
137.
See 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5607–08. This order enabled ISPs to create internet
highways in which they could charge higher prices for faster access—also referred to as an
internet “fast lane”—it is comparable to a highway charging a premium for access by a motor
vehicle. Id.
138.
See id. at 5607.
139.
600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
140.
Id. at 644.
141.
Id. at 661; see also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56.
142.
Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 648.
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“information service,” subject to Title I regulations.143 It raised the question
of whether the FCC actually has the legal authority to repeal title
classifications and if it could be estopped from reclassification because of clear
inconsistencies.144
In 2014, Verizon challenged the FCC again on the basis that it lacked
authority to impose regulations.145 In Verizon v. FCC,146 the court held that
the FCC did not have the authority to hold ISPs to nondiscriminatory policies
and common carrier regulations because of the title classification of the
internet.147 This ruling was a landmark case for the FCC because it clearly
demonstrated the means in which the FCC could implement net neutrality
regulations.148 Verizon ultimately led to the reclassification of the internet
once more, since it showed the FCC a new avenue of achieving net
neutrality.149
In 2015, the FCC released an updated Open Internet Order that would
allow equal, uninhibited distribution of data to all internet users in the United
States by reclassifying ISPs as a telecommunication service, recognizing the
internet as a “common carrier” subject to Title II standards of the
Communications Act.150 True to its name, the Open Internet Order was
intended to preserve internet openness.151 Specifically, the Act stated the
following:
Given that broadband providers—both fixed and mobile—
have both the incentives and ability to harm the open Internet, we
again conclude that the relatively small incremental burdens
imposed by our rules are outweighed by the benefits of preserving
the open nature of the Internet, including the continued growth of
the virtuous cycle of innovation, consumer demand, and investment.
We note, for example, that the disclosure requirements adopted in
this order are widely understood, have industry-based definitions,
and are commonly used in commercial Service Level Agreements
by many broadband providers. Open Internet rules benefit
investors, innovators, and end users by providing more certainty to
143.
Id. at 649.
144.
Id. at 644, 647.
145.
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
146.
740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
147.
Id. at 628, 650.
148.
See id. at 667 (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149.
See id. at 667–68 (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56;
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5870–71 (2015).
151.
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5603
(2015).
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each regarding broadband providers’ behavior and helping to ensure
the market is conducive to optimal use of the Internet. Open Internet
rules are also critical for ensuring that people living and working in
rural areas can take advantage of the substantial benefits that the
open Internet has to offer. In minority communities where many
individuals’ only Internet connection may be through a mobile
device, robust open Internet rules help make sure these communities
are not negatively impacted by harmful broadband provider
conduct. Such rules additionally provide essential safeguards to
ensure that the Internet flourishes as a platform for education and
research.152

In essence, common carrier status means that a service cannot vary the
type or quality of access it provides to users.153 A common carrier is held to
the highest legal standard of care in providing a service, maintaining the
utmost level of liability for occurrences caused during the administration of
their service.154 For the internet, it basically meant that ISPs could no longer
block access to websites and were required to maintain the speed and quality
of their services.155 As it relates to prioritizing certain information over others,
the Order addressed this as follows:
A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
engage in paid prioritization. “Paid prioritization” refers to the
management of a broadband provider’s network to directly or
indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic, including through
use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, resource
reservation, or other forms of preferential traffic management,
either (a) in exchange for consideration (monetary or otherwise)
from a third party, or (b) to benefit an affiliated entity.156

This classification had some major implications, especially for
protecting consumers.157 Consumers benefited from the classification because
it ensured that their private data was handled with the utmost level of care.158

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 5643–44.
See id. at 5644.
See Carrier, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5646.
Id. at 5607–08.
Id. at 5605.
Carrier, supra note 154.
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In theory, this meant that ISPs could be held responsible for preventable data
breaches and censorship violations.159
B.

Challenges to Net Neutrality

A notable downside to the reclassification was the possibility of
creating monopolies and reducing private spending on infrastructure.160 This
potential for monopolization was conceivable by understanding that increased
regulations can result in higher barriers of entry to the ISP market, due to the
expensive precautions that ISPs would need to take in delivering secure,
uninhibited internet access.161 The maintenance of regulations may also
redirect private spending by ISPs away from innovative development of
technology and infrastructure.162 This could be problematic because the ability
to maintain efficacy as more internet users come online can be hindered by the
lack of innovation and infrastructure to support those users.163
In 2017, the Trump administration took control of the White House,
which was accompanied by the newly appointed chairman of the FCC.164 Ajit
Pai, who had served on the FCC under the Obama administration, had
previously served as general counsel for Verizon, one of the big three ISPs.165
The FCC began to work on the repeal of net neutrality, asserting that the
reclassification of ISPs would create an increase in economic stimulation in
the private technology sector, and consequently lower the barriers for entry
into the ISP marketplace.166 In January 2018, the Open Internet Order was
officially repealed and ISPs would soon be allowed to return to the way things
were before.167
Unfortunately, not long after the repeal, the state of California was
faced with its first major issue arising out of the newly reestablished Title I
159.
See Net Neutrality: When Data is Used Against You, BOOST LABS (Aug.
29, 2018), http://boostlabs.com/blog/net-neutrality-when-data-is-used-against-you/.
160.
See Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 364, 390–91 (2018).
161.
See id. at 364.
162.
Id. at 368–69, 370.
163.
See id. at 369–70.
164.
Christine Wang, President Trump Designates Ajit Pai as Next FCC
Chairman, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2017, 6:34 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/23/presidenttrump-designates-ajit-pai-as-next-fcc-chairman.html.
165.
See id.; Jon Brodkin, There Are Ajit Pai “Verizon Puppet” Jokes That the
FCC Doesn’t Want You to Read, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 7, 2018, 12:42 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/02/there-are-ajit-pai-verizon-puppet-jokes-that-thefcc-doesnt-want-you-to-read/; Mobile Broadband Internet Providers, BROADBANDNOW,
http://broadbandnow.com/Mobile-Broadband-Providers (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
166.
See 33 F.C.C. Rcd. at 450.
167.
Id. at 491, 578.
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classification.168 On June 29, 2018, the Santa Clara Fire Department
(“SCFD”) responded to a rapidly spreading fire in Northern California.169
Unbeknownst to the emergency responders, the repeal of network neutrality
had gone into effect weeks prior, leaving them little to no notice regarding the
opportunity of data throttling.170 Data throttling “is a reactive measure
employed in communication networks to regulate network traffic and
minimize bandwidth congestion.”171
Verizon was the ISP in charge of providing access to the SCFD at the
time of the fires.172 While coordinating its response, the SCFD noticed that its
vehicles were experiencing significant connectivity issues.173 Apparently, its
internet speed had “slowed to a crawl.”174 Emails were quickly sent out to try
and resolve this issue, with hours going by before receiving a response from
Verizon.175 The SCFD expressed its need for an internet plan without data
caps or throttling and an account manager with Verizon suggested it simply
needed to upgrade its subscription.176 According to the declarations and
emails submitted by the SCFD fire chief, “Santa Clara Fire paid Verizon for
‘unlimited’ data but suffered from heavy throttling until the department paid
Verizon more.”177 Fire Chief Anthony Bowden presented his case as to why
the lack of network neutrality protections presents challenges to safety.178
“Bowden said Verizon reduced its data rates to just one two-hundredths of
168.
See Gigi Sohn, Verizon Couldn’t Have Restricted Santa Clara County’s
Internet Service During the Fires Under Net Neutrality, NBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2018, 10:35 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/verizon-couldn-t-have-restricted-santa-clara-countys-phone-ncna903531.
169.
See Tesla Fire, CAL. DEPT. FORESTRY AND FIRE PROTECTION (CAL FIRE),
http://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2018/6/29/tesla-fire/ (last updated Jan. 4, 2019, 9:57 AM).
170.
See Sohn, supra note 168; Colin Dwyer, Verizon Throttled Firefighters’
Data as Mendocino Wildfire Raged, Fire Chief Says, NPR (Aug. 22, 2018, 4:13 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2018/08/22/640815074/verizon-throttled-firefighters-data-as-mendocinowildfire-raged-fire-chief-says.
171.
About:
Bandwidth
Throttling,
DBPEDIA,
http://dbpedia.org/page/Bandwidth_throttling (last visited Apr. 1, 2022) (recalling that the Open
Internet Order in 2015 restricted the ability to throttle internet access).
172.
Jon Brodkin, Verizon Throttled Fire Department’s “Unlimited” Data
During Calif. Wildfire, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 21, 2018, 3:49 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2018/08/verizon-throttled-fire-departments-unlimited-data-during-calif-wildfire/
[hereinafter Verizon Throttled Fire Department’s “Unlimited” Data During Calif. Wildfire].
173.
Dwyer, supra note 170.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Verizon Throttled Fire Department’s “Unlimited” Data During Calif.
Wildfire, supra note 172.
178.
Dwyer, supra note 170.
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what was usual—and did so at a critical time for the emergency response.”179
In its response, Verizon stated the following:
Regardless of the plan emergency responders choose, we
have a practice to remove data speed restrictions when contacted in
emergency situations . . . . We have done that many times, including
for emergency personnel responding to these tragic fires. In this
situation, we should have lifted the speed restriction when our
customer reached out to us. This was a customer support mistake.
We are reviewing the situation and will fix any issues going
forward.180

The newly repealed net neutrality protections allowed Verizon to
throttle data because of the lack of government regulations.181 This was one
of the first instances in which unforeseen consequences of net neutrality reared
its head.182
V.

ISSUES WITH CURRENT APPLICATION OF INTERNET REGULATIONS

Within the last three presidential administrations, the United States
has seen the internet reclassified three different times.183 The inconsistent
application of regulations has allowed ISPs and media companies to alter how
they provide services to their customers.184
A.

Rinse, Repeal, Repeat

When reclassifying the internet, and other services for that matter, the
FCC makes decisions pursuant to an executive appointment.185 Their
decision-making affects all consumers of the internet, but these decisions may
179.
Id.
180.
Verizon Throttled Fire Department’s “Unlimited” Data During Calif.
Wildfire, supra note 172.
181.
See id. Recall that the emergency response to the sinking of the Titanic was
also delayed because coordination was impossible due to the lack of governmental oversight on
the medium of communication. Coughlan, supra note 36.
182.
See Verizon Throttled Fire Department’s “Unlimited” Data During Calif.
Wildfire, supra note 172.
183.
See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5603
(2015); 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20 (2020).
184.
See 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5603.
185.
See Chris Mills, Former FCC Chairman Destroys the Anti-Net-Neutrality
Argument Point by Point, BGR (Aug. 1, 2017, 6:06 PM), http://bgr.com/politics/fcc-ajit-paitom-wheeler-net-neutrality-arguments/; Verizon Throttled Fire Department’s “Unlimited”
Data During Calif. Wildfire, supra note 172; 47 U.S.C. § 151.
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not be representative of the betterment of the internet; rather, they may be
made pursuant to political party objectives.186 Additionally, because the FCC
is appointed by the executive branch, the possibility that lobbying or cronyism
influences the manner in which citizens are granted access to a fundamental
part of our functioning society, can create issues.187 Because the FCC is
making decisions that determine the way people get information, express their
opinion, conduct their work, and help society function as a whole, some argue
that they should be subject to constitutional restrictions and consequently
should make ISPs subject to state action.188
Proponents of Title I classification may resort to comments on the
FCC’s website to support the idea that there is no clear majority opinion on
the title classifications.189 In the past decade, the internet has been reclassified
by the FCC two times, under two different FCC Chairmen, serving politically
distinct administrations.190 In 2014 and 2017, the FCC digitally opened the
floor for commentary regarding the decision to reclassify the internet by
encouraging citizens to give feedback on their website.191 Celebrities, talk
show personalities, and other influencers made a push for citizens to get
186.
See What We Do, supra note 29; PAULA WILLIAMS, HOW THE INTERNET IS
BEING USED BY POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: PROMISES, PROBLEMS AND POINTERS i (Dep’t
Parliamentary
Libr.
2012),
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/DR005/upload_binary/DR005.pdf
;fileType=application/pdf#search=%221990s%201998%22.
187.
See Mills, supra note 185. Tom Wheeler was a president and CEO of two
major ISP related organizations, in addition to serving as the FCC Chairmen during the Obama
Administration. Id.; Biography of Former FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler, FED. COMMC’NS
COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/biography-former-fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler (last updated Jan.
20, 2017); Common Cause, New Report: How Lobbying and Political Influence by Broadband
Gatekeepers Has Shaped the Digital Divide, YUBANET (July 19, 2021),
http://yubanet.com/usa/new-report-how-lobbying-and-political-influence-by-broadbandgatekeepers-has-shaped-the-digital-divide/.
188.
See Eric Sirota, Can the First Amendment Save Net Neutrality?, 70 BAYLOR
L. REV. 781, 784 (2017).
189.
See Bridget C.E. Dooling & Michael Livermore, Bot-Generated Comments
on Government Proposals Could Be Useful Someday, SLATE (June 21, 2021, 11:00 AM),
http://slate.com/technology/2021/06/bot-generated-comments-on-regulatory-proposals-couldbe-useful.html.
190.
See, e.g., Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601,
5614 (2015); 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20.
191.
See Jacob Kastrenakes, FCC Received a Total of 3.7 Million Comments on
Net
Neutrality,
VERGE
(Sept.
16,
2014,
6:06
PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/16/6257887/fcc-net-neutrality-3-7-million-comments-made;
Paul Hitlin et al., Public Comments to the Federal Communications Commission About Net
Neutrality Contain Many Inaccuracies and Duplicates, PEW RSCH. CTR. 1, 2 (Nov. 29, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/11/29/public-comments-to-the-federalcommunications-commission-about-net-neutrality-contain-many-inaccuracies-and-duplicates/.
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involved and express their opinions on the matter.192 However, the FCC was
free to ignore the comments and had no obligation to take them into
consideration.193
In 2014, the FCC’s website crashed due to the unexpected traffic
volume, with an overwhelming number of citizens advocating for stricter net
neutrality regulations.194 In 2017, the FCC sought to repeal the regulations
that were established at the end of 2014.195 Again, the FCC welcomed
comments from citizens discussing their opinions surrounding the
classification.196 This time, there was a pretty comparable number of
proponents and opponents of the choice to return to Title II regulations.197
However, some internet users claimed that the FCC’s comment page may have
been the victim of some type of spambot attack.198 One user detected
abnormalities with language processing techniques that pointed to suspicious
consistencies like duplicate comments and similarities in verbiage.199 Users
also asserted that spambot campaigns were used to generate millions of proTitle II submissions in an attempt to create a false illusion of repeal support.200
Recently, the importance of having adequate, uninhibited access to the
internet has become very apparent.201 Throughout the coronavirus pandemic,
192.
See Soraya Nadia McDonald, John Oliver’s Net Neutrality Rant May Have
Caused
FCC
Site
Crash,
WASH.
POST
(June
4,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/04/john-olivers-netneutrality-rant-may-have-caused-fcc-site-crash/.
193.
See Jacob Kastrenakes, FCC Ignored Your Net Neutrality Comment, Unless
You Made a ‘Serious’ Legal Argument, VERGE (Nov. 22, 2017, 10:58 AM),
http://www.theverge.com/2017/11/22/16689838/fcc-net-neutrality-comments-were-largelyignored [hereinafter FCC Ignored Your Net Neutrality Comment].
194.
McDonald, supra note 192; Kastrenakes, supra note 191.
195.
See DANA A. SCHERER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45338, FCC MEDIA
OWNERSHIP RULES 2 (2021).
196.
Hitlin et al., supra note 191, at 2.
197.
See id. at 6.
198.
See Dooling & Livermore, supra note 189; What is a Spam Bot? How Spam
Comments
and
Spam
Messages
Spread,
CLOUDFLARE,
http://www.cloudflare.com/learning/bots/what-is-a-spambot/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2022). A
spambot attack is essentially a campaign by one or more users to cause a mass influx of
comments on an internet medium. Id.
199.
Jeff Kao, More Than a Million Pro-Repeal Net Neutrality Comments Were
Likely Faked, HACKER NOON, http://hackernoon.com/more-than-a-million-pro-repeal-netneutrality-comments-were-likely-faked-e9f0e3ed36a6 (last updated Nov. 29, 2017).
200.
See id.
201.
See Emily A. Vogels et al., 53% of Americans Say the Internet Has Been
Essential During the COVID-19 Outbreak, PEW RSCH. CTR. 1, 2–3, 7 (Apr. 30, 2020),
http://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-
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our country has witnessed this first-hand.202 Whether the internet was required
to work or attend school, it has become absolutely essential in how our country
functions.203 Accordingly, the necessity of regulating the internet as a utility,
rather than its current classification, should be one of the country’s largest
concerns.204 The internet has become so ingrained in our daily lives that to
function without it seems unfathomable.205 In fact, school districts that had
less access to the internet had to turn toward other entities in order to provide
access to their students.206 Specifically, some governments and organizations
have worked together to provide students with tablets, computers, and internet
access, so that these students could be accommodated in the age of online
education.207 If nothing else, this past year has shown the citizens of the world
how essential the internet is to provide information, and accordingly, should
be treated as a public utility.208
VI.
A.

ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT REGULATIONS

Comparisons to Other Countries

If the United States wants to align consistently with the founding
fathers, it is in society’s best interest to ensure the highest level of freedom on
the internet.209 However, internet freedom does not simply mean that nothing

content/uploads/sites/9/2020/04/PI_2020.04.30_COVID-internet_REPORT.pdf (“Americans
were also asked how important the internet has been for them during the coronavirus pandemic.
Fully 87% of adults say the internet has been at least important for them personally during the
coronavirus outbreak, including 53% who describe it as essential.”).
202.
See id. at 3–5.
203.
See id.
204.
See Jack J. Barry, COVID-19 Exposes Why Access to the Internet Is a
Human Right, OPEN GLOB. RTS. (May 26, 2020), http://www.openglobalrights.org/covid-19exposes-why-access-to-internet-is-human-right/.
205.
See Vogels et al., supra note 201, at 2–3.
206.
See The Impact of COVID-19 on Student Equity and Inclusion: Supporting
Vulnerable Students During School Closures and School Re-Openings, OECD (Nov. 19, 2020),
http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-student-equityand-inclusion-supporting-vulnerable-students-during-school-closures-and-school-re-openingsd593b5c8/ [hereinafter COVID-19 and Student Equity].
207.
Id.; see also James K. Willcox, COVID-19 Relief Package Will Help
Families
in
Need
of
Internet
Access,
CONSUMER
REPS.,
http://www.consumerreports.org/broadband-access/covid-19-relief-package-will-helpfamilies-in-need-of-internet-access/ (last updated Dec. 28, 2020).
208.
See Barry, supra note 204.
209.
See The Founding Fathers, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 24, 2020),
http://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/founding-fathers/.
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is censored and anything goes.210 Internet freedom stands for the idea that
information should be easily accessible to all citizens without giving
preference to information that may be slanted or biased one way or another.211
Iceland is an example of a country that has been recognized for having
high levels of internet freedom.212 Iceland is a country that explicitly values
citizens’ rights to their own personal data, which is recognized through
legislation.213 Consistent with the free flow of information are Iceland’s
whistleblower protection laws, which grant immunity to those who uncover
wrongdoings conducted by government officials.214 Furthermore, “[t]here are
no government-imposed restrictions on connectivity in Iceland, and the
government does not exercise technical or legal control over the . . .
infrastructure.”215
B.

Ideas for the Future

Ultimately, the manner in which the internet is regulated needs a
complete overhaul.216 For starters, the market share held by any single ISP
should be limited.217 In order to maintain the freest flow of information, our
internet access should be available from several different entities.218 As it
stands, the current state of accessibility is generally limited to two or three
different ISPs, with a few other subsidiaries of those ISPs posing as separate
entities.219 However, these subsidiaries function by using the same
infrastructure as the main ISPs, and therefore are limited to providing services
210.
See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959) (exemplifying obscene
speech as one of the several categories of speech that is not protected by the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press).
211.
See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17905,17941–42 (2015).
212.
Freedom on the Net 2020: Iceland, FREEDOM HOUSE,
http://freedomhouse.org/country/iceland/freedom-net/2020 (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216.
See Peter Christiansen, Why Can I Only Get a Few Internet Providers?,
HIGHSPEEDINTERNET.COM (Nov. 11, 2021), http://www.highspeedinternet.com/resources/whycan-i-only-get-a-few-internet-providers.
217.
See id.; VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45650, FREE SPEECH
AND THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT 32–33 (2019).
218.
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994);
Christiansen, supra note 216.
219.
See Christiansen, supra note 216; Ingrid Burrington & Commentary,
Tracing the Byzantine Maze of the Companies that Have Come to Control America’s Internet,
QUARTZ (Oct. 5, 2016), http://qz.com/790210/tracing-the-byzantine-maze-of-the-companiesthat-have-come-to-control-americas-internet/.
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by the big three.220 Further, our country should encourage competition by
restricting the amount of market share, as was done with radio and television,
prior to the adoption of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.221
There are important implications for changing the current state of
internet regulation.222 As it stands, social media companies, as well as many
other internet websites, are given broad latitude in how they regulate speech
on their platforms.223
This is done pursuant to section 230, the
Communications Decency Act of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.224
Section 230 allows websites to regulate speech and posts on their websites
with complete immunity.225
As discussed above, the websites that allow posts on their websites are
not held to be publishers of that speech—rather, they are held to be distributors
of the speech.226 This is significant because it brings up the issue of allowing
private entities to regulate speech and the dissemination of information
reflecting conflicting viewpoints.227 However, there is a lot of debate and
differing viewpoints that suggest social media companies should be subject to
constitutional restrictions for censoring speech on their platforms.228 The
arguments for section 230 state that a private company should have the ability
to restrict users from its platform however it sees fit.229 The problem with this
thought process is that the restrictions may result in the controlled
dissemination of speech, sometimes reflecting only one side of the story.230
The arguments against section 230 protections largely cite to this problem.231
220.
See Christiansen, supra note 216.
221.
See Rev. of the Comm’n’s Reguls. Governing Television Broad., supra
note 70; Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 230, 110 Stat. 56, 137.
222.
See Wesley D. Lewis, Trends in ISP and Platform Liability: CDA Section
230 and DMCA Safe Harbors, HAYNES BOONE 2, 4 (Aug. 18, 2020),
http://www.haynesboone.com/-/media/project/haynesboone/haynesboone/pdfs/attorneypublications/2020/cda-section-230-and-dmca-safe-harbors.pdf.
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USA
TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/01/04/trump-biden-pelosi-section-230-repealfacebook-twitter-google/4132529001/ (last updated Jan. 5, 2021, 11:10 PM).
224.
See Lewis, supra note 222, at 1; § 230, 110 Stat. at 137.
225.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
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See Lewis, supra note 222, at 1.
227.
Id. at 2.
228.
Id.
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See discussion supra Section III.B; 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
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See Lewis, supra note 222, at 2; Torsten Bell, The Truth Is Out There, but
It’s Increasingly Hard to Distinguish from Lies, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2021, 5:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jul/04/the-truth-is-out-there-but-it-isincreasingly-hard-to-distinguish-from-lies.
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See Lewis, supra note 222, at 2.
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Allowing large corporations with dominant market shares, and consequently
large influence over society, to dictate the information being given to its users
creates platforms where a single viewpoint or ideology is represented, and
consequently creates echo chambers for persons who do not get to see
alternative arguments.232
VII.

CONCLUSION

Recently, Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion that
discussed the legal difficulties in applying old doctrines to new technology
and digital platforms.233 In the lower court, the Second Circuit held that the
comment threads on Twitter were a public forum in justifying its holding.234
But many argued that if Twitter comment threads—which make up the
majority of the platform—are held to be public forums, they should not be
treated as such.235 The Court has previously held, as a matter of law, that a
public forum is subject to the highest judicial scrutiny under the First
Amendment.236 As such, the government may not regulate speech in a public
forum, unless it meets judicial strict scrutiny.237 However, social media
platforms, like Twitter, are given immunity from civil lawsuits for regulating
speech on their platform, yet they are held to be a public forum in the eyes of
the Second Circuit.238 In addressing this, Justice Thomas stated the following:
Today’s digital platforms provide avenues for historically
unprecedented amounts of speech, including speech by government
actors. Also unprecedented, however, is the concentrated control of
so much speech in the hands of a few private parties. We will soon
have no choice but to address how our legal doctrines apply to
highly concentrated, privately owned information infrastructure
such as digital platforms.239

With that in mind, it is easy to see the inconsistency in allowing
platforms, such as Twitter, to be free to regulate speech as they please without
232.
233.
1221 (2021).
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
1226.
239.

See Bell, supra note 230.
See Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220,
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1221,
Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1221.
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facing liability, but at the same time treating the platform as a public forum
that is traditionally subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny when
regulating speech.240 Many critics have argued that the enforcement of the
Communications Decency Act was the product of legislative cronyismand
allowing it to continue will undoubtedly lead to more interference with the
First Amendment rights of individuals who should not be subject to this in the
first place.241
Internet regulations, as well as communication regulations as a whole,
need to be updated.242 Failing to do so would delegitimize the legislature
because the regulations would be easily alterable and constantly subject to suit
the executive office’s objectives.243 In some cases, this can be a good thing,
but it leaves it susceptible to cronyism as well.244 We have seen the importance
of the internet firsthand throughout the pandemic.245 Accordingly, it should
be regulated by an updated law that emphasizes the importance the internet
has in our lives.246 This could be done by repealing the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 and amending the Communications Act of 1934 to reflect how we
classify various mediums of communication and the protections we give
media companies.247 Specifically, the law should hold all forms of
communication up to common carriage standards.248 Additionally, new
regulatory legislation should hold ISPs as having an agency relationship with
the government so that they are held to upholding constitutional rights.249
Further, it should reevaluate whether media companies should be given
complete immunity in censoring their platforms because some of these
websites have proven themselves to be integral in how citizens receive

240.
David McGee, What Constitutes a Public Forum on Social Media?, 43
HUM. RTS., no. 4, 2018, at 10.
241.
47 U.S.C. § 230; see When Does Twitter Blocking Violate the First
Amendment?, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Aug. 1, 2019), http://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/podcast/when-does-twitter-blocking-violate-the-first-amendment.
242.
See Ben Sperry, Conservatism and the Section 230 Debate: Applying First
Principles, TRUTH ON MKT. (Sept. 30, 2020), http://truthonthemarket.com/tag/communicationsdecency-act-section-230/; Christiansen, supra note 216.
243.
See Sperry, supra note 242.
244.
See, e.g., NAT’L CONST. CTR., supra note 241.
245.
See Vogels et al., supra note 201.
246.
See id.; United States: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report, supra
note 10.
247.
See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5723
(2015); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56; Communications
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-4165, 48 Stat. 1064.
248.
See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17905, 18067 (2010).
249.
See BRANNON, supra note 217, at 25.

304

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

information, and thus creates echo chambers of information where people do
not have an opportunity to receive diverse information.250

250.

Bell, supra note 230; see also supra Section VI.B.
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INTRODUCTION

It is well established that the First Amendment’s free speech clause
does not protect the production or exchange of real child pornography—
material that exhibits the real abuse or sexual conduct of children.1 However,
virtual child pornography, where no real children are required for its
production, is still a widely contended topic among courts.2 Although
seemingly simple, this subject walks a fine line between the protection of free
speech and the public interest in protecting children from abuse.3 With the
overwhelming advancements in editing and digital technology, there have
undoubtedly been new obstacles for lawmakers and prosecutors in terms of
creating laws to control this issue.4 These advancements have made it difficult
to distinguish between what images contain real children and what images
contain, so called, fake children or some other hybrid form.5
There are three general categories of virtual child pornography.6 The
first is computer-generated child pornography, which is made without the use
of real children or images of real children.7 Therefore, the children depicted
in these sorts of films are completely fictional and fabricated.8 The second is
child pornography that is created with the use of youthful-looking adults who
role play as children.9 Both are considered legal, as the first does not involve
the harming or use of real children and the second involves films or images
between consenting adults.10 The focus of this Comment is on the third
category—morphed child pornography—a subject that falls in the middle of
what is considered real child pornography and completely computer-generated
child pornography.11 Morphing is developed by using actual photos or videos
1.
Shepard Liu, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography and First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2007); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2.
Liu, supra note 1, at 3; United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th
Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
3.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002).
4.
David L. Hudson Jr., Virtual Child Pornography, FREEDOM F. INST.,
http://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech2/internet-first-amendment/virtual-child-pornography/ (last updated Sept. 18, 2017).
5.
Id.
6.
Liu, supra note 1, at 2.
7.
Id. at 3.
8.
See id.
9.
Id. at 2.
10.
Virginia F. Milstead, Note, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: How Can
Virtual Child Pornography Be Banned Under the First Amendment?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 825,
834–35 (2004).
11.
Liu, supra note 1, at 2; United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th
Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
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of children, which can then be digitally manipulated to create an entirely
different sexualized image.12 For example, this can be accomplished by
superimposing the faces of children onto the bodies of adults engaging in
sexual conduct.13 With these methods, there are many ways that a child
predator could use superimpositions to create child porn.14
Circuit courts have disagreed on whether morphed child pornography
should be categorized as a protected speech, since it seems to be the middle
ground between what has historically been unprotected and what is still
considered protected under the First Amendment.15 In February 2020, United
States v. Mecham16 brought the issue before the Fifth Circuit.17 The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged the arguments on both sides, but ultimately joined the
Second and Sixth Circuits in its decision to exclude morphing from First
Amendment protection.18 More importantly, the court in Mecham dissected
and rejected the main argument brought forth in the Eighth Circuit, which
supports that morphing should be categorized as protected speech.19 Further,
the Supreme Court decided not to review the decision in United States v.
Mecham.20 Thus, the Supreme Court has failed to guide courts on how to
address this issue uniformly.21
This Comment will discuss the legislative history of child
pornography, the different cases and arguments surrounding the current circuit
split, and the newest case to add an opinion on the issue of morphed child
pornography.22 Ultimately, this Comment will argue that morphed child
pornography should not fall within the protections of the First Amendment
and that the absence of clear precedent on this issue, along with conflicting
arguments across circuits calls for judicial review at the Supreme Court level.23

12.
Liu, supra note 1, at 3.
13.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
14.
See id.
15.
See id. at 265.
16.
950 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2020).
17.
Id. at 257.
18.
Id. at 265.
19.
See id. at 266–67.
20.
141 S. Ct. 139 (2020) (cert. denied) (referring to United States v. Mecham,
950 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2020)).
21.
See id.
22.
See infra Parts III, IV, V.
23.
See infra Part VI.
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THE SOCIETAL IMPACT OF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

The sexual abuse and exploitation of children through child
pornography has always been a significant national concern.24 Unfortunately,
the internet has created new avenues for child abusers to commit crimes behind
the comfort of their screens.25 According to the United States Sentencing
Commission, more than half of all internet child pornography content is of
infants and toddlers.26 Thus, not only does internet child pornography exploit
the weakest members of our society, but it also creates a forum in which abuse
is permanent and can be further circulated.27 Children who fall victim to any
form of child pornography on the internet experience extreme emotional and
psychological harm.28 Child pornography has shown to be a new form of
abuse since child molesters no longer have to physically abuse their victims.29
Instead, they can easily manipulate child victims into performing acts or
posing for a camera, which can later be used for sexual purposes.30 Victims
of this abuse often suffer from anxiety, depression, isolation, and may even
develop their own sexual behavioral issues.31 For obvious reasons, the most
negative outcomes appear in individuals who have experienced abuse from a
father figure or have experienced abuse for a long duration of time.32
Similarly, victims whose images have circulated the web experience
deep shame and embarrassment at the thought that someone will recognize
them from images of their abuse.33 As a result, victims of child pornography
are forced to relive their abuse over and over again.34 Clinical psychologists
note that many victims struggle to identify a time when their abuse ended and
cannot find closure, even as adults.35
24.
25.

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, INTERNET CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY: CAUSES, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PREVENTION 2 (Graeme R. Newman ed., 2012).
26.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
NON-PRODUCTION SENTENCES 4 (2021), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/research-publications/2021/20210629_Non-Production-CP.pdf; Emily Riley,
Internet Blamed for Increase in Child Porn, CRIME REP. (June 29, 2021),
http://thecrimereport.org/2021/06/29/internet-blamed-for-increase-in-child-porn/.
27.
Sarah Sternberg, Note, The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 and
the First Amendment: Virtual Antitheses, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2783, 2785 (2001).
28.
Id.
29.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 75.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 72.
32.
Id. at 73.
33.
Id. at 77.
34.
See WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 77.
35.
See id. at 77.
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Aside from the various harms imposed on victims, child pornography
acts as a tool for child molesters to seduce children into normalizing sexual
activity with adults.36 Child molesters may use materials to persuade children
into participating in creating sexual images which can be utilized to lure more
child victims.37 Child pornography viewers may also find support and
encouragement in groups or forums that engage in the same content; fortythree percent of offenders have participated in some sort of an internet child
pornography community.38 The effects that child pornography has on its
viewers are equally harmful.39 When enacting child pornography legislation,
Congress acknowledged that pedophiles use this content to self-gratify and
stimulate their sexual appetites.40
Similarly, almost all pedophiles collect some sort of child
pornography in an attempt to fulfill their fantasies or to collect ideas to
perpetuate abuse.41 In 2019, forty-eight percent of child pornography
offenders, who were not charged with its production, committed some sort of
“aggravating sexual conduct” before, or at the same time, as their offense.42
These statistics comparatively increased from studies conducted in 2010,
showing that there has been a steady incline in abrasive conduct by child
pornographic viewers.43 Experts have described child pornography as an
addiction for pedophiles.44 The addiction eventually intensifies and requires
the individual to search for more graphic and explicit content to continue to
achieve arousal.45 Repeated exposure to the same stimuli will eventually
require new content for the viewer’s stimulation.46 Thus, the user becomes
desensitized to the content, no matter how extreme.47 Additionally, child
pornography viewers often experience a worsening of their personal
relationships and problems.48 One-third of people arrested for child
pornography offenses between 2001 and 2006 were actively living with their
significant other and experienced such issues.49
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2786.
Id.
Riley, supra note 26.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 82.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2786 (citing S REP. NO. 104-358, at 12 (1996)).
Id. (citing S REP. NO. 104-358, at 13).
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 26, at 6; Riley, supra note 26.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 26, at 6; Riley, supra note 26.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2786.
Id. at 2786–87.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 83.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2787.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 82.
Id.
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The profitability and demand for different types of child pornography
are what drive the market, a market that likely holds billions of dollars.50 The
fact that the distribution of this content is international poses an enormous
challenge for its regulation and control.51 For example, an image can be
created in Asia, held in a server in Europe, and be accessed by an offender in
North America.52 Most of the time, child sexual abuse material is being
investigated in the present jurisdiction where it is occurring.53 However, when
those materials cross jurisdictional boundaries, it becomes difficult for police
departments and investigators to share that information.54 Additionally,
different countries have different laws pertaining to child pornography and its
derivatives.55 For example, Australia and the European Union have already
gone as far as to outlaw all virtual child pornography, even fully computergenerated material.56 On the other hand, in the United States, certain types of
virtual child pornography are still constitutionally protected.57 Prices for this
content in the industry rarely decrease and because the chances of getting
caught are less likely on the internet, child pornographic producers have no
interest in stopping.58
Computers, cellphones, and other technological advancements have
allowed for the expansion of child pornographic material.59 Morphing
software enables individuals to combine real images of children with
pornographic images of adults.60 Thus, the reality is that real children are no
longer needed to produce child pornography.61 In fact, because most child
pornography is produced by family members or individuals who are close to
the children, many victims would not even be aware that they are being used
in pornographic contents.62 Consequently, when the digital age changes the
way child pornography is made, child pornography laws deserve a second
look.63
50.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2787.
51.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 2.
52.
See id.
53.
See id.
54.
See id.
55.
Id.
56.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 5.
57.
Milstead, supra note 10, at 834–35.
58.
See Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2787.
59.
Brian G. Slocum, Virtual Child Pornography: Does It Mean the End of the
Child Pornography Exception to the First Amendment?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 641
(2004).
60.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2788.
61.
Id. at 2788–89.
62.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 72, 74.
63.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2789.
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HISTORY OF REGULATIONS SURROUNDING REAL AND VIRTUAL
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN THE UNITED STATES

Although the sexual abuse and exploitation of children are as old as
humanity itself, internet child pornography is a relatively new phenomenon.64
The miniature boom of child pornography occurred around the 1960s, as
obscenity laws in other countries loosened.65 For the first time, the United
States set forth regulations to outlaw child pornography and to prohibit its
importation.66 By the 1980s, the internet had exponentially increased the
amount of child pornography that was being produced and traded.67 However,
virtual child pornography, particularly morphed content, is what has become
known as the legal gray area of this topic.68 The only piece of legislation that
sought to regulate virtual child pornography in the United States was
introduced in 1996, as the Child Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”),
which was later overturned in 2002.69
A.

The Miller Standard and its Application to Child Pornography

In 1973, Miller v. California70 created the current standard of review
for obscenity.71
Although not directly relating to restricting child
pornography, Miller made an important distinction on what type of
pornography is considered obscene.72 Under the Miller test, the guidelines to
determine whether material is obscene must be:
(a) [W]hether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest, . . . (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken

64.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 1.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at 2.
68.
United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
69.
Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 121, 110 Stat. 3009-26, invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
70.
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
71.
Id. at 24.
72.
Id. at 36–37.
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as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.73

Although this test would certainly include some sort of child
pornography, by nature it would not include all of them.74 It would be even
less likely that it includes child pornography that falls in the gray area of what
is considered real and fake.75 Because the Court in Miller failed to categorize
child pornography as inherently obscene, future decisions were bound to be
made to specifically attack this issue.76
B.
New York v. Ferber: Child Pornography as a Compelling State
Interest
In 1982, New York v. Ferber77 established that child pornography is
not protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free expression.78 In
addition, the Supreme Court clarified that the government has a compelling
interest in prosecuting individuals who partake in the creation of child
pornography, as the sexual exploitation and abuse of children has always been
a national concern.79 Ultimately, the standards set forth in Miller were
irrelevant to the issues of child pornography, as Miller only established that
adult pornography was protected under the First Amendment, so long as the
materials were not obscene.80 Generally, Miller defined obscenity as images
lacking “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”81 Ultimately,
Ferber determined that the Miller case could not be used to examine the
material of children engaging in sexual conduct and therefore, child
pornography did not require proof of obscenity.82
In Ferber, the defendant sold two sexually explicit films to an
undercover police officer.83 The films depicted young boys engaging in sexual
acts.84 Under New York law, “[a] person is guilty of promoting a sexual
performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he
73.
Id. at 24.
74.
See id. at 27.
75.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
76.
United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020); see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 16.
77.
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
78.
See id. at 764.
79.
See id. at 760–61.
80.
Id. at 761; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
81.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
82.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
83.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751–52.
84.
Id. at 752.
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produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct
by a child less than sixteen years of age.”85 Therefore, the defendant was
convicted at the trial level under the New York statute.86 However, because
the statute did not require the obscenity standard set forth by Miller, the
defendant claimed the statute was overly broad and appealed his convictions.87
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s convictions.88 However, the New York Court of Appeals agreed with
the defendant and reversed the convictions on the grounds that the statute
violated the First Amendment.89 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted the state’s petition for certiorari.90
The Supreme Court presented five compelling government interests
that justified the ban of non-obscene child pornography.91 First, the Court
emphasized the importance of safeguarding the “physical and psychological
well-being” of children.92 Even when laws have shown the possibility of
imposing on some area of constitutionally protected rights, the Court has
sustained legislation that has protected youth.93 Second, child pornographic
films and photographs impose direct and continuous harm on the children
involved.94 Digital pornographic materials allow for a permanent record of a
child’s involvement that negatively impacts the child’s life with every
circulation.95 Third, there is an economic motive and a continuous demand for
the production of such films.96 Thus, allowing any remnant of protections for
child pornography would essentially be the Court’s promotion of illegal
activity.97 In the same manner, the Court suggested that the constitutional
freedom of speech and freedom of press does not excuse the use of speech and
writing that directly contributes to crime and illegality.98 Fourth, cases where
depictions of children engaging in sexual conduct are used for scientific or
educational work are unlikely.99 Therefore, there is little value in protecting
non-obscene child pornography for the purpose of protecting the few and rare
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 751.
Id. at 752.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752–53; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752.
See id.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 756–57, 759, 761–63.
Id. at 756–57.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id. at 761.
See id. at 761–62.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62.
Id. at 762–63.
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instances where it would be acceptable.100 Fifth, the negative impact that child
pornography has on children is substantial, and therefore outweighs the
concerns for First Amendment protection.101 For these reasons, the Court held
that New York’s statute was not overbroad.102 Almost half of all states at the
time of Ferber were enforcing legislation that directly targeted child
pornography without the obscenity standards set forth by Miller.103
Ultimately, the case seemed to focus on the types of harms that child
pornography causes.104 The physical and psychological harms that are
imposed on children who are the subjects of child pornography exemplify a
direct injury.105 This direct harm is also present when these pornographic
materials are continuously distributed and that child’s trauma is further
exasperated.106 The Court also considers the indirect harms of child
pornography.107 Child abuse is at the core of all child pornography.108 For
example, pedophiles often utilize child pornography to seduce their victims
into engaging in sexual activity.109 The Court in Ferber even proposes that
the eradication of the child pornography market would likely prevent the
infliction of harm on other children.110 Thus, preventing the direct and indirect
harm of children is in the interest of the state.111
The Court successfully recognized that child pornography, whether
obscene or not, should be prohibited.112 The consensus was that the First
Amendment’s protections became of smaller importance when held in
comparison to the societal damage that child pornography produces for the
Nation.113 However, the focus of the case was dedicated to real child
pornography, that is pornography that captures the actual abuse of a child,
whereas the more elusive issue of virtual child pornography was not directly
addressed.114 Instead, the Court suggests that “other depictions of sexual
conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or
photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains First
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 762.
See id. at 764.
Id. at 774.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 8–9.
Id.
Id. at 8.
See id. at 9.
Id.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 9.
See id.
Liu, supra note 1, at 9.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
See id. at 758.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 10.
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Amendment protection.”115 This rhetoric creates a loophole in both the way
that child pornography can avoid regulation and the way that child
pornographic content creators can experiment with images and videos to give
the illusion that children are engaging in sexual conduct, when, in fact, there
is no live performance taking place.116 The decision in Ferber was expanded
in 1990 with Osborne v. Ohio,117 which made it illegal to possess child
pornography.118 Furthermore, the Court in Osborne expressly listed the use of
child pornography in the seduction process as a valid reason for the state to
encourage the destruction of these materials as well as the criminalization of
their possession.119 However, over time, the absence of clear precedent on
virtual child pornography brought about the introduction of the CPPA.120
C.

Virtual Child Pornography
1.

The CPPA

In 1996, Congress sought to regulate virtual child pornography with
the CPPA.121 The CPPA defined child pornography as:
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (B) such visual
depiction is [] [a digital image, computer image, or computergenerated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that] of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction
has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable
minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (D) such visual
depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the
material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.122
115.
116.
117.
118.

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 10.
495 U.S. 103 (1990).
YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 95 (2008); Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; see Ferber,
458 U.S. at 748.
119.
AKDENIZ, supra note 118, at 96; Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
120.
Liu, supra note 1, at 10; see Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110
Stat. at 3009–27.
121.
Liu, supra note 1, at 14; see Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110
Stat. at 3009–27.
122.
Liu, supra note 1, at 14; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat.
at 3009–28.
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Essentially, the CPPA broadened the scope of the ban set by Ferber
by covering actual child pornography, as well as all three categories of virtual
child pornography.123 The ultimate goal of the CPPA was to destroy the
market for child pornography, protect child victims, and prevent child
molesters from feeding into sexual desires that could result in the
manifestation of criminal activity.124 By outlawing computer images that
appeared to be real children, the CPPA casted a broad net and in the process
was able to rectify the loopholes left by the Ferber decision.125
2.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

Soon after the introduction of the CPPA, Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition126 reversed the Act in 2002.127 The Supreme Court in Ashcroft found
that virtual child pornography was not a compelling government interest, and
that the CPPA was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.128 Ultimately, the
Court held that virtual child pornography was protected under the First
Amendment.129 Particularly, Ashcroft focused on the unconstitutionality of
the Act’s language, such as the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the
impression.”130 The concern was that this language would allow the
prosecution of individuals who created their materials without the use of real
children.131 Hypothetically, if a producer created a film in which he or she
used a youthful-looking adult movie actor to play the role of a child, then that
producer could possibly face punishments under the CPPA.132 Similarly, this
language would technically prohibit all virtual child pornography despite its
possible literary, artistic, or scientific value.133 For example, the Court cited
Academy Award-winning movies, such as American Beauty, in which there
123.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 14; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110
Stat. at 3009–28; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
124.
Liu, supra note 1, at 15; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat.
at 3009–27.
125.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 15; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110
Stat. at 3009–28; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 748.
126.
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
127.
But see Child Pornography Prevention Act, § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009-28;
Liu, supra note 1, at 32.
128.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002); Liu, supra note 1
at 33; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009-27.
129.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 234, 258.
130.
Id. at 256, 258; Hudson Jr., supra note 4.
131.
Hudson Jr., supra note 4.
132.
Id.; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009–26.
133.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 261, 265.
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are portrayals of teenage sexual activity as well as sexual relations between
teenagers and adults.134 Such films would likely fall under some of the Act’s
prohibited content.135 In addition, the Court distinguished its decision from
that of Ferber’s, noting that virtual child pornography records no actual crime
and therefore creates no victims.136 The issue of morphing was not fully
considered, as the respondents had not challenged that specific provision in
the Act.137 However, the Court’s dicta indicated that morphed child
pornography still implicated real children and therefore was more aligned with
the images presented in Ferber.138 Whether this comparison meant that
morphed child pornography was also unprotected by the First Amendment was
not made clear.139 Justice O’Connor concurred in part in regards to the CPPA
being unconstitutional when applied to material containing youthful-looking
actors.140 However, she dissented in part, acknowledging that there was a clear
concern for the rapidly advancing technological tools being used to create
virtual child pornography and that the CPPA’s ban on virtual child
pornography was not overbroad.141 Justice Scalia also agreed with
O’Connor’s opinion that the CPPA’s ban on child pornography was not
overbroad.142
3.

The PROTECT Act

The Court’s decision in Ashcroft was nothing short of controversial.143
For some, the decision meant that free speech and the First Amendment were
being protected to the fullest extent.144 For others, the Court’s decision left
questions on the definitive legality of virtual child pornography.145 In response
to the decision in Ashcroft, Congress considered a more narrowly tailored
approach to the provisions struck down in the CPPA.146 On April 03, 2003,
134.
Id. at 248.
135.
Id. at 247–48.
136.
Id. at 250; see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
137.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
138.
Id. at 242.
139.
See id.
140.
Id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Child
Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009-28.
141.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009–26.
142.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 263, 267 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009–26.
143.
Slocum, supra note 59, at 654.
144.
Id; Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 238.
145.
Slocum, supra note 59, at 654.
146.
Id. at 655; see Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 238.
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Congress passed an act entitled “Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003” (“PROTECT Act”),
which sought to correct many of the CPPA’s provisions.147 The Act cleared
up some of the issues that were determined to be First Amendment
violations.148 In regard to the virtual child pornography provisions of the Act,
the PROTECT Act replaced some of the CPPA’s unconstitutional language.149
For example, “appears to be . . . a minor” was replaced with “indistinguishable
from that of a[n] [actual] minor.”150 Thus, the PROTECT Act allowed for the
prosecution of virtual child pornography that was so realistic that it would be
impossible to determine whether the child being used was real or computergenerated.151
Similarly, the Act also defined virtual child pornography in a way that
does not impose on material which may have artistic or literary value.152
Although the new definitions and provisions narrowed prior law, the Act also
broadened prior affirmative defenses to virtual child pornography.153 The
CPPA granted an affirmative defense for cases that involved youthful-looking
actors; however the PROTECT Act grants an affirmative defense for any cases
in which there was no actual child used in the production of the material.154
The Act seemingly portrayed Congress’ new goal of prohibiting virtual child
pornography only to the extent that it will prevent the production of real child
pornography.155 Congress also asserted that child pornography images that
were being trafficked as of 2003 were produced through the actual abuse of
children.156 Some critics of the PROTECT Act’s provision on virtual child
147.
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, § 1(a), 117 Stat. 650, 650; Slocum, supra note 59, at
655.
148.
Hudson Jr., supra note 4; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. 650.
149.
Slocum, supra note 59, at 655; Child Pornography Prevention Act, § 121,
110 Stat; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
150.
Slocum, supra note 59, at 655–56; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, § 502, 117 Stat. at 678.
151.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 648; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
152.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 656; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
153.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 657; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
154.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 657–58; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
155.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 658; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
156.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 658.
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pornography believe that Congress is attempting to remedy an issue that does
not yet exist.157 However, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Ashcroft notes that
the Court’s cases “do not require Congress to wait for harm to occur before it
can legislate against it.”158
Although the PROTECT Act is able to prohibit some computergenerated images that are indistinguishable from real children and protect
work that is deemed artistically valuable, it still fails to recognize the gray
areas of virtual child pornography where the sexual abuse of real children is
not needed.159 Morphed child pornography is a category which usually does
not implicate the live abuse of real children, but certainly contributes
significant harms to its victims.160 Additionally, the attainability of editing
applications and software has dramatically increased since 2003, to the point
where morphed child pornography can likely be created with the use of just a
smartphone.161 Thus, the PROTECT Act neglects to provide a uniform and
multifaceted approach to the varying areas of virtual child pornography.162
IV.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON MORPHED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

A.
Arguments Against the First Amendment’s Protection of Morphed
Child Pornography
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established
morphed child pornography is not afforded First Amendment protection.163
The main argument put forth by the Court had to do with the overwhelming
emotional and reputational harm that morphed child pornography imposes on
victims.164 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
did not answer a First Amendment question, it was still able to establish that

157.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 665; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
158.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 264 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 656–57; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
160.
See United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
161.
See Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2788.
162.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 656–57; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
163.
United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011).
164.
Id.
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morphed child pornography constitutes an immediate injury to those victims
involved.165
1.

The Second Circuit and Hotaling

In United States v. Hotaling,166 the defendant admitted to possessing
sexually explicit images of six female minors that had been digitally
morphed.167 The heads of the minors had been cropped out of their original
photographs and then superimposed on the images of partially nude bodies of
adult females engaging in sexual conduct.168 One of the photographs
contained the face of the defendant superimposed on a nude male’s body
engaging in sexual intercourse with a female bearing the face of one of the
child victims.169 There were also images of the victims faces that were
superimposed on bodies that were shackled, leashed, and restrained. 170 Some
of the images were taken from pictures of the defendant’s daughters with their
friends.171 The pictures were held in digital index folders and were labeled
with a pornographic website uniform resource locator (“URL”).172
Additionally, the pictures were titled with the victims’ actual names.173 The
defendant asserted that no actual children were ever harmed when he created
the images and that no sexual activity took place.174 He challenged the state
statute as being overbroad and vague.175 Similarly, the defendant claimed the
images were a way for him to enjoy his sexual fantasies without hurting
anyone and therefore, his actions should be protected under the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.176
The court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ferber, citing
the government’s compelling interest in protecting minors from the emotional
trauma of child pornography.177 In the same manner, the court acknowledged
dicta brought forth by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft, which indicates that
morphed images, although technically considered virtual child pornography,
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Doe v. Boland (In re Boland), 946 F.3d 335, 341–42 (6th Cir. 2020).
634 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 727.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 727.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 727, 729.
Id. at 727.
Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 727.
Id. at 728–729; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
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more adequately resembled the images discussed in Ferber.178 In other words,
morphed images still include real children and therefore, still pose a threat to
the overall emotional and reputational security of children.179 Ultimately, the
court reasoned that the photographs did implicate the recognizable faces of
minors and therefore caused great psychological and reputational harm to
those victims.180 Thus, sexually explicit images that bear the faces of
identifiable children are not afforded protection under the First Amendment.181
2.

The Sixth Circuit and Boland

In Doe v. Boland,182 the defendant was an attorney and expert witness
who was working as a technology expert for individuals that were charged
with the possession of child pornography.183 In an attempt to make the
argument that children in pornographic images were indistinguishable from
computer-generated children, the defendant took online images of two young
girls and morphed them to create images of the two girls engaging in sexual
acts. 184 Ultimately, his argument was that if he could easily create these
doctored images, then certainly his clients could have downloaded doctored
material as well.185 The defendant presented his images in federal court as an
expert witness and was subsequently told by a judge to delete the images.186
Instead, he kept the images and called federal prosecutors in his hometown to
determine if the images were in fact illegal.187 Ultimately, he was found
criminally and civilly liable for the images.188 The defendant claimed he did
not intend to willfully or maliciously injure the minors, but instead he was
simply creating images that would be used as exhibits in court.189
The court reasoned that there is a substantial certainty of injury when
the faces of identifiable minors are used for the purpose of creating morphed
child pornography.190 It was noted that there is a legal presumption of injury
178.
U.S. at 238.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 729; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 748; Free Speech Coal., 535
Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 729–30.
Id.
Id. at 730.
946 F.3d 335 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Boland, 946 F.3d at 337.
See id. at 338.
Id. at 341.
See id. at 341–42.
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when a child’s identity is used in morphed pornography.191 Thus, the injury
begins at the moment the images are created.192 The court drew similarities
between morphed child pornography and defamatory statements, stating that
both occur when an individual acts with the knowledge that substantial injury
or harm is likely to occur.193 Consequently, the court agreed that the
presumption of injury in morphed child pornography was great.194 It is clear
that whatever causes great injury to minors cannot, on its face, be protected
under the First Amendment.195 The court held that the defendant had
substantial knowledge that his actions would cause injury and harm to the
victims.196 Therefore, the defendant could not be released from his charge.197
B.
Arguments in Support of the First Amendment’s Protection of
Morphed Child Pornography
1.

The Eighth Circuit and Anderson

In United States v. Anderson,198 the defendant sent unsolicited
sexually explicit images to his half-sister’s eleven-year-old daughter.199 One
of the pictures he had sent depicted an adult male and an adult female engaging
in sexual intercourse with the caption: “this is what we will do.”200 The
defendant had superimposed his own face onto that of the male’s body and the
victim’s face onto the female’s body.201 Ultimately, he admitted that he
created the image and sent it to the victim’s Facebook account.202 The
defendant moved to dismiss his charges on the basis that the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment.203
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that only visual depictions produced through the sexual abuse of a
child fell under unprotected speech.204 Although the court noted the decision
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 342.
In re Boland, 946 F.3d at 342.
Id. at 338–39.
See id. at 342.
See id. at 341–42.
Id. at 342.
In re Boland, 946 F.3d at 342.
759 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 893.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 893.
Id. at 894.
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in Ferber, the understanding was that Ferber focused on child pornography
that was intrinsically related to child abuse and criminal conduct.205
Furthermore, because no minor was abused in the production of the
defendant’s content, nor was there historical or Supreme Court case law
addressing this issue, the defendant’s material fell under protected speech.206
In order to understand the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Anderson, it is
important to acknowledge the cases that drove the opposing party’s arguments
and the court’s decisional reasoning.207
The state argued that Anderson was identical to United States v.
Bach.208 In Bach, the Eighth Circuit heard a case involving a morphed image
which superimposed the face of a minor on the body of a minor posing in a
sexually explicit manner.209 Because the underlying image was still the body
of a minor, the court reasoned that the material could not be protected by the
First Amendment.210 The underlying image was a record of criminal activity
against a child, notwithstanding the face that was superimposed upon it.211
However, the defense suggested that Anderson and Bach are completely
different.212 The main difference outlined by the defense was that in Anderson
the underlying images were of adults engaging in sexual conduct, whereas in
Bach, the underlying image was of a real child.213 Thus, no children were
attempted to be portrayed in creating the images in Anderson.214 Without the
presence of some sort of child abuse in the material, the defense advanced the
opinion that the images in Anderson are protected by the First Amendment.215
The Court in Anderson used the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United
States v. Stevens216 to support its argument that child pornography is only
unprotected by the First Amendment when it displays the criminal abuse of
children.217 Additionally, the Court used Stevens to explain that the First
Amendment’s protections do not rely on a balancing test of costs versus
benefits.218 Instead, it reasoned that First Amendment protection depends
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
See id.
400 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2005); see Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
Bach, 400 F.3d at 624, 632.
Id. at 632.
Bach, 400 F.3d at 632.
Id.; Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895; Bach, 400 F.3d at 632.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895.
Id. at 894–95.
559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
Id; Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 at 464.
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primarily on whether the content in question has been historically or
traditionally prohibited by the courts.219 In Stevens, the Supreme Court held
that animal cruelty content was not automatically excluded from the First
Amendment’s protection, as there is no evidence of historical prohibitions
against the depictions of animal cruelty.220 Although Stevens focused on
animal cruelty videos, the Eighth Circuit chose to apply this rhetoric to its
morphed child pornography question in Anderson.221 The court held that
morphed child pornography should not be excluded from First Amendment
protection because it lacks traditional and historical prohibition in the law.222
Specifically, morphed child pornography does not present the abuse of real
children—which has historically been required for First Amendment
exemption—therefore, morphed child pornography should fall within the
realm of protected speech.223 The court expressed that morphing attempts to
portray a minor, such as the case in Bach, and would thus qualify as an
exemption from First Amendment protection because it would display the
abuse of a child.224 However, morphing that does not implicate a real minor,
such as images of adults engaging in sexual relations with superimposed faces
of children, would not qualify as an exception under the reasoning in
Anderson.225
V.

THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. MECHAM

In United States v. Mecham, the Fifth Circuit asked whether the First
Amendment protects morphed child pornography.226 The court notes that real
child pornography goes unprotected under the First Amendment and that
pornography created with youthful-looking adult actors or completely
computer-generated children is protected.227
However, the court
acknowledges how morphed child pornography usually falls between these
established categories.228
In Mecham, the defendant took his computer to a repair shop where it
was discovered that he had used it to store thousands of images of nude adults
219.
Id.
220.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 at 481, 482.
221.
Id.; Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
222.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
223.
See id.
224.
Id. at 895; Bach, 400 F.3d at 632.
225.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895–96.
226.
See United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
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with the faces of children superimposed onto them.229 After a search of his
home, police obtained over 30,000 files of morphed child pornography.230 All
the images found used the faces of the defendant’s grandchildren.231 The
defendant admitted that he had superimposed the faces of his four
granddaughters onto the bodies of adults engaging in sexual intercourse.232
The defendant claimed he had created the images and videos in anger after his
daughter prohibited him from having any contact with his granddaughters.233
The victims were of the ages of four, five, ten, and sixteen.234
The defendant had managed to email some of these videos to his oldest
granddaughter.235 One of the videos showed the sixteen-year-old victim’s face
superimposed onto the body of a female engaging in sexual intercourse with a
male.236 The defendant had superimposed his own face onto the body of that
male.237 This video also depicted explicit and disturbing animated scenes of
the defendant ejaculating on the victim.238 Another video contained a photo
montage of images of the five-year-old victim’s face cropped onto the bodies
of females engaging in various sexual acts.239
The defendant contended that the charges against him should be
dismissed because morphed child pornography is protected under the First
Amendment.240 Furthermore, the defendant argued that he could not be
charged because no children were sexually abused in the production of the
content.241
The court recognized that morphed child pornography is closer in
relation to real child pornography, as the face of an identifiable minor is being
used to depict sexual content.242 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit did not neglect
to review the arguments on both sides of the circuit split.243 The court
emphasized the importance of the lower court’s actions during times when the
Supreme Court’s caselaw on an issue is not yet solidified.244 Lower courts
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 263.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id.
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must not attempt to guess what the Supreme Court might decide, but instead
should look to the underlying concerns of the Supreme Court in applicable
past decisions.245
For example, both Ferber and Ashcroft focused on reputational and
emotional harm to children.246 The Court wanted to address Stevens, as this
case supported the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Anderson and had not been
addressed by the Second or Sixth Circuits.247 Stevens put forth the argument
that the First Amendment’s protections are not decided on a cost-benefit
analysis or balancing test.248 The court in Mecham found this statement
irrelevant, stating that the Second and Sixth Circuits did not reach their
decisions from a simple balancing testing of morphed child pornography, but
instead reached their decisions based on their interest in preventing the
reputational and emotional harm of children.249 In the same manner, the court
noted that Stevens focused on depictions of animal cruelty and only mentioned
child pornography in passing.250 This rhetoric alone cannot override the
precedent of the court’s concerns regarding child pornography.251
Additionally, Stevens cannot reliably be used as the only justification for First
Amendment protection of morphed child pornography, as it makes no mention
of the emotional and psychological harm to children that the Supreme Court
is trying to prevent.252 If Stevens was attempting to make a significant
doctrinal development of child pornography, it would not have been done in a
case about animal cruelty videos.253
Finally, the court proposed that defining child pornography as only
images that exhibit the real criminal abuse of a child would not only limit the
prohibition of morphed child pornography, but of real child pornography as
well.254 The definition of real child pornography does not limit itself to
pictures and videos depicting real child abuse.255 On the contrary, real child
pornography can be an image of a child in which genitals are exposed or even
a cropped image of a child’s genitals in which the child’s face is not even
245.
Id.
246.
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758
(1982); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002).
247.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469–71 (2010); see Mecham, 950
F.3d at 264–65; Anderson, 759 F.3d at 891.
248.
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 264–65; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464.
249.
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265.
250.
Id. at 265–66; see Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469, 471.
251.
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265–66.
252.
See id.; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
253.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266; see Stevens, 559 U.S. at 465–66, 471.
254.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267.
255.
Id. at 266.
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shown.256 This broad definition of child pornography has been used for
decades to prosecute individuals even when there is no evidence that physical
sexual contact occurred.257 The court did not believe that the decision in
Ferber was meant to constrict the definition of child pornography to only
images which depict abuse, rather, it was only one of the Supreme Court’s
rationales in reaching its decision.258 Regarding morphed child pornography,
the Fifth Circuit recognized that Ashcroft and every other circuit case to
address this issue had established that there was indeed a significant threat to
the psychological well-being of children affected.259 Ultimately, the court
disagreed with the defendant’s claim that morphed child pornography is
protected under the First Amendment.260
VI.

CONCLUSION

The court in Anderson mistakenly interpreted the Supreme Court’s
rhetoric in Stevens.261 Stevens differentiated the issue of child pornography
from the issue of animal crushing videos, admitting that child pornography is
always a special case due to its historical establishment as a long standing First
Amendment exception.262 Simply, the Court in Stevens was describing its
inability to create another First Amendment exception category for animal
crush videos, as there would be no historical support for such a ruling.263
Although the Court in Stevens also suggests that there is little need for a costbenefit analysis in child pornography due to its already established history, it
is unlikely that the Court was envisioning the more controversial and gray area
category of morphed child pornography.264 A cost-benefit analysis would
likely be essential for such a contested issue.265 Such an analysis would show
that morphed child pornography poses a significant harm to children and
provides little to no benefit to society.266 Under the reasoning in Mecham, if
256.
Id.
257.
Id.
258.
Id.; see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 750–51, 764 (1982).
259.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002); Mecham, 950
F.3d at 267.
260.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267.
261.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010); United States v.
Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 2014).
262.
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471–72.
263.
See id. at 471.
264.
See id.
265.
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236, 251–53 (2002).
266.
United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
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a cost-benefit analysis was deemed irrelevant and the concern was solely based
on harm to children that was expressed in Ferber, morphing would still not
fall under protected speech.267
Admittedly, child pornography, whether real, virtual or morphed, is a
difficult topic to address.268 In the past, child sexual abuse was often
ignored.269 However, the new digital age has also provided some sort of
transparency on the true magnitude of this issue.270 It is important to
acknowledge that child sexual abuse content does not always arise out of
situations that were abusive or harmful.271 The production of sexual images
with the use of an identifiable minor constitutes abuse in itself.272
Consequently, American jurisprudence has indicated that the
government has a compelling interest in safeguarding the overall well-being
of our youth.273 It is established that real child pornography causes extreme
psychological and reputational harm to its child victims.274 Virtual child
pornography does not always implicate real children getting abused.275 Thus,
it is also established that non-obscene virtual child pornography is protected
by the First Amendment.276
However, the issue still stands with morphed child pornography.277
When the identities of real children are implicated in the production of
sexually explicit imagery, it would be unreasonable to believe that no harm
has occurred.278 It is essential to acknowledge that child sexual abuse images
do not always arise out of situations of abuse themselves.279 It is quite possible
to be a victim of child pornography without ever even knowing it.280 If we
follow the reasoning in Ferber, the Court’s concern was exclusively on the
direct and indirect harm that pornography has on the psychological,
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reputational, and emotional well-being of child victims.281 These same harms
are present with morphed images as well.282 The circulation of morphed
images is simply another way of disguising exploitation and child abuse.283
The importance of free speech cannot be used to justify harm and abuse to
children.284 If we are a nation that refuses to protect the sanctity of our youth
under the guise of freedom, then we are inherently saying those freedoms are
more important than the lives of the people that they were designed to
protect.285 The Supreme Court’s guidance to lower courts on how to address
this issue uniformly is insufficient and current legislation has failed to cover
the plethora of issues that may arise from virtual child pornography.286 The
absence of clear precedent calls for judicial review at the Supreme Court level
that aligns with the current majority view of the circuits.287
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